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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The Malay is courteous and self-effacing. His world is full of
nobility and he is never far from his rajas and chiefs.
[Tihe vast majority of Malays are feudalist and wish to remain
so... It is the rulers who have in the past furnished, and
continue to present the Malay character of Malaya. Remove
them, and the last vestige of traditional Malaya would
disappear.
It is the old values and ways of life which have held the
Malays back, cutting them off from the changes continually
taking place in the rest of the country and the world.1
1969 was a turning point in postcolonial Malaysian history. In the May
elections of that year, class and ethnic tensions erupted into riots following
the relatively poor showing of the dominant Malay political party, the
United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Constitutional
government was suspended while a plan was devised to deal with the
social, economic, and political divisions within Malaysian society. The
following year saw the publication of The Malay Dilemma, quoted from
above. The author, Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, would go on to become
the dominant architect of late twentieth century Malaysia, becoming leader
of UMNO and Prime Minister of the country in 1981 In his book,
Mahathir tried to explain the central problem of Malaysian society—the
lagging socio-economic development of the indigenous Malays compared
1Mahathir bin Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma (Singapore: Times Books International,
1970), 116, 104, 113.
1
2to the immigrant Chinese—and diagnosed a problem within Malay society
itself. Mahathir’s “Malay dilemma” was the reluctance of Malays to assert
their rights because of the value they attached to politeness and
consideration for the rights of others. At the same time, he argued, due to
the economic dominance of the Chinese, Malays felt they were being
“dispossessed in their own land.”2 It was this unresolvable conflict,
according to Mahathir, which erupted, and would erupt again, into
violence.
Mahathir placed considerable blame on British colonial policies in
diagnosing the origins of this situation and to remedy it argued that the
Malays should be recognized as the “definitive” citizens of Malaysia in
terms of culture, language, and education. But his book was more
fundamentally concerned with Malay society itself. As suggested by the
quotations above1 Mahathir held the Malays responsible for their own
backwardness through their adherence to “old values.” Examples of this
argument abound in Mahathir’s critique. The Malay emphasis on
formality and ritual, he argued, was conservative, working against
innovation and inventiveness.3 Fatalism made the pursuit of worldly
goods and hard work low priorities.4 Malay disregard for time was
especially symptomatic of backwardness:
Disregard for time is seen in the careless way in which it is
spent. Doing nothing, or sipping coffee, or talking is almost a
Malay national habit When there is no awareness of time,
there can be no planning and work is never reliable... A
community which is not conscious of time must be regarded
as a very backward society. What is more, it will remain a
2Ibid., 3.
3fl,id., 157.
4Th1d., 158-59.
3backward society. It can never achieve anything on its own
and it can never be expected to advance and catch up with
superior time-conscious civilizations. There is no doubt that
the Malay failure to value time is one of the most important
handicaps to their progress.5
Further, Mahathir criticized Malays for displaying an “undeveloped”
attitude toward money. They understood and used money as a
“convenience,” rather than as capital for investment1 making them poor
businessmen.6
This critique was dearly aimed at bringing Malays into the capitalist
economy which was the legacy of colonial rule and large-scale Chinese
immigration. Indeed, Mahathir’s prescription for Malay progress was that
they become urbanized and educated and engage in specialized labor. Yet
strangely, Mahathir did not propose sweeping away the remnants of the
olc! order on his march to creating a capitalistic Malay society. Classifying
Malays as “feudalist,” he accepted their putative desire to remain so. He
thus placed the retention of an obsolete class structure—commoners
paying deference to rajas and chiefs—on the same level as adherence to
Islam, as an essential characteristic of Malay culture. To accommodate the
ensuing contradiction between feudalism and capitalism, Mahathir argued
rather unconvincingly that a feudal society, which he elsewhere
condemned as conservative, “can be a dynamic society if there is
dynamism at the top.” He found other virtues as well:
In itself the feudalist inclination of the Malays is not
damaging. It makes for an orderly law-abiding society. People
who could follow and observe an unwritten code of
behaviour are easily made to observe the written laws of a
country. People who accept that a society must have people of
5IbId., 162-63.
6pj 167-69.
4varying degrees of authority and rights easily make a stable
society and nation A revolution in such a society is unusual
unless led from above7
Why did Mahathir exempt the feudal class structure from his
condemnation of “old values” which consigned the Malays to
backwardness? The political utility of accepting the continued privilege of
an ascriptive ruling class should not be overlooked. At first, he may have
thought it would make his message seem less radical. (The book was
nevertheless banned) Later, the image of Malays as intrinsically obedient
to constituted authority provided an ideological basis for the centralization
of power in executive hands; Mahathir himself would lead a revolution
from above But it is also true that such a characterization of Malay society
was entirely commonplace. Mahathir merely reinforced a truism when he
wrote that typical Malay citizens relied on their “rajas and chiefs” and that
the Malay ruling classes “present thE Malay character ofMalaya.”
Noteworthy here is the sense that Malay identity relies on the visibility,
even the existence, of the Malay aristocracy and rulers. The consequences
of this commonly held view are suggested by the juxtaposition of the three
quotations above. Seeking to discard all other hindrances of traditional
culture, Mahathir’s acceptance of this essentialist position creates another
dilemma. Incongruously, the survival of a feudal class is necessary to
guarantee Malay social and cultural identity in a capitalist society.
This understanding of Malay society introduces the fundamental
problem explored in this study. Backward, traditional, and feudal have
been common descriptions of Malay society through much of the
twentieth century. In a broad sense, I will ask how that judgment became
7lbId., 170-71. Emphasis added.
5so common. More specifically, I will explore how a traditional ruling class
under British colonial rule “creates a world after its own image.”8 In trying
to survive colonialism, the Malay ruling class successfully universalized
its image and interests onto an entire society and left that society ill
equipped, in the early years of independence, to understand itself as capable
of change. It was this legacy that Mahathir denounced and this era that,
despite his theoretical forbearance towards the feudal remnants, he would
do much to end.
Preservation and Change under Colonial Rule
Direct British control over the Malay peninsula was only established in the
last quarter of the nineteenth century, but the power of Fax Britannica was
felt much earlier. The British acquired the island of Pinang in 1786 from
the Sultan of Kedah, established a trading entrepôt at Singapore in 1819,
and took possession of coastal Melaka from the Dutch by treaty in 1824.
These three possessions became crown colonies, known as the Straits
Settlements. After decades of informal empire—economic and military
influence emanating from Singapore—the British signed protectorate
treaties with several Malay rulers beginning in 1874. Their territories—
Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, and Perak—were united Into the
Federated Malay States (fMS) in 1896 Suzerainty over Kedah, Perlis,
Kelantan, and Trengganu was obtained from the Siamese by treaty in 1909.
Over the next decade, administrative control was advanced over these
8Much as Marx described the successful quest of the bourgeoisie, which of course provides
the larger context for the particular Ideological struggle under consideration here.
“Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in The Portable Karl Marx, ed. Eugene Kamenka (New
York: Viking PenguIn, 1983), 208.
6states and Johor, although they all successft1ly resisted incorporation Into
the FMS. Collectively, they were known as the Unfederated Malay States.
It was the central paradox of colonial rule in the Malay states that
while the economic, demographic, and political foundations of the
peninsula were transformed, the British sought to preserve Malay society
in traditional form—overwhelmingly rural, politically docile, and
deferential to traditional aristocracies and royalties. This would have been
a surprising outcome to any Englishman familiar with the area in the
early- to mid-nineteenth century. At that time British opinion was largely
hostile to Malay culture and wished to see it recede in favor of something
altogether different. British power represented the intrusion of the
industrialized world seeking raw materials, areas for investment, and free
trade. In pursuance of these things, the British demanded within their
sphere of influence what they called good government or civilization,
which was characterized by the rule of law, the creation of wealth through
capitalism, and free labor. In contrast, Malay culture was condemned as
offering mainly piracy, civil war, and slavery. The moral condemnation
heaped on the Malays is expressed in the following passage by R.O.
Winstedt, a British scholar-bureaucrat who was influential in defining
Malay culture in the twentieth century for both the British and the Malays:
As for home policy, both in Malacca and in modern Malay
States, there was no expenditure on roads or education or on
any of the ends of a modern civiised government. Instead of
a regular army there were only a collection of swashbuclders
and Indian mercenaries, attached to the court or to the
households of the greater chiefs. Justice was not reformative
but savage and deterrent. The only civil servants were police
and tax-collectors. Taxes before the British period were framed
7to extort revenue to enhance the wealth and importance of
ruler and chiefs.9
It was argued at the time that the extension of British control over these
states would be justified by the imposition of British values and the
consequent progress the Malays would make toward civilization,
Yet by the early 1880s, in the midst of the “forward movement,” a
new attitude was ascendant: as an oriental people, the Malays were
incapable of achieving the same heights of civilization as the British and
would probably never be able to govern themselves well. The British
would therefore provide the legal and economic structure necessary for the
territory to progress at a steady pace, regardless of the progress of the Malays
themselves. Within this legal structure, backed by military power, those
aspects of nineteenth century Malay society which hindered capitalism
were gradually eliminated. The economic structure facilitated a large influx
of Chinese laborers who would come to outnumber the Malay population
on the west coast.10 In essence, British control rendered the Malays first
harmless, then superfluous to the project of expanding capital. But at the
same time, the dynamics of the changing environment had not left Malay
society untouched. Malays had been adjusting for some time to the power
of the Straits Settlements by incorporating British ideas—such as
progress—into their own political practice, adoptions welcomed by the
9Rlchard Winstedt, The Matays: A Cultural History, 5th ed. (London: Roufledge and Kegan
Paul, 1961. First published 1947.), 77-78.
10By 1947, Malaya and other “Malaysians” (a category which meant indigenous people of
the region, including Indonesians and aborigines) constituted only 43.49% of the population
of British Malaya. Chinese made up 44.7% and Indians (including Sri Lankans) 10.25%.
Chinese and Indian immigration was connected with the exfractive and agricultural
Industries which grew under colonial rule, mainly tin mining and rubber planting. Although
they were considered transients by the British and the Malaya, by 1931 one-third of the
Chinese and one-fourth of the Indians were locally born.
8British even after Malays were no longer considered capable of full
civilized status. Less welcome were Malay efforts to benefit from the influx
of capital into the tin areas of the west coast. Appearing to result only in
more political rivalry and less stability, these developments were
interpreted by British observers as the very disintegration of Malay culture,
As British control was extended and consolidated in the 1880s and 1890s
and that culture was no longer a hindrance to capital, its demise became a
cause for concern. For if the Malays could no longer aspire to be English,
and this was what the inability to be civilized really meant, then they must
certainly remain Malay. Hence the British became nostalgic about Malay
culture and sought to restore and preserve it.
Hendxik Maler, writing about this attitudinal shift and its
consequences, describes the “strange contradiction [thatJ was created”:
innovation was to be connected with preservation in such a
way that the Malay identity would be safe-guarded in a world
that was rapidly changing as a result of economic
explorations, the introduction of all sorts of technical
achievements. The Malays should not change, but they
should.11
This contradiction echoes down through the years and forms the basis of
the most fundamental Malay dilemma. While Malay culture had grappled
with changing conditions in the mid-nineteenth century and had
consequently changed itself, in this new conception Malay identity could
only be recognized through a culture which was unchanging. R.J.
Wilkinson, founder of the colonial Malay educational system, wrote in
11Hendrik M.J. Maier, In the Center of Authority: The Malay Hikayat Merong
Mahauangsa (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1988), 51.
91906 in favor of a policy of “conservation combined with development.”’2
Education was meant to equip the Malays for participation in modern
society, but Wilkinson was nevertheless disturbed by the disruption to
traditional custom which ensued. He asked in 1925,
How long are these old Malay ceremonies likely to survive?
Not long, perhaps. The Malay is becoming educated; he is
commencing to believe in newspapers and books, and, above
all, he is beginning to have a good conceit of himself. Why
should he defer to the custodians Of these ancient customs,
old and ignorant people who cannot read and write? He does
not discard—he would not be a Malay if he did—but he
improves upon what went before and his improvements are
of a most deadly character There was once a Malay who tried
to introduce poetic elements into the official letter-writing of
the State Secretariat with which he was connected. The object
was laudable enough, but the fond expressions used by Malay
lovers seemed singularly out of place in official documents.
Anyone who attends a modern Malay ceremony, be it a
wedding or an ear-boring or even the installation of a prince,
will be struck by the mevitable confusion between the new
and the old. Not even Malay conservation will suffice to
preserve the old customs of the country from the
disintegrating influence of modern inprovements.’3
This impossible ideal—that Malays should preserve their
precolonial culture intact while becoming proficient in modern life—
permeated British writing on Malaya. One last example will throw further
light on the postcolonial dilemma. T.S. Adams was a British official
known for his pro-Malay sympathies; after World War U he became an
adviser to the Malay rulers. During the war Adams wrote a short
retrospective on “the Malay in Malaya” in which he discussed the
possibility of unifying the states of the peninsula, a goal long held by
12CIted In P.L. Burns, “Introduction,” Papers on Malay Subjects, ed. RJ. Wilkinson (Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971), 3.
13RJ. Wilkinson, Life and Customs. Part One. The Incidents of Malay Life (Kuala Lumpur:
Federated Malay States Government Press, 1925), 4748.
10
London and considered an inevitable stage in the progress of British
Malaya. Adams wrote positively of a “younger educated generation” which
“hopes to keep its culture and tradition and is looking for a way to preserve
them,” even while adapting to “a world which thinks in continents and
not in villages” On the future of Malaya, Adams made this curious
comment:
W can at least be sure that if we retain the confidence and
loyalty of Malays of all classes, and never weaken their culture
and way of life, they themselves will rncreasmgly look for
greater unity among themselves, and be ready to associate
with them peoples of other nationality, who are willmg to
share their loyalty and devotion to their land, and their
respect for their constituted authorities 14
Here we encounter the dilemma in two guises. First was the idea that if
Malays were protected from change, they would embrace change. Second,
Adams was strangely confident that immigrant commumties, who were
employed largely in export industries and urban occupations and who had
not under British rule been required to assimilate to Malay society, would’
nonetheless have developed an attachment to the land and a respect for
indigenous aristocracies. The unsoundness of this assumption only
underlines the increasing marginalization of Malay culture within British
Malaya. Nevertheless, Adams’ comment distills the essence of Malay
tradition as it was understood on the eve of decolonization: an agrarian
economic base and a feudal class structure.
14Theodore Adams, “The Malay in Malaya,” Asiatic Review 40, 141 (1944): 99-100.
11
Traditionalism as a Mechanism of Survival
Why was this particular distillation of Malay culture enshrined as the
definitive tradition in a period of rapid change in the Malay world?
Several reasons are discernible. During the nineteenth century, British
maritime power and the suppression of piracy had forced the Malaya to
shift from the sea to the land, resulting in a sharp diminution of power
and resources. As control of the regional trade passed out of Malay hands, a
more cosmopolitan and outward-looking tradition was accordingly less
accessible. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the influx of
immigrant labor to plantations and mines made Malaya a rice-deficient
area. In addition to importing rice from other parts of the empire, colonial
policy encouraged Malay rice production. The evolving needs of the
export-oriented economy thus dovetailed with what was construed as the
natural or traditional occupation of the Malays. finally, the British
mechanism for extending control over the Malay states differed sharply
from their practice in the Straits and in Burma. Protectorate treaties, rather
than direct rule, necessitated the retention of at least a remnant of a ruling
elite.
These factors alone do not explain the elaboration of a particular
idea of Malay tradition, but they do provide the preconditions. Indirect rule
especially supplied the structure for the project of preservation outlined
above. To trace the developments which led to Mahathir’s dilemma, we
must first clarify what is meant by tradition in the context of changing
circumstances, and then examine the Malay response to these colonial
preconditions.
12
In a period of change, the way things have lately been (and are no
more) is th.own into high relief. Once that way no longer exists, it can be
named—tradition—and becomes the beautiful thing that once was, longed
for all the more when change is rapid and dislocating. As in the Malay case,
there often arise movements to restore, hold fast, or return to tradition.
Such a thing is not possible in the sense intended, for as Joseph Levenson
reminds us in his work on intellectual continuity in China, the conditions
surrounding an idea have as much to do with its meaning as the idea
itself:
an idea changes in its persistence as well as in its rejection,
changes “in itself” and not merely in its appeal to the mind
This apparently paradoxical transformation-with-
preservation of a traditional idea arises ftom a change in its
world, a change in the thinker’s alternatives.15
As the British worked to restore Malay court culture, to preserve customs
and rituals of the past, the meaning of these traditions inevitably changed
because they operated not in the Malay world which had given rise to
them, but in a new world determined by British economic and political
power. Rituals which had once been the unconscious reflection of the
values and practices of a society were now consciousty invoked, and they
could not help but play a different role in the colonial context, no matter
what the intentions of those who recalled them. It is this element of
conscious invocation which is the difference between tradition and
15joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and its Modem Fate. The Pro&lem of Intellectual
Continuity fL.ondon: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), xlii. David Cannacline makes a
similar pomt when he comments on the anachronism of the British monarchy’s horse-drawn
coach after World War I: “by now, the monarchs’ mode of conveyance, already unusual and
grand In the preceding period, had become positively fairytale.” “The Context, Performance
and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the ‘Invention of Tradition’, c. 1820-
1977,” in The Invention of Tradition, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 142.
‘3
traditionalism. I will use the latter term throughout this study to mean the
conscious use of tradition—the appeal to, selection of, or even
reconstruction of old idioms and rituals—to serve present needs. In
Levenson’s words, “the conscious will to narrow the vision.., not the blind
plodding in the footsteps of the past, is the essence of traditionalism.”16
Two aspects of traditionalism will be evident in this study of Malay
society under colonial rule. The first was the need to be quite selective in
restoring Malay culture. As Benedict Anderson writes of nationalist
imaginings, so too in traditionalist imaginings, much had to have been
“already forgotten.””’ In order to remember their traditional culture,
Malays were required to have forgotten piracy, to have forgotten opium-
smoking rulers, to have forgotten surplus-appropriating chiefs. It was a
somewhat expunged tradition, one which, if it did not quite need to foster
capitalist relations within Malay society (for that was no longer necessary),
still could not be allowed to hinder them in the wider Malayan society. The
second important manifestation of traditionalism was the need to create
new ritual where none existed. Late nineteenth and early twentieth
century Malaya featured innovations in technology and political
institutions which had to be incorporated into the tradition being restored
and preserved. A Malay ruler, to cite only one example, would find
himself attending council meetings with the leading British, Malays, and
Chinese of his state. To contain this innovation—a meeting of colonial
officialdom, hereditary privilege, and foreign capital—within the vessel of
tradition, it was adorned with new ceremonial utilizing familiar cultural
16Levenson, Confucian China, xviii.
17Benedlct Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origtn and Spread of
Nationalism, rev. ed. (London and New York: Verso, 1991), 199-203.
14
material. This process can best be understood using Eric Hobsbawm’s
idea
of inventing tradition.18 In Hobsbawm’s view, the crucial thing
is not the
familiarity, but the new purpose to which familiarity is put: “the u
se of
ancient materials to construct invented traditions of a novel type f
or quite
novel purposes”19 Tie new tradition—ritual, custom, ceremonial—i
s
always in the service of change. It is invented to make change more
palatable for those experiencing it, not to limit the change or turn back
the
clock. In the Malay case, the novel purpose which new. tradition served
was both the legitimation of British power and the survival of the M
alay
ruling class.
Political changes imposed on the Malay ruling, class in the second
half of the nineteenth century were sweeping. Malay politics before
colonial rule was control of manpower embedded in a spiritual system
of
leadership Malay rulers represented “the organizing principle in the
Malay world” and their success was measured by graceful demeanor
and
the spiritual rewards they bestowed, as much as by their military
achievements,20 Successful rulers maintained large retinues of follow
ers
and slaves; good relations with more or less autonomous regional ch
iefs
guaranteed stability for peasant cultivators whose response to oppress
ive
‘8”Invented tradition’ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally gover
ned by overtly or
tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inc
ulcate certain
values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies
continuity with
the past In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity w
ith a
suitable historic past” Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction Inventing Traditions,” in Th
e
Invention of Traditton, 1 Chve Kessler uses this approach to analyze colo
nial and
contemporary Malay political culture in “Archaism and Modemity/’ in F
ragmented Vision:
Cutture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia, ed, Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh Ko
k Wah
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992), 133-157.
“Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” 6.
20See A.C. Milner, Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial Rule (Tucson,
Ariz.: University of Arizona Press, 1982).
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leadership would be to flee to the orbit of another chief. In this agrarian
setting, rulers did their best to monopolize trade and appropriate economic
surplus, because the role of wealth was to further political-spiritual power.
The British, more and more forcefully as the century wore on, demanded
the protection of property, free labor, and political security for the
movement of capital. These things the Malay system could not provide;
they were simply not part of the Malay world on the eve of colonial rule.
As the British lost their reluctance to intervene directly on the peninsula,
the Malay system was condemned and alternatives for the Malay elite
narrowed.
The problem facing Malay leaders then was how to survive the
surge of British power that threatene4 to sweep them away culturally, as
well as economically and politically. The idioms of Malay political life—
rigid class hierarchy, peasants ruled by ascriptive nobiities, royal
ceremonial of indigenous, Hindu, and Islamic origins, and rulers who
embodied spiritual more than military power—all seemed likely to be lost
in the British demand for rationality in administration and the regular
collection of taxes. In this context, the shift in British priorities from
civilization to preservation created a second chance for the Malay political
idiom and encouraged the mechanism of elite survival to be
traditionalism. Very quickly the use of traditional forms created suitable
versions of Malay rituals, politics, and social relations which were
articulated within colonial structures of authority. New rituals of state, the
glorification of Malay royalty, and the bureaucratization of Malay
aristocrats shielded colonial reality from peasants who understood
themselves to be living in Malay states, as defined primarily by the
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presence of their rulers. The incorporation of British elements and officials
into Malay ritual—”the inøvitable confusion between the new and the
old” condemned by Wilkinson—usefully subordinated Malay culture to
British imperial power. This articulation of tradition also directly served
the Malay ruling class in each state, especially the rulers, who were
complicit in the project, by giving them roles in the colonial state and
preserving their privileged position in Malay society. Traditionalism in
colonial Malaya should be understood, then, neither as the persistence in
old ideas and idioms by an elite resisting change, nor as the imposition of a
fabricated tradition by a colonial power. Instead, traditionalism in Malay
society represented thedynamic interaction of British power and priorities,
including the urge to preserve, with the effort of the Malay ruling class to
survive in the new order.
The conse4uences of traditionalism—a reified version of Malay
tradition capped by seemingly inherent deference to a hereditary ruling
class—were evident to Mahathir in 1969, although he mistook its
manifestations for essential characteristics of Malay society. It is the
purpose of this study to illuminate that misunderstanding by
demonstrating how the Malay ruling class used traditionalism to safeguard
its privileged position through two crucial transitions which featured
fundamental change in the way political power was exercised. The first, the
central issues of which are outlined above, was the transition into colonial
rule, which I trace by analyzing selected Malay-British interactions in the
late nineteenth century and by focusing thematically on the
transformation of the ruling class after colonial rule was consolidated. The
second transition took place after World War U and involved not just the
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Malay ruling class and British colonial officials, but now also “the people.”
The new idiom of power was mass politics and the language it spoke was
the language of nationalism. In this transition into the postcolonial era, I
will focus on the events known as the Malayan Union crisis of 1945-1946,
in which the restored colonial state tried to impose a unified political
structtre on the Malay states and which witnessed the first mass
mobilization of peninsular Malays in opposition to that plan under the
leadership of Malay aristocrats. The resulting political party, the United
Malays National Organization (UMNO), went on to claim the mantle of
mainstream Malay nationalism and has led every Malaysian government
since independence in 1957.
The Ideological Struggle Underlying Nationalism
William Roff’s now classic Origins of Malay Nationalism was a landmark
of the first generation of postcolomal scholarship Concerned to write from
the colonized, rather than colonizer’s, point of view and making extensive
use of Malay-language sources, Roff’s aim was “to study the effects of
British colonial protectorate control and of consequent social, political, and
economic change.”2’ His ground-breaking study debunked the notion that
Malay society before World War U had been thoroughly stagnant and that
political change had begun only with the anti-Malayan Union campaign.22
Still, an effective prohibition on political activity, on the traditionalistic
grounds that Malays should leave politics to their rulers, had indeed
21Wllhiam R. Roll, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan
Universitl Malaya, 1980, originally publIshed 1967), xlv
22For the latter view, see, for example, Ishak bin Tadm, “Dato Onn and Malay
Nationalism 1946-51,” Journal of Southeast Asian Htstory 1 (March 1960).
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prevented the emergence of what was recognized in other colonial
territories as popular nationalism—movements which sought the
removal of the colonial power while simultaneously reconceptualizing
society. British officials in Malaya, on the lookout for the emergence of
nationalism, had hoped it would take the form of a pan-Malay movement
which would n’ake easier the administrative unification of the peninsula,
if only the loyalty of the Malay ruling class could be retained. We have
seen this in the wartime reminiscence of T.S. Adams, who anticipated a
pro-colonial nationalism among the educated elite23 This unity in ruling
class outlook, which was mildly encouraged by the educational grid of
British Malaya, was slow to appear, for like political activity, it was caught
in the conflicting demands of change versus preservation. Nevertheless,
there was Malay attention to the idea of the nation before the war. Roff
telisus:
The concept of a Malay “nation,” though much discussed by
the press and the intelligentsia, existed less as an ideal polity
than as a defensive community of interest against further
subordination to or dependence on “foreigners,” in particular
against the domiciled Asian communities now so firmly
entrenched in the states and seftlernents.24
The dominant response to this situation—that of the aristocratic
bureaucracy and even of the small non-aristocratic intelligentsia—was to
call for strengthened British protection of Malay special privilege vis-à-vis
the foreign communities in the realms of education and administrative
appointment. Significantly, this response did not demand control of the
state, only the enhancement of privileged access to it. In fact, the colonial
23”There has been none of those growing pains which have shown themselves in some
countries in hostility to the administration” Adams, “The Malay In Malaya,” 99
24Roff, Matay Nationalism, 235.
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state was relied upon to tee the place of the Malays while they
modernized and “caught up with” the other communities. The most
vitriolic criticism of the British in the prewar period was reserved for those
moments when this guarantee was thought to be in danger.
A recent study by Ariffin Omar brings the discussion of Malay
politics into the postwar period. Ariffin examines the change in status
undergone by Malay rulers immediately after the war and argues that the
community, bangsa Metayu, supplanted the rulers as the focus of Malay
identity and loyalty. Ariffin terms this new focus “Malayism—defined as
the belief that the interests of the bangsa Melayu must be upheld over all
else.”25 Ariffin does not call this nationalism, and it is not hard to see why.
Malayism merely advances Malay interests against those of other
communities. It is characterized by anti-Chinese chauvinism and the idea
of Malay special privilege. Once again, the colonial state may be called
upon to play a role in upholding Malay interests; anti-colonialism is not
intrinsic to Malayism. This phenomenon is clearly a child of the plural
society. Can either Ariffin’s “Malayism” or Roff’s “defensive community of
interest” be considered an “origin” of Malay nationalism?
Ethnic identity, such as both of these rest on, may form a primary
basis for national identity. At least one scholar has argued that despite
geopolitical realities, a pan-Indonesian identification based on cultural,
linguistic, and religious commonaliUes was the basis of a Malay “nation of
intent” for much of the twentieth century.26 But most students of
25jjffi1 Omar, Bangsa Melayu. Malay Concepts of Democracy and Community 1945-1950
Kua1a Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1993), 52.
£6Rugm Sani, “Melayu Raya as a Malay ‘Nation of Intent,” in The Nascent Malaysian
Society: Developments, Trends and Problems, ed. H.M. Dahlan (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan
Ankopologi dan Sodologi, Unlversih Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1976)
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nationalism also point to self-determination1 or sovereignty, as a
fundamental aspiration of every nation-in-the-making. Ernest Geilner
calls nationalism the principle “which holds that the political and the
national tmit should be congruent.”27 In Anderson’s conception, the
nation became a visible model “available for pirating by widely different,
and sometimes unexpected hands.” Since that model was pioneered in the
American and French Revolutions, crucial components were the
sovereignty of the national state and political rights for members of the
nation.28 Popular, anti-colonial nationalism reflects these twin purposes
when it seeks the ouster of the colonial power through mobilization of
national citizens-in-the-making. It is true that the elite leadership of
nationalist movements in turn generate their own “discourse of order,”
often to prevent the emergence of socially revolutionary movements,29
but they must still hold out promise of a better life for citizens in the -
postcolonial world. This they do by appeal to popular sovereignty: the state,
like the nation, will belong to all of us. This dynamic of state and popular
sovereignty was not present in the political aspirations of what Roff called
the administrators—English-educated bureaucrats largely of aristocratic
background. Before the war, this bureaucratic elite tried to protect its
privileged access to a state which could not easily be imagined as a national
Malay state, ruling as it did over disparate groups of Malays, Chinese,
Indians, and Europeans. Nor did it see beyond the traditionalistic
formulation of its own society in which most Malays were “peasants,” not
27Ernest Cetiner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1.
28Anderson, Imagined Communities, 7,67.
29g Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World A Derivative
Discourse (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
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“citizens.” Criticism of the colonial state, as Roil tells us, “took the form of
special pleas for continued Malay privilege, not of anti-colonial
nationalism.” When the war broke out in 1939, conservative Malay
associations dominated by this bureaucratic elite declared their loyalty to,
and support of, the British Empire in its time of need.30
It is not surprising, then, that independence, elections, or any other
manifestation of state or popular sovereignty were not immediate aims of
the aristocrat-led political movement which emerged after the war to
oppose the Malayan Union, to form UMNO, and to go on, more than ten
years later, to lead the country to independence. How can it be that UMNO,
leader of every national government of independent Malaysia, was not a
nationalist movement at its inception? I will argue in the latter part of this
study that these aristocrats-turned-bureaucrats-turned-politicians came late
to the nationalist agenda because they had crucial ideological “repair” work
to do after the war. This work Involved the restoration and rehabilitation
of a tradition which would guarantee ruling class survival in yet another
new order. The Japanese wartime occupation of Malaya had shattered the
traditionalistic Malay world in many ways, the most important of which
were the introduction of mass politics, the decline in the status of the
rulers, and the ambiguous standing of Malay bureaucrats whose
continuing service to the colonial state (now Japanese) won them the
wrath of the Chinese resistance. In the wake of the occupation, colonial
restoration could not stop unprecedented violence between the Malays and
the Chinese; the seemingly peaceful plural society could not be put back
together again. The restored colonial state then made its own assault on its
30Roff, Malay Nationalism, 24041.
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erstwhile allies with the Malayan Union proposals. This new
constitutional arrangement would accomplish the long-sought
administrative unity of British Malaya at the expense of Malay ruling class
privilege. The Malay rulers would lose their sovereign status and become
religious figureheads. Access to positions in the state, and all future
political rights, would accrue to Chinese and Indian residents—the so-
called “Malayans”—in open competition with the “backward” Malays.
finally, the war had allowed a small group of radical Malay intellectuals to
make the leap into political mass action, resulting in the establishment of
the Malay Nationalist Party fM, or Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya)
shortly after the occupation came to an end and well before the aristocrats
had conceptualized any response to the new situation. This party hilly
embraced nationalism, and drew inspiration as well as rhetoric and models
from the Indonesian revolution occurring just across the poorly patrolled
Straits of Melaka. The MNP’s constant attention to the Indonesian
revolution in its affiliated newspapers also served notice to the ruling class
that its days might be numbered.
forced to defend itself against both colonial state and nationalist
rivals, the ruling class waged an ideological battle in the immediate
postwar period which would determine the shape of the postcolonial
state.31 Accepting mass politics as the new idiom of power, the aristocrats
established a political party (UMNO) and became self-described “right-
wing” politicians. But they also endeavored to bring traditionalism into
the political era. By protesting the Malayan Union within the framework
311n Gramscian terms, the Malay ruling class was engaged in a “war of position” not only
against the colonial state, but more fundamentally against the nationalist threat from
below.
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of colonial discourse—British “fair play” and the protection of the
indigenous culture—conservative politicians successfully established
ideological continuity with the prewar colonial past. Then UMNO used the
new mass politics to mobilize Malays in support of a traditional Malaya
which had emerged during colonial rule, Specifically, the Malays rallied in
support of the degraded rulers, whose actions in agreeing to the new
constitution could be interpreted as either the result of British
intimidation or as selling out their people. UMNO publicly focused on the
former, while privately threatening the rulers with the implications of the
latter. The restoration of the rulers with the withdrawal of the Malayan
Union established for postwar politics the identity of the Malay ruling class
with the survival of the Malays.
In order to secure its position, however, UMNO found that tradition
was not enough. In yet another spin on the idea of “conservation
combined with development,” conservative politicians began to
incorporate the language of nationalism into their discourse and
simultaneously the tenets of traditionalistic Malay culture into
nationalism. The process may be glimpsed in the use of the terms bangsa
and kebangsaan before and after the war. Bangsa is an old word meaning
descent group, race, or nation (in a pre-modern sense). Kebangsaan entered
the public discourse in 1940 meaning national. It was one of a number of
grammatical innovations which differed somewhat in meaning or
connotation from the root from which it derived. Another example was
kerakyatan (citizenship) from rakyat (originally subject), which appeared in
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1941.32 Like kerakyatan, kebangsaan took an old idea or category and
infused it with a contemporary political meaning, in this case the whole
package of rights and duties attendant upon modern nationhood.
Conservative Malay associations had refused to embrace the word when
they met in 1940 for fear of upsetting the traditional order.33 By 1946, after
the establishment of the Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya fMNP)
conservatives began using the term as well, although conservative usage
disarmed it of much of its potency by simply ignoring its new
connotations. According to Ariffin:
since the bangsa Metayu was the focal point of identity and
loyalty, the conservatives did not see the need to define a
Malay nation, a definition which would entangle them in
such thorny issues as nationality, nationalism, democracy.. 34
I would reverse Ariffin’s emphasis here: avoiding a definition of the Malay
nation was not merely an outcome, but the very purpose of focusing on
the demands of the Malay bangsa in the colonial setting. Using kebangsaan
as if it issued unproblematically from bangsa served to silence the
troublesome questions of nationality, nationalism, and democracy in a
multi-bangsa society. This reading of kebangsaan implied that Malays
could take their place in the modern world of nation-states without
fundamental change to their society. Along with the rehabilitation of
tradition, this appropriation of the language of nationalism for a
conservative agenda was responsible for the triumph of the Malay ruling
32Mohd. Taib Osman, The Language of the Editorials in Malay Vernacular Newspapers Up
to 1941 (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1966), 22.
33See “Minit Persidangan Persatuan-Persatuan Melayu Semenanjung Tanah Melayu yang
Kedua,” in Tokoh-Tokoh Tempatan dan Dokumen-Dokurnen datam $ejarah Malaysia, ed.
Cheah Boon Kheng (Pulau Pinang: Universiti Sairts Malaysia, 1982).
34Ariffln, Bangsa Metayu, 197.
25
class in the political transition of the 1940s. The legacy of that triumph can
be read in Mahathir’s critique of a “backward” society in 1970, but also in
his acceptance that the Malay world is “full of nobility.”
The Study and the Sources
Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the colonial period before World War II and the
development of traditionalism as an important force in colonial Malay
society. Chapter 2 demonstrates three fundamental ways in which Malay
society was changed by the onset of British rule. These changes—in the
meaning and purpose of government, the geo-political definition of the
Malay state, and the political economy of leadership—represented nothing
less than a paradigmatic shift in the fundamental categories and values of
Malay politics. This paradigm shift was a necessary precursor to the
restoration and preservation of Malay tradition which followed, for t
reordered the Malay political world and subordinated it to British political
and economic priorities. This chapter will also discuss how the
contradiction between preservation and progress began to create a cleavage
in the ruling class between royalties and aristocracies and resulted in the
partial bureaucratization of the latter. Chapter 3 focuses wholly on the
royal embrace of the preservationist project, which is related to the
problem of centralization of power in nineteenth century Malay politics.
Traditionalism proved useful to Malay rulers in their continuing
competition with chiefs. The apotheosis of the royalty is demonstrated by
innovations in three areas of royal life: personal style, public ceremonial,
and public visibility. Finally, this chapter argues that the articulation of
new royal ritual, ostensibly the strengthening of Malay court culture, just
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as importantly reaffirmed British paradigms and British superiority over
Malay society as a whole.
The sources for the first part of the dissertation are largely British
colonial records and despatches, and secondarily, British scholarly accounts
of Malay culture and politics. These sources are used to demorstrate the
triumph of the new political paradigm, as well as the way traditionalistic
constructions of Malay culture were presented as authentic restorations of
the Malay past and were subordinated to British imperial power. Just as
importantly, Singapore’s despatches to London during the period of the
“forward movement” usually contained voluminous attachments seeking
to justify local officials’ actions The attachments often included
translations of letters from Malay rulers and chiefs to British officia1s In
this way, and less directly through reported conversations and transcribed
int&Views, we can see how Malays themselves sought to manage the
transition to British colonial rule. Examination of Anglo-Malay encounters
will reveal Malay chiefs at times resisting the new paradigm and at other
times incorporating British ideas into their own discourse to further their
political power in the new order.
Chapter 4 serves as a chronological bridge to the postwar period. It
discusses changes in colonial society which threatened the viability of the
traditionalist approach to the Malay role in Malaya. The effect of the
Japanese occupation on the ruling class is examined, asis the effort of the
colonial state to reestablish its authority after the war. New parameters for
acceptable political speech and action that developed in the immediate
postwar period provided the conditions for the development of mass
politics and the ensuing struggle among rulers, UMNO, and the MNP.
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Chapters 5 through 7 discuss the transition from colonialism into
the era of decolonization. I focus on political discourse in the years 1945-47,
a period roughly concurrent with the British Military Administration and
the Malayan Union. Soon afterwards, the Chinese-led Malayan
Communist Party began armed struggle and the colonial government’s
counterinsurgency measures ended the relatively free political discourse of
the immediate postwar years. Chapter 5 focuses on the threat posed by the
Malayan Union to the ruling class and demonstrates how the aristocracy
pursued its interests at the expense of both Malay rulers and Malay radicals.
tJMNO led an unprecedented barrage of press criticism of the rulers in the
name of political progress, securing for conservative politicians the status
of protectors of the Malays. By updating the tradition of loyalty, UMNO
gained control of the meaning of the rulers, and thus of tradition, for the
postcolorüal future. At the same time, UMNO and ts press organs
successfully defeated the challenge of the Malay nationalists’ drive to
depose the rulers altogether, transforming the rulers into symbols of Malay
survival. The contradiction between preservation and progress was
resolvedwith the ascendancy of the chiefs within the ruling class.
Chapter 6 focuses on the contest between UMNO and the MNP. It
argues that UMNO needed more than control over the meaning of the
rulers to secure hegemony in the newly politicized postwar atmosphere. In
this period, UMNO successfully developed a nationalist credibility through
four types of political practice: the intersection of the prescriptive mode of
traditional manuscript culture with the new political propaganda, an
updating of the Malay hero in the person of Onn bin Jaafar, the attachment
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of national symbols to party identity, and the appropriation of militaristic
youth culture from the radical parties.
Chapter 7 indicates the direction UMNO would take nationalism
once it had established itself as the mainstream party and the only
legitimate voice of the Malays. UMNO redeployed ideas with traditional
resonance—inity, loyalty, treason, sovereignty—to construt a particular
kind of nationalism which both demobilized its Malay critics and deflected
calls for independence, a traditionalist and de-poifticized nationalism.
Along with archival sources, party documents, and political
memoirs, contemporary newspaper editorials provide the main source for
the second half of the study. Political discourse in the Malay press has long
been used as a source of historical data about Malay political activity, as a
measure and celebration of the emergent nationalist movement, and, most
recently, as a tool for analyzing changes in Malay political ideas “which
have long been submerged beneath narrative histories of the 1940s.”35 In
the spirit of this last approach, I have treated political writing of the period
19454947 as a public transcript of the debate on important political issues of
the day. The public discourse found in daily newspapers and weekly and
monthly journals reflects the attempt of the literate and politically active to
shape public opinion and political practice—the new idiom of power in the
postwar world. My examination of this public transcript will address
questions of medium, style, and readership and their effect on the new
political discourse. As the exchange of ideas found in these publications is
part of an ideological battle fought under the conditions of late colonial
351b1d., vi.
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rule, I will also describe the role played by colonial censorship in setting
parameters for legitimate political expression.
Many publications of the period under consideration were short-
lived and only scattered issues are housed in the Arkib Negara Malaysia
[Malaysian National Archives]. In cases where I have been unable to view
the original, I have had to rely on the meticulous monitoring of the press
by the colonial government. Newspaper editorials were monitored daily by
Malay, Chinese, and Indian government employees who prepared English
summaries and translations. Extant newspapers were consulted wherever
possible, and I have relied most heavily on those publications which I
consulted directly. The press summaries were very useful, however, in
ascertaining the range of Malay opinion being published and the types of
arguments put forward. I have indicated in the notes where my reference
is to a press summary by including the ANM file number.
Chapter 2
BRITISH POWER AND ThIE REORDERING OF MALAY POLITICS
British power in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries transformed the
demographic, economic, political, and cultural landscapes of the Malay
peninsula. This chapter analyzes one aspect of that transformation: the way
the Malay ruling class and Malay politics were changed as a result of the
new configuration of power. The most evident and most commented on
change in the practice of leadership was the bureaucratization of the Malay
aristocracy which started in earnest in most states after the turn of the
century. I will argue here that an ideological conversion was under way
long before that point, the groundwork being laid in the decades of British
paramountcy and in transitions to colonial rule. In the following pages I
will show how British power and Malay response reshaped three
important aspects of the conceptual framework in which Malay politics
operated—assumptions about the meaning and purpose of government,
the definition and shape of the political unit referred to as the “Malay
state,” and the relation of economic resources to political leadership. These
fundamental shifts in paradigm set the stage for the survival of the Malay
ruling class not only through colonial rule but into the postcolonial period
as well.
The following sections examine selected episodes in Anglo-Malay
history through which it is possible to see the gradual acceptance by the
Malay elite of a British discourse on government and politics. In the first
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stage, British power is understood as that of an overlord, in indigenous
terms, or as the paramount power, as the British termed themselves. Up
until direct intervention in the western states, British officials advanced
the virtues of good government, or civilization, whenever the economic
and military power of Singapore gave them access to a local political
incident. At this stage, the successful demonstration of good government
by a native state consisted of taking British advice, not inviting in other
Europeans, “opening up” territory to investment and settlement, and
keeping the peace. The existence of slavery, “arbitrary” justice, and
decentralized rule by powerful district chiefs was still largely accepted.
In the next sectior, I will discuss the advancing of the British
discourse through direct intervention in the Malay states. With
intervention, the administration of British justice and the centralization of
revenue collection became priorities, thus bringing the colonial power
head to head with Malay resistance. The outcome of these struggles
brought the affirmation of the new style of government and the
reorientation of elite energies to finding political advantage in the new
order, which was further entrenched with the establishment of a new
political economy.
In the third section, I will examine another effect of successful
intervention: the standardization of the political units themselves. This
process resulted from the economic imperative to survey and map the
land preparatory to capital investment It was also integral to the triumph
of British political definitions over indigenous ideas of sovereignty. In the
final section I will discuss the bureaucratization of the Malay elite, not as a
transformation of the first order, but rather as a phenomenon resulting
from its prior ideological conversion as well as from a paradox in British
attitudes towards the Malays.
Britain as Paramount Power
Throughout the nineteenth century, the power of Singapore made the
British the paramount power in the Malay peninsula. This meant that,
from the 1820s, the independent Malay states “tended to look on the
[English East India] Company as the arbiter of local politics to whom they
reprted the accession of new Rulers, and appealed for help to settle
internal disputes as well as quarrels with their neighbors.”1 When the
Straits Settlements (Singapore, Melaka1 and ?enang) were transferred from
Company to crown authority in 1858, government policy still did not allow
direct intervention, so Britain remained more of a regional overlord than
a colonial po er. Theperiod under eathinaUon here the i87Os was
transitional time in which power was starting to be expressed in more
direct ways. But the older form of paramountcy was still very much in
evidence as the difficulties of direct intervention elicited caution from
London.
As overlord, the British projected their authority, emanating from
Queen Victoria, in a way that was deemed understandable, yet superior, to
Malay authority:
It has always been the object of this government to impress
the NaUve Rajas and people with the idea that Her Majesty is
a Raja very much above all Malay Rajas, therefore it was long
ago decided not to style Her Majesty by any of the expressions
of respect common amongst Malay Rajas, but that Her
1Funlce Thio, British Policy in the Malay Peninsula, 1880-1910. Vol. 2. The Southern and
Central States (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1969), xvi.
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Majesty should be Ici own to them as Her Majesty Queen
Victoria yang mulia dan yang mulia besar: Her Majesty Queen
Victoria, utmost noble and the greatest... more often without
the prefix of Her Majesty, which the natives naturally do not
understand. I kow of no earthly title greater than this one,
and it is the one by which Her Majesty is known and respected
all over the Peninsula.
Flowing from the Queen, British authority was projected as a powerful
personage, a projection which allowed it to operate as an overlord in the
Malay world, where power was exercised in a personal way:
In the same way we call the British Government British
Guberment Or Guberment Inggris as something so different
from the Malay perintahan... as to be altogether inadequately
described by that word. But the real point.., is that the “British
Government” is here spoken of in its “personal” character,
and in this sense the word perintahan is inadvisable, this
word meaning simply the act of governing or the authority of
a ruler The “British Government” is now as well known and
understood in the Settlements and the Peninsula as the old
kumpni (Company) of the Indian Government’s days.2
By playing the role of overlord, the British employed the local idiom
of power relations and exercised their paramountcy in symbolic as well as
practical ways. Sometimes a practical function incorporated ritual
significance, such as the tour of a highly ranked official, which gathered
information about land and population while symbolically inscribing the
realm. The Malays, being comfortable with this idiom, used it deftly to
move at times close to and at other times away from British power. The
Bendahara of Pahang, for cxample, made a point of receiving Governor
Jervois when he toured the east coast states in 1875, at a time when Pahang
was being reimbursed for expenses incurred fighting in Selangor. Despite
the ruler’s illness, “the Governor was received most cordially by the
2Frap Sweftenham to Governor Jervois, 27 December 1876. CO 273/90.
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Bendahara, who was surrounded by many chiefs and some three hundred
Malays, sitting in solemn condave in and about the Balei or Council
Hall.”3 In 1882, however, the expansionist Governor Weld, draft treaty in
hand, had to postpone his proposed visit because, as the Bendahara wrote,
“the entrance reception hail which we are preparing is not yet finished,
and so how can we receive our friend?”4
Overlords did not always get their way. But the preponderance of
British power nevertheless caused the meaning of local idioms gradually
to shift according to British usage, introducing new elements and
requirements which would eventually transform Malay political life. This
can be seen in the way British concerns crept into the discourse of those
Malay chiefs who had to deal with them. The central concern was the
nature of government, the British promoting the idea that good
government was an active institution which had legitimate goals to
pursue in society. The British ideology of good government was not
compatible with Malay politics, of course, The practice of leadership in
Malay society, involving grants of revenue-producing areas, maintenance
of armed followers, kerah (corvee labor), and debt-bondage, dashed with
the British agenda of “opening up the country” to foreign investment and
increasing revenue at the disposal of the central authority. The British
expressed the difference in moral terms, as between oppression and
barbarity, on the one hand, and good government and civilization on the
other.
3Straits Tim, 31 July 1875. CO 882/3.
4C0273/116,
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Good government was marked fundamentally by the expansion of
capitalist economic relations. The surveying of borders, making of maps,
laying of roads, and collection of revenue would all eventually be projects
of state governments in the Malay peninsula. But these projects depended
upon what was understood as the spread of English justice, often referred
to simply as civilization, which consisted of guaranteeing property rights,
protecting trade, and laying the groundwork for the proletarianization of
the Malay peasantry—ending arbitrary or excessive extraction of goods and
labor and abolishing slavery. This pursuit of justice undercut the
traditional Malay political economy.5 The right of the ruling class simply to
appropriate stood in the way of capitalism; the labeling of this right as
barbaric and oppressive would signal a paradigmatic shift in social and
economic relations.
Representing the paramount power, British officials found a variety
of opportunities to advance their ideology of civilization against native
practices. The east coast tour of Governor Jervois in 1875 offers a case in
point. At this time, the British were beginning to intervene directly on the
west coast, but still knew little of the remainder of the peninsula, including
those states under Siamese suzerainty. The Straits Times, voice of British
business interests in Singapore, applauded the Governor for establishing
relations with these Malay rulers and hoped the rulers would be
encouraged to visit Singapore as well:
So, only, can confidence be established, liberal and enlarged
views instilled into the conservative native mind, trade
flourish, resources become developed, and the prosperity of
5See Jomo Kwame Sundaram, A Question of Class: Capital, the State, and Uneven
Development in Malaya (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988), chapter 1.
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the native States as well as of these Settlements be increased
and ensured.6
Jervois himself was quite direct on these points when he met the
Bendahara of Pahang:
During the course of this interview I explained to him the
advantages which would be derived from a good system of
taxation and collection of revenues, and informed him that
the British Government was anxious that the resources of his
State should be opened up, in order that the natural wealth of
the country might be developed, the prosperity of himself and
his people increased, and trade improved thereby. I also
informed him that I would be ready to assist him with advice,
and to instruct him as to the best mode of attaining these
ends.7
The Bendahara took advantage of the governor’s ignorance of Malay
politics in order to fend off this tentative advance; he professed to have no
power to accept such an offer and politely promised to consult his chiefs.
The British were far more successful in spreading their ideology
where they had more influence, that is, closer to Singapore. The remainder
of this section will examine two instances in which British authority was
exercised in Malay affairs. In both these episodes, concerning the first stage
of the Negeri Sembilan consolidation (the Sri Menanti confederation) and
Johor’s annexation of Muar, direct intervention was prohibited by London,
so the paramount power employed the local idiom. Yet in both cases the
British successfully began to redefine the meaning of that idiom, and
Malay politics began to adjust to the new meaning.
The Negeri Sembilan was an area of Minangkabau settlement in the
hinterland of Melaka controlled by territorial chiefs (undang) who had,
6Sfraits Times, 31 July 1875. CO 882/3.
7co 882/3.
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from 1773, agreed unanimously on rulers (Yam Tuan Besar) descended
from previous rulers originally invited from Minangkabau.8 In 1869,
however, the four undang (of Rembau, Sungai Ujung, Johol, and Jelebu)
could not agree on a successor, one backing Ahmat, a son of the late Yam
Tuan, and the others backing Antah, a son of the previous Yam Tuan.
Civil war over the issue led to the establishment of a British Residency in
Sungai Ujung in 1874, during the first wave f intervention, but the
subsequent failure of the first Perak Residency (discussed below) led the
Colonial Office to insist on more indirect means of settling the Negeri
Sembilan dispute. The Straits government eventually solved the problem
by backing the more popular Antah and managing the reconstitution of
some of the Negeri Sembilan districts into a confederation which agreed,
first, to keep the peace amongst themselves and with the districts which
had not joined, and, second, to refer all disputes to Maharaja Abu Bakar of
Johor. Certain elements in the changing idiom of government and politics
can be discerned in this episode.
The most important concerns the advancing of the discourse of good
government. The Datu Kiana of Sungai Ujung accepted a British Resident
in 1874 for the most conventional of reasons; the British were willing to
recognize him as the legitimate ruler over his rival, the Datu Bandar. He
couched his request in terms of the existing idiom of overlord-vassal
relations by requesting protection. The Datu Kiana wrote to the Lt.
Governor of Melaka, relating how he had tried to raise the British flag, “so
as to be under the protection of the Great Governor,” but was prevented by
8This very abbreviated account Is based on Thio, British Policy, xxl-xxvi. She gives further
references.
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the Datu Bandar. “If we raise the flag, perhaps the Datu Bandar will attack
our place...” He also requested rice. But then he went on to betray new
influences:
And further we would like very much to have our country
populous, and a good straight road for traders to come and go
on, so that the country may be populous, and doing good to
all men. And further, we would like very much for an officer
from the Great Governor, who can give good advice, so that
we may do what is right under that protection.9
Johor’s mediation for the British with the new confederation further
advanced the new discourse. Johor was the local exemplar of good
government at this time. According to Harry Ord, Governor from 1867 to
1873, Abu Bakar was the reason for this:
In his tastes and habits he is an English gentleman, as a ruler
he is anxious to promote in every way the advancement and
civilization of his people and is the only Rajah m the whole
peninsula or adjoining States, who rules in accordance with
the practice of civilized nations.10
More concretely, Abu Bakar, following his father Ibrahim, fully accepted
the British as overlord in the Malay peninsula, embraced the discourse of
good government by opening up his territory to foreign investment, took
British advice, and, by being the first to do these things, achieved a favored
position as mediator in the period before direct intervention.11
Abu Bakar’s mediation allowed the Singapore government to dictate
the terms of the Negeri Sembilan confederation, while appearing to
conform to the dictates and idiom of local politics. Here is Governor
Jervois on his initial meeting with the chiefs and the Maharaja:
9C0 882/3.
10C0 273/94.
See the next chapter for a fuller discussion of these rulers.
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Having i ormed His Highness of my wish to see the Chiefs
of the States in question, if they could be induced to come in,
he sent some of his officers up the Muar River by Luigga and
Sejamet to endeavour to communicate with them, and, with
a view of arranging a settlement of affairs. The result of this
mission was that these Chiefs, accompanied by some eighty
followers, many of high rank, came to Johore.12
Following the establishment of the confederation, Abu Bakar would
continue to mediate between the chiefs and the British. The Negeri
Sembilan chiefs may have thought that his mediation would preserve the
local idiom by forming a buffer between themselves and the alien British:
I ascertained that Tunku Antah was desirous of
communicating with this government generally through the
Maharajah of Johore, he stated that he did not so well
understand the ways of Europeans.. .
Actually, rather than a buffer, Abu Bakar would act as a conduit for the
transmission of the British discourse on good government, a discourse
which was ultimately to undermine Malay politics:
I explained to them that the British Government are
desirous to see their states peacefully and properly governed,
and pointed out to them that they should strive to emulate
the example of the Maharajah of Johore.’4
There are two other ways in which the Negeri Sembilan episode
suggests the power of the British to change the meaning of the local idiom
even while seeming to comply with it. The first is the way British officials
inserted themselves into, and thus changed the meaning of, Malay
ceremonial. The Resident of Sungai Ujung, Captain Murray, accompanied
Yam Tuan Antah on a kind of vast processional around the districts,
picking up important chiefs on the way to an installation cunt treaty
12 882/4.
T3IbId.
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signing in Sri Menanti. The significance of British participation was
recognized by the Datu Muar, who “dressed in a complete European
costume (white) without a sarong.” Later that day the Malay principles
visited the graves of their ancestors and prayed, but the main ceremony
occurred the next noon, after more than five hundred people had arrived.
Murray’s account continues:
At that hour, I took my place in the chair, having the Yam
Tuan on the right and Tuanku Ahmat on the left—the
remaining Datus, etc. were arranged on benches, right and
left, according to rank. The agreement signed by the Chiefs
was then read, at the conclusion of which, I shook hands with
Tuanku Antah and handed him into the chair, taking my
place on his right. The Police (sixty-five) then fired three
volleys in the air, after which I read a farewell address, and
the ceremony was concluded, with the exception of the
shaking of hands with everyone, which occupied a
considerable time. 15
Even if this account is, as one would expect, somewhat myopic, the
centrality of the British role is unmistakable, Unlike a conventional
overlord, especially a foreign one, the British here insisted on participating
in what was, after all, a very local occurrence, and on demonstrating their
power unequivocally.
The second innovation in the overlord-vassal relationship was the
letter of compliance. Having already signed the treaty, chiefs of the districts
were then required to send written assurances to Singapore that they
would abide by its terms. Perhaps analogous to paying obeisance, a duty
which now could not be avoided, this innovation bears clear signs of the
new terms of overlordship. From the Yam Tuan:
‘5co273/9o.
4;
We tender many thanks and compliments to our friend,
because at this time with the assistance of our friend we are
living in comfort and are now examining all the districts
under our jurisdiction and all our subjects and slaves are
living happily and quietly. With the assistance of our friend,
all these countries now are in peace.
From Tunku Ahmed Tunggal:
AS regards the action taken by our friend and Tunku
Maharaja of Johor Bahru to appoint Tunku Antah as Sultan,
we are much pleased with it and we have presented ourselves
before the Petuan Tunku Antah and the twelve Lambaga
(chiefs), and we summoned all the people to appear in the
Royal presence; they were all agreed.
From Penghulu Muar:
We will obey all our friend’s commands and are all agreed
and of one mind.
From Penghulu Fenas to the Governor:
Regarding the Yam Tuan Antali who our friend has ordered
to return and rule the countries again, we are very glad of it
and thank our friend very much.
And, lest the contents of the letter be mistakenly thought to admit of
variance, from the Datu Kiana:
We inform our friend that we are very sorry of having
omitted to mention in our last letter, that we will keep
ourselves and our Country peaceable and in prosperity, and
we will not in any way interfere or molest the neighbouring
States.16
One final point should be made. British officials, when commenting
on the Negeri Sembilan, were unconifortable with the very configuration
of Malay political authority there. Governor Clark, in 1874, said: “They are
small, they are apparently insignificant, and from the very fact of their
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smallness and insignificance they have been really more difficult to deal
with than some of the larger States “17 Governor Jervors, after the
settlement, wasn’t sure things would go smoothly: “In these small States,
where there are a number of subordinate chiefs, all may not yet be
satisfied.”18 These comments, as well as the confederation itself,
demonstrate an impatience with variety and multiplicity in the size and
authority structure of Malay political units. They may be seen as the point
of departure for the articulation of a new ideal Malay political unit, one in
which uniformity of size and clarity of authority structure are prioritized.
This point will be returned to below.
The second episode in the influence of paramountcy is the Muar
succession of 1877. Muar was the only district of the penirülatinder the
control of Sultan All, son of Husain, who had been named Sultan of
Singapore by the British in return for the cession of that island in 1819
Neither Husain nor his son had exercised effective control over Muar, and
when Ali died in 1877 officials in the Straits did not want the district to
pass either to Mi’s designated heir, an eleven-year-old son by a third wife,
or to his eldest son Alam. They claimed that Alam was not of royal blood,
but it appears that his real disqualification was that the British considered
him “a stupid indolent man like his father.”20 Once again Colonial Office
policy forced Singapore to act indirectly, and once again the Maharaja of
Johor was the beneficiary. The steps taken to bring about the annexation of
Muar to Johor (including the disinheritance of the rightful claimant)
17C0 882/3.
CO 273/90.
19i’Jo, British Policy, xxvi-xxx.
20 273/91.
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furthered the centrality of the British role in local politics, as well as the
British discourse on government, and introduced a new element in the
political economy of leadership.
Although the Assistant Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, the
influential Robert Meade, declared that “who is to be the ruler of this little
state we do not care two pins” and that “the Straits government should
only recognize as Sultan the person who is at once acceptable to the people
and who is the rightful claimant according to Malay Custom,” he did in
fact lay down criteria which the successful candidate had to meet: “the
individual selected should be informed that he will be recognized as long
as he behaves himself and governs properly.” What was the state of affairs
in Muar that elicited this concern? According to the pro-Johor Colonel
Anson, Muar was characterized by “the absence of any government” and
provided refuge for “bad characters from our own Settlement of Malacca,
as well as from that of Johor.” A reconnoitering trip up the Kessang and
Muar Rivers by a British official revealed the telling sign of bad
government in the Malay states—underpoptilation:
On the Muar side there is desolation, and I should not be
surprised if the estimate of the population of the whole Muar
Country which I heard from an independent Native authority
was correct: he put it at eight hundred only.
This state of affairs was blamed on the de facto ri.iler in Muar, the
Temenggung, and to prevent his faction from gainingpermanent control,
the district was placed in the temporary custody of the Maharaja of Johor
until the proper election of a new ruler could be held. The Temenggung
and his allies were in favor of Alam, a legitimate choice, but this was
mterpreted by the British as a way of mamtammg the unsatisfactory status
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quo. The Temenggung and his men were said to fear the selection of a man
of “energy and ability.., who would reside in the country.” Only a few
months later, the Maharaja had once again demonstrated good
government: he had investors ready to commence tobacco planting and
had selected appropriate sites for police stations.21
The Straits government used several means to encourage the
acceptance of the good government ideology among the Muar elite. They
arranged for the younger son of Sultan All to be educated in Singapore at
the Raffles Intituffon, where he boarded with other sons of Malay royalty
(and deposed royalty). It was particularly important to influence and shape
this boy, Mahmud, as he was his father’s designated heir, and it was
anticipated that he and his younger brothers may be “fitted for posts of
responsibility in the Country on their attaining their full ages... depend[ing}
in a great measure upon the character and talents developed by the young
men.”22 In the shorter term, the government again relied on the Maharaja
for the muscle the Straits government was prohibited from using:
The Maharajah of Johore was good enough, at my request, to
send one of his small steamers to Muar, and invite the
Penghulus, or headmen of the Country, to come to Singapore
to se me, and this those that were able have since done.
Here the chiefs “expressed their strong desire, that the State of Muar
should be placed under the charge of the Maharajah of Johore.”23
Ibid.; CO 882/3.
23C0 273/91. Th Colonial Office did not miss the coercion: “But I observe that they were
summoned to Government House at Singapore and it must therefore be borne in mind that it
would be in accordance with Malay character in these circumstances if they merely put
their signatures to a document which at the moment they thought would be agreeable to and
in accordance with the wishes of the Colonial Government by whom they had been
summoned to discuss the question!’
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Once again, British officials participated in Malay ceremonial for the
purpose of achieving their desired outcome, while appearing to respect
local custom. As in Negeri Sembilan, their participation had the
unintended consequence of defining Malay custom on British terms. The
first intervention was in criticiing All, posthumously, for naming the
thirteen-year-old Mahmud as his heir on his deathbed:
The proper course, according to the Malay custom of the
cotmtry, for Sultan All to have adopted in appointing a
successor, was to have called a Council of the Chiefs and
Penghuius, named “the Waris” and to have presented to
them the person whom he intended should be his heir and
declared him to be so. This person would then have been
known and acknowledged by them from that time as the
“Tunku Besar” or the great Tunku (Master).
Because the Malay ruler had not appointed a successor in “proper” fashion
(and the British had ruled out the candidate of royal blood on grounds of
good government), there was no one to pay for and preside over Sultan
Ali’s funeral. This became the occasion for the second intervention:
[Sultan Ali] died in the Settlement of Malacca, and this
Government and the Maharajah of Johore advanced money
for the expenses of his Funeral, and its accompanying feasts
and other ceremonies, thus performing the duty that should
have formed part, and a very important part, of the duty of
his successor... At the time of the late Sultans death, the
Colonial Secretary was sent to Malacca, to be present at his
funeral, in order to prevent the Uccasion being made one of
riot or disturbance,... and to see that no one was proclaimed, at
the Funeral, as his successor, by any faction, without those
persons being present, who had a right to a voice in the
matter.24
Most significant was the third intervention in Malay custom—
managing the election of Ali’s successor. The government informed the
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Temenggung that it would send an officer to “witness” the event. The
Maharaja of Johor was not to be present, which would give his anticipated
election the strong appearance of being “spontaneous and unrestrained.” It
was communicated to the Muar chiefs that the government had no wish to
influence the outcome of the election, but that British recognition of the
successful candidate “would naturally depend on his personal merits and
the character of his administration.”25
The report of the officer who attended the election, A.M. Skinner,
reveals not only crass mampulation of the outcome, which is no surprise,
but also the adaptation of Malay ceremonial to the new conditions laid
down by the overlord. In the first place, there was considerable confusion
about the nature of the proceedings and who had a right to participate.
There were about two hundred people present, including three Germans,
connected to the new tobacco plantations,26 and two important officers of
the Maharaja’s. Skinner advised the Johor officers to leave as their
presence might be misconstrued, This they did, but they left behind a
sealed letter addressed to the governor in the name of the assembled Muar
chiefs proclaiming the election of the Maharaja. (Skinner called the post
election presentation of this letter, clearly prepared beforehand and by
outsiders, “an unsatisfactory incident.”) The whole procedure seemed to
have an ad hoc quality which may be attributed to the government’s
insistence that its preordained outcome be validated by Malay custom.
Skinner had been given a list by the government of village headmen and
penghutus (subdistrict chiefs) who were entitled by custom to vote, and he
26 Thlo, British Policy, 67-69, for British concerns about German activity in Asia and
Africa.
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noted right away that there were too many penghutus. It turned out that
the additional ones had come from the Johor side of the river, and he
Inquired of the Temenggung whether they should participate. The
Temenggung answered “With a phrase he constantly employed, ‘kenapa
tidak’ (why not).” Skinner also noted “the way the penghulus were
‘nursed’, without which they could not I believe have been brought there,
or kept together so long.” Although the British officer was dearly
confronted with ceremonial manufactured for the occasion (“1 could not
ascertain that there was any particular or separate custom of Muar”), he did
not attribute this to British interference. Instead he concluded merely that
what he witnessed was not an election in the English sense, but
“something between the Proclamation and the Coronation of a new
Raja.”27
There was also evidence that Malays were appropriating the
discourse of good government in face of unrelenting British backing for
the Maharaja. The Temenggung himself praised Abu Bakar “for his justice,
equity, compassion and liberality towards all his subjects.” Skinner spoke
to a penghutu who had been particularly dose to Au and had originally
opposed the Maharaja:
He told me that he rejoiced now to escape his visit to [the late
Sultan’s residence in MalaccaJ, for he was always made to
work when he went there (under the “hukum kerah”) and
never got any pay for his labour. He said a good deal more
reflecting on the late Sultan and the Temenggung, his Wakil,
the latter he described as a rather selfish and tyrannical old
gentlemen, who was on his best behaviour just now, but
whose administration had been very unpopular. All this was
volunteered as if in self-defence. He also referred to the
wretched state of the Country. His father and grandfather had
27C0 273/91.
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been Penglailus of Tassek before hinh and intheir days the
kampung had numbered one hundred souls; now there were
not fifty. He also drew a comparison between the north and
south banks of the Muar, and here again in reference to the
Maharajah’s rule he pointed out that the custom of “kerah”
was not so often enforced on the Johor side, for that in Johor
people were paid for their labour and the Raj&s rule was less
severe (tida begitu kras).
The outcome of the election was a source of great satisfaction to the
Maharaja’s backers in Singapore, who now would not have to contend
with the “feeble and inexperienced” Alam Abu Bakar, by contrast, had
“both the will and the ability to tranquilize and develop the country.”28
The very strength of the claim of the late Sultan’s family and its
patent mistreatment by the government, however, left it with many
supporters. In an effort to defuse this threat, the British began to develop
another tool which would have long-term impact on Malay politics—the
pension. The nephew of Sultan All, as réprèsëñtáfive of the Sultan’s
brother’s family, was offered $600 per year, provided he agree to live in
Singapore, not return to Muar, and remain on “good behaviour.”29 All
proved more difficult to pay off, refusing “with much abuse” the
Maharaja’s offer of $68 per month. The government eventually
determined that his acquiescence was worth much more and offered him
$500 per month, plus more for other members of his family “as long as [he]
live quietly and in no way attempt intrigues or disturbances.” The pension
was understood to entail the cessation of claims, not only because it was
explicitly laid out so, but also because Alam’s acceptance of the money
would be interpreted by other Malays as “seilrng his country,” ensuring
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that “his friends and supporters would have little left to complain
about.”30 Both the vulnerability of the Malay elite to cash buyouts and
their impact on Malay politics will be pursued further below.
These episodes of British involvement in Negeri Sembilan and
Muàr illustrate the adaptation of local politics to the new requirements of
the British overlord. first and foremost, the British advanced a discourse
of good goveranent. The growing influence of Johor, backed by Singapore,
both demonstrated and increased the power of this new discourse. British
participation in Malay ceremonial also served to introduce the new
discourse into the local idiom, which then compelled Malays themselves
to begin to use it. The twofold result of these interventions was that the
meaning attached to Malay political ritual and ceremoxtial began to change
according to British priorities, but the relevance of the forms themselves
was extended into the colonial period.
The Wages of Resistance: Payoffs And Payrolls
Transitions to colonial rule brought more heavy-handed imposition of the
new discourse and practice of government into Malay political life. It was
at this point that room to maneuver began seriously to narrow and good
government measures to harm the economic, cultural, and political
interests of Malay elites. Resistance was unsuccessful, but illustrated the
way Malays were grappling with the changing idiom of politics, some
seeking to master the new discourse and others retreating to the old. The
aftermath of resistance occasioned the further incorporation of the Malay
ruling class into the British discourse of government. Through the
30jbjd Co 273/95.
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construction of a new political economy of leadership, the British secured
not merely grudging accommodation, but active Malay participation in the
transformation of their political life. In this section I will discuss the
experience of Perak, which subsequently served as a warning to other
Malays, and make reference to similar processes occurring in Selangor and
When J.W.W. Birch arrived in Perak in November 1874 as the first
British Resident, he “at once proposed to introduce great changes in the
constitution, customs and financial arrangement of the country.”31 By the
following April, he had taken the collection of customs duties out of the
hands of two Malay officials “who kept no accounts, and took what they
chose for themselves.”32 At the time of his murder by the men of Sri
Maharaja Lela, Birch was in the process of posting two proclamations in
Malay villages in the name of Sultan Abdullah.33 The first acknowledged
the power of the Resident and the second served notice on the Malay
ruling class that the political economy of the state was (from their point of
view) about to be shattered:
Now it has become necessary to examine into and alter the
whole present system of taxation in Perak; for in several
places there are taxes which ought to be put a stop to. It is also
necessary to raise money to pay fitting allowances to us and to
certain Chiefs of Perak, and the expenses of rightly
administering the country.34
31Enqulry as to the Complicity of Chiefs In the Perak Outrages. CO 273/86. (Hereafter
Enquiry.)
32Report of the Acting Resident of Perak, 2 April 1875. CO 882/3.
33For fuller accounts of the first Perak Residency, see Emily Sadka, The Protected Malay
States, 18744895 (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1968), 77-97, and C.
Northcote Parkinson, British Intervention in Milaya, 1867-1877 (Kuala Lumpur: University
of Malaya Press, 1964), 194-233.
CO 882/3.
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No less related to the economic well-being of the ruling class was Birch’s
implacable opposition to slavery; he insisted on its speedy abolition and
himself Sheltered runaway female slaves. For these reasons he engendered
widespread opposition. The example of one powerful chief, the Orang Kaya
Menteri, demonstrates how completely good government was prepared to
undercut the Malay ruling class:
The Menteri was the only chief who made any open objection
to signing the Treaty: nor can it be wondered that he should
have been dissatisfied with it, seeing that by the conditions of
the Treaty, Abdullah, with whom he had never been on good
terms, was set up over him as Sultan of Perak, and over
Ismail (who had been elected Sultan chiefly through his
influence); that he was prohibited from driving the Ghee
Hins out of Perak..., and that he was forced to acknowledge as
a debt due by him to the government of the Straits
Settlements the charges an expenses to which the colony had
already been, or might be put, by their efforts to secure the
tranquillity of Perak and the safety of trade. Probably,
however, the part of the Treaty which affected him most
seriously, and which must have been most galling to his self-
pride, was that which declared his future position would be
that of Governor of Larut only, on a fixed allowance, and that
the revenues of Larut would be merged in those of Perak.35
The reaction of the Malay elite to this imposition was varied. The
Menteri’s represented one type of response: eagerness to use the British
idiom and discourse to his own advantage, just as the British had used
Malay idiom against the Malays in the era of paramountcy. The Menteri
paid a $12,000 retaining fee to a Singapore lawyer in an attempt to get his
case taken to England and questions asked in Parliament. It was from his
English lawyers that the Menteri learned about the different layers of
British authority and came to the conclusion (not unreasonable in 1874)
35Enqulry.
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that “the Colonial Office will never interfere in the Malay Peninsula.” On
this basis he urged Sultan Abdullah to challenge Birch legally
We were all forced to sign the Treaty. It was not with our own
consent. Therefore, I think, if we go before the law, the
Pangkor Treaty will be void.
Sultan Abdullah, however, did not trust the Menteri and, under the
guidance of closer advisers, pursued other methods of resistance. first,
perhaps understanding the central importance of the person and power of
the Sultan to the success of Birch’s government, he tried to disperse his
power in several directions and make himself inaccessible to the Resident.
He issued a kuasa (authorization) to his top chiefs delegating them to
represent him in all matters to Birch “The kuasa set out that in future
whatever they said was what the Sultan said, and what they did was his
doing; and that, therefore, he authorized Mr. Birch in future to deal with
them, and not with him” Unfortunately, “Mr Birch refused to receive the
kuasa.” Second, Abdullah tried to bypass the Resident with a personal
appeal to the departing Governor Clarke. He sent a deputation to
Singapore explaining the troubles he was having with Birch and
requesting confirmation of his title so ‘that the new governor might not
repudiate it. In attributing power personally to Clarke rather than to the
office of governor, Abdullah revealed a less than perfect grasp of the new
idiom. He also wrote to a Mr. Kim Ching, “asking him to come to Perak
and undertake the collection of the Revenue of Larut under the kuasa
which Sultan Abdullah had formerly given him, so that the Sultan might
have his assistance to hold his own against Mr. Birch.” These letters failed.
Clarke met with the deputation from Perak after Jervois had already taken
over as new governor and lectured them never to send mail over the
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Resident’s head again. Kim Ching also refused to help, having “given up
his kuasa long ago to Sir Andrew Clarke.”36
Other chiefs were even less comfortable with the new idiom of
power relations and thus couched their resistance in wholly indigenous
terms. The Shahbandar, who had lost control of the collection of customs
duties, confronted Birch with the authority of the Sultan, as Birch recorded
in his journal:
[The Shahbandar] said that he had made his farm at the
Qualla by the Sultan’s orders, and would not give it up; he
also said he would go on collecting on oil, salt, etc., and that
we must fight for it if we wanted it. When I met him I told
him I would not let him collect any more, and that if he went
on breaking the Pangkor Treaty, I would recommend the
Governor to send him out of the country. This evidently
frightened him. He said that he did not think I could do
anything till I got the Sultan’s chop.37
Sri Maharaja Lela, before directing the murder of Birch just one year after
his arrival, dedaed: “I will not depart in the smallest degree from the old
arrangement.”38 The death of Birch, of course, brought down the might of
the British empire on Perak and ensured that the “old arrangement” was
no more. The Perak ruling class had shown a certain willingness to learn
the new idiom of power relations, but met disaster by resolving to return
to the old.
The most significant consequence of the Resident’s murder to
Perak’s future was not, however, the temporary posting of troops from
India and Hong Kong, but the participation of Malays in the
administration of British justice. Although Sultan Abdullah and the
361b1d
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Menteri, Laxamana, and Shahbandar were dealt with extrajudicially and
exiled from Perak, those of lower social rank were tried in a court of law in
the state. Their judges in these summary trials were leading Perak chiefs
who had been cleared (some of them just barely) of involvement in the
plot. Thus the lowly Siputum, actual wielder of the krde, was sentenced to
hang by Raja Dris, a sentence that was carried out in front of the Sultan and
the leading chiefs.39 Other Malay judges appointed to investigate the case
were Raja Muda Yusuf and Raja Allang Husein. Once again the Maharaja
of Johor played a mediating role in advancing British discourse, this time
the discourse of justice, when he took the surrender of several fugitives in
exchange for a guarantee that “they will have a fair and open trial on the
charges made against them before a competent and impartial tribunal with
a full opportunity of preparing and making their defence.” After the seven
defendants (including Sri Maharaja Lela) had been found guilty and
sentenced to death, the British government decided to spare the lives of
four. The Malay judge was so informed and was instructed to carry out the
sentences against the remaining three as soon as possible.4° In this matter,
the Malay elite had no autonomy but was seen carrying out the judgments.
The visible participation of leading Malays in the administration of
British justice suggests a systematic method of consolidating colonial rule
and coopting the ruling class. It had been undertaken earlier in the
punishment of pirates in Selangor when Governor Clarke “insisted upon
the ruler of the country accepting the responsibility for their act, and
39The future Sultan Idris had been made judge in 1675 after successfully giving up opium. CO
882/3.
CO 273/90.
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punishing them himself.”41 Frank Swettenham later noted that the local
people “still speak with awe of that trial and the executions. What probably
had the greatest effect on them was that the pirates were tried and
condemned by a court of their own people.”42 Twenty years later, the
recalcitrant Sultan of Pahang received the same treatment when he was
forced to punish the rebels of his own state with whom he sympathized.43
The use of leading Malays to administer colonial justice took place
in the context of a far more fundamental change in the political idiom—
the complete restructuring of the political economy of Malay leadership.
As noted In the case of Muar, British interference in a Malay political
incident usually left one party dispossessed and disgruntled. To pre-empt
the threat of further “disturbances,” the monthly pension was devised to
recompense political actors for their enforced retirement from politics. The
number of disaffected chiefs, the potential threat, and theopportunity for
payoffs were all multiplied when formal colonial rule was extended. In
Perak, in 1874, Abdullah’s rival for the position of Sultan accepted siooo
per month for stating that “he resigned all his affairs into the hands of the
Governor, and relied entirely on the protection of the British
41C0 882/3. AccordIng to Winstedt, “It was feared that uncertainty as to the place of the
crime, whether on the high seas or In Selangor waters, might lead to acquittal In a British
court, and that punishment in Bnhsh territory would have little deterrent effect in
Selangor... His Highness readily agreed to the trial of the murdering pirates by a Court
composed of the Viceroy, Dato’ Aru, the Penghulu Dagang and See Ah Keng, the Chinese
headman at Langat, with the Colonial Engineer Major McNair and the Viceroy’s legal
friend, Mr J.G. Davidson, as commissioners. On the 15th February 1874 this court sitting in
the stockade at Kuala Jugra condemned seven of the prisoners to be speared and creesed, the
eighth being reprieved on account of his youth The next morning at eleven o’clock the
sentence was carried out with a creese sent overnight by the Sultan.” A History of Malaya
(Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Part I, Volume XIII, March
1935), 240-41.
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Government.”44 The compensatory pension, however, was insufficient
when good government aimed to dispossess the entire ruling class of its
means In developing a new political economy, the British had to do more
than buy acquiescence; they had to replace the old system of economic
reward and political power. Highly-placed, well-rewarded Malays
dispensing British justice thus represents an early glimpse of what the new
political economy would look like.
Along the way, however, the new colonial rulers experienced an
early failure that illuminates the development of the new system. In 1876 a
plan was proposed, which was eventually abandoned, to present honorary
swords to five Malay chiefs who had helped the British pursue the Perak
fugitives after Birch’s death. The specifications of the swords were as
follows:
The swords to be all alike, the blade between twenty-seven
inches and thirty inches long, flat, two-edged, light, and
sharpened on both edges. A crescent and five-pointed star in
the ornamental engraving. The inscriptions on the blade,
English on one side, Malay on the other. The handle to be of
silver, heavy. The sheath of steel or Mechi’s silver steel.
And a sample inscription:
Presented by Sir William Francis Drummond Jervois,
Governor of the Straits Settlements, to Raja Mahmud bin
Panglima, Raja of Selangor, in recognition of his spontaneous
help, his gallantry and good service to the British
Government in Perak in the year ;$7545
It was later suggested that the swords should be a gift from the Queen
herself, but there was disagreement about the best way to represent
Victoria’s title in Malay. (Sections of that correspondence are reproduced at
CO 273/86.
45C0 882/3.
57
the beginning of this chapter.) It was consequently decided to inscribe the
swords in English only.46 This was an attempt to use a form familiar to
Malays—a gift from one’s ruler, heavy with meaning, but not necessarily
functional—in order to achieve a new outcome—the acceptance of the
British monarch as the Malaya’ overlord. Yet new meaning also attached to
these gifts; they were rewards for past service and were hoped to elicit
continued cooperation from the recipients. In other words, the British
were endeavoring to transform the gift from ruler to chief from a spiritual
reward to a secular contract.
The plan ran into trouble, however, when the activities of the five
chiefs were examined more critically and the question arose whether they
were deserving of government recognition. Two of the chiefs had engaged
in piracy and robbery both before and after aiding the British in 1875. They
were all condemned as “idle,” one in particular as “an idle, gambling,
opium-smoking, free lance, who by his own admission did not murder Sir
W. Jervois [during his visit to Perak in September 1874] only because
Abdullah did not give the signal.”47 The new Resident of Perak, Hugh
Low, felt that “the Rajas are all, I believe, adventurers who served on the
side they hoped would pay them best”48
More serious was the suspicion that the intended meaning of the
swords would be disregarded. When asked whether there was any danger
of the chiefs “making an improper use of the swords,” the Residents of
CO 273/90; CO 882/3. Bernard S. Cohn discusses similar debates about the representation
of the British monarch to Indian subjects at precisely the same time In “Representing
Authority In Victorian India,” in The Invention of Tradition, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and
Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 184-85, 201-2.
47Th1s was Bloomfield Douglas (Resident of Selangor) on Syed Mashor. Co 273/91.
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both Perak and Selangor answered in the affirmative. Low considered that
the chiefs were angry that they had not received “pecuniary provision” and
did not think that swords would satisfy them. Further,
there is every probability that the swords would be used by
Syed Mashor and Raja Indut, and perhaps by the others, as
insignia of authority and for imposing upon the people of the
Native States. If a reward in money could be substituted, it
would, in my opinion, be more appropriate and probably
more acceptable.
The Resident of Selangor agreed that the swords would be used as “a
means of oppression” and “a symbol of authority.”49 Once the contract was
feared likely to be misconstrued or unenforceable, the Colonial Office felt it
had no choice but to withhold the swords.
The possibility of gifts being willfully misinterpreted by their
recipients exposed the disadvantage of using symbols in making contracts
with the Malays. Hard cash proved more successful. Chiefs who had been
powerful before the British arrived were incorporated into a civil list
which provided a monthly allowance from state revenues. Allowances
also had a precedent in Malay political life, being analogous to royal grants
of revenue-producing territories. But the royal grant had been a sign of
favor from the ruler and thus enhanced the political stature (power) of the
recipient; the monthly allowance was contingent upon continued
adherence to the principles of good government. In Perak, the civil list was
reduced considerably as a result of the investigation into Birch’s murder;
those chiefs who survived the cut were informed that “they would forfeit
all right to their allowances, should they attempt to exact revenue not
491b1d.
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legitimately due to them.”50 As Malay chiefs were cut off from more and
more income-generating activities, beginning, of course, with piracy, they
became vulnerable to the strings attached to the allowances.
Very quickly, the allowance became the cornerstone of a new
political economy of Malay leadership. Unlike the pension used earlier to
buy a chief out of politics altogether (often with the requirement that he
live in Singapore), allowances recognized a recipient’s position in society
and guaranteed his correct behavior in political life. Although the punitive
aspect did not disappear, the allowance (and its increase) was used as a tool
to foster active cooperation with British rule. In Pahang:
It is based on the average receipts which each chief is
calculated to have had for his own use together with some
slight addition in order to make these headthen appreciate
that the introduction of the Residential system has rather
improved than otherwise their pecuniary position, and thus
to ensure, if possible, their willing cooperation in the reforms
which must be introduced.51
Because there were so many chiefs, the civil list had to constitute a
considerable portion of state expenditures in the early years of colonial
rule, even where the chiefs were not well paid. Perak spent $48,000 on
Malay chiefs in 1877 out of a total budget of $272,000; this included over
$11,000 granted to the exiled chiefs and their families at home. Selangor
spent the same, which constituted twenty percent of its budget, the same
amount as was devoted to public works. Sungal Ujung spent one-sixth of
its budget on its chiefs.52
CO 882/3.
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The allowances succeeded in creating a new discourse surrounding
political behavior and economic reward. This can be seen in the case of
Pahang in the 1890s, when a grant was signed over, in the Sultan’s name,
to the Straits government to help pay for the cost of putting down a
rebellion in that state. No one noticed that some years earlier, the Sultan
had signed over that same grant, amounting to $600 per month, to his
eldest son. The aggrieved Tunku Mahmud lost no time pointing out the
injustice in that “he, almost the only Raja of Pahang who was loyal to the
Government during the disturbances of 1892, should also be the only one
on whom a share of the burden of expenses of the expedition should fall.”
Reluctant to dock the Sultan’s allowance and equally loathe to increase
state expenditures “because somebody blundered,” the Colonial Office
delayed a decision on this matter until Frank Swettenham, then Resident
General of the Federated Malay States, reminded them that “until we
interfered, the Sultan and his family practically constituted the state.” The
Tunku eventually received $300 per month, but only after he carried out a
“fitting marriage” to the sister of the Sultan of Johor.53
The complete success of the new political economy can be seen as
early as 1889 in the state of Selangor. The governor’s visit that year found
Sultan Abdul Samad wearing the badge and star of the order of St. Michael
and St. George. The Sultan declared himself pleased with “all that was
going on in his country [and] perfectly satisfied with the amount of the
allowance which he drew and which, with a laughing reference to past
times as he was aware I knew, was regularly paid.” The circulation of gifts
53C0 273/228 — CO 273/230. The latter requirement probably reflected British efforts to
integrate the family of the non-royal Sultan of Johor into the royalty of the peninsula. See
the discussion In the next chapter.
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and economic resources had become thoroughly detached from Malay
meaning and control. Their meaning was now commanded by the British
and accessed by Malay accommodation of British justice and good
government. The new political economy had developed in two stages. In
the first, symbolic gifts were liable to be misinterpreted as a mark of favor,
as constituting participation in the power of the ruler instead of the
agreement to relinquish power. This explained the cancellation of the
swords and the consequent preference for cash allowances. With no
alternatives in sight, the Malay ruling class endeavored to get on the civil
list and wield a new kind of power, highly circumscribed in comparison
with the older power, but offering regular rewards. In the second stage,
after colonial rule had been firmly consolidated, symbolic honors could be
safely bestowed without fear of misinterpretation. The allowance was
recognition of position in Malay society; the order of St. Michael and St.
George conferred membership in the British Empire.
Standardization of the Malay State: Internal and External
The consolidation of British power in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century entrenched the discourse of good government, as well as a new
political economy, in southern Malaya. It also accelerated the
standardization of political units (Malay states) which was shown as an
impulse in the case of the Negeri Sembilan. The result would be a greater
uniformity in the size and structure of Malay states, the clarification of
authority as lesser sovereignties disappeared, and a new ordering of
relations between states. The process can be seen in brief by surveying the
southern peninsula at two points in time: the end of the first quarter of the
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nineteenth century, atef British influence had been clarified through
treaties with the Dutch and the Thais, and again towards the end of the
century.
Early in the century, political structures varied and were largely
determined by the continuing dissolution of the Johor-Riau polity. The
heir to that dynasty by then resided in Dutch-controlled territory and was
more and more cut off from the peninsula. The British had recognized a
rival claimant to the throne who became Sultan in Singapore, but he had
little prestige or power and two generations later, his grandson Alam
would be stripped of Muar, the family’s last remaining territory on the
peninsula This left de facto control in the hands of the Bendahara in
Pahang and the Temenggung in Johor. Though both Pahàng and Johor
were seen as discrete political entities, they had neither “tidy” borders nor
ideal political hierarchies and were not understood to be independent
states.54
In contrast, Perak and Selangor were independent. Perak had an
impeccable pedigree, having been founded by a son of the last Malay ruler
at Melaka, and the Thais had renounced all claims to the state in the 1826
treaty with Britain.55 Selangor had been acknowledged as an independent
state since 1766, when the Bugis ruler received the Malay mark of royalty
from the Sultan of Perak. But civil wars in both states, complicated by the
participation of rival Chinese clans and Straits financial interests, fractured
the exercise of power. Selangor, for example, was divided by mid-century
54A.C. Milner, Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial Rule (Tucson,
ArIz.: University of Arizona Press, 1982), 29-30.
55Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia (London:
MacmIllan, 1982), 59-60, 117-18.
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into five autonomous territories; the Sultan at Langat controlled one of
them.56 Finally, the interior of Melaka, known as tFe Negeri Sembilan
fnine states), consisted of a number of Minangkabau rantau (outlying area)
districts, some of which were nominally under the suzerainty of Johor, but
which were actually quite autonomous.57
By the end of the century, all these entities had become proper
“states” with centralized power structures. Most striking was the creation
of modern Neger; Sembilan Relations between these small states were
gradually regularized through negotiation and treaties, and they were all
finally drawn into one entity between the years 1889 and 1898. Treating this
creation as clarification of a messy situation, British scholar-bureaucrat
R.O. Winstedt later borrowed a Minangkabau saying to describe the
outcome: “the intricate had been disentangled, the turbid cleared, the rain
had ceased and the mist dispersed.”58 Johor and Pahang were also
recognized as independent states by the British overlord and their rulers
confi±med in the title of Sultan.59 As in the areas of government and
political economy, British recognition of states involved a restructuring of
meaning. In the Malay idiom, politics was about control of manpower
rather than land, and political entities only acquired meaning through “the
condition of having a ruler.”60 To the British, states were understood as
5611,fd., 96, 14748.
571b1d., 94-5.
R.O. Winstedt, ed., Malaya: The Straits Settlements and the Federated and Unfederated
Malay States (London: Constable, 1923), 150-51.
59The relation between Malay rulers and the centralization of state power will be discussed
in the next chapter.
60MItner, Kerajaan, 8-9.
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territorial entities and were defined through the technology of mapping.61
The new attitude was easily summed up: “without a complete map the
country cannot be opened up.”62 Malay disregard for precise knowledge of
borders was somewhat astonishing to the British and always worthy of
note, as in this comment on the governor’s 1875 trip to the east coast:
The boundaries on the western side of the State of Trengganu
seem to be little known The Sultan himself said that there
was a great extent of jungle in the interior, but that nobody
had ever visited it, nor was It nown where the Trengganu
boundary ran It appears that but little light can be thrown on
this subject of boundaries, even by the natives themselves.. 63
Thus not only the “new” state of Negeri Sembilan, but all the states under
British dominion found themselves redefined by the new idiom, a process
in which the Malay ruling class played an important role.
The clarification of borders through surveying and signed
agreements became the principle means of accomplishing the
territorializafion of Malay states. One example of this process illustrates
how border mapping changed the nature of political authority, while
providing opportunities to Malay elite who were astute enough to grasp
the new idiom. In 1878, the border between Selangor and Sungai Ujung
was “settled by their respective Chiefs assisted by the advice of the
Residents.”64 Not surprisingly, some areas between th states had been
found to be under uncertain authority. As Thongchai Winichakul notes in
the case of Siam’s tributaries, ambiguous territories under multiple
618ee Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Ceo-Body of a Nation
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994) for the triumph of the new geography in
mneteenth century Siam, as well as Britain role in that transformation
62Straits Times, 31 July 1875. CO 882/3.
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sovereignties were a common manifestation of indigenous political space
and sovereignty.65 This situation was intolerable to colonial rule.
Ambiguous territory became “territory in dispute [which] was neglected
and did not share the advantages reaped by the other Districts of Selangor
and Sungai Ujung from the introduction of a better system of
government.” Venturing into the murky waters of multiple sovereignty,
British officials found the evidence collected to be hopelessly
“contradictory.” finally, top British officials and the Malay ruler of each
state, together with a representative from the Straits government, reached
an agreement “based upon mutual convenience and upon general
principles of equity.” Through the exchange of several localities, Sungai
Ujung received a coastline, expected to “prove of much service in
developing the country.”
The rearrangement of territory did not please everyone, however,
and the subsequent controversy demonstrates one Malay chief’s deft leap
from the old idiom to the new. Raja Bot objected to the transfer of Lukut
from Selangor to Sungai Ujung. He claimed to possess, through his father,
a kuasa from the Sultan of Selangor to collect the revenues of that district,
an authorization which would be voided by the transfer. The revenues of
Lukut had declined to between $200 and $300 per month, and the whole
system of autonomous revenue collection was in any case being
dismantled, but Raja Dot pressed his claim to better his’standing in the new
order. He engaged a Singapore lawyer who proceeded to publicize the
injustice that had been done to the Raja. The Britith government, which
65mongchai, Siam Mapped. He discusses the transforma Lion of “overlapping margin” into
“vertical Interface” in chapter 5.
66
had earlier considered him friendly, tried to approach him with a
settlement, but “acting no doubt tinder advice, he refused to come to the
Secretariat to see Mr1 Swettenham, though several times sent for.” Raja
Bot’s claim to sovereignty over Lukut was disputed by the British, who
nonetheless played the Raja’s game by debadng the issue on his terms; they
claimed the kuasa was of the type which could be revoked at will. The
Sultan of Selangor’s reaction to Raja Bot’s plan to seek legal redress reveals
the translation of power from the old idiom to the new from another
angle:
[The Sultan] broke into a fit of laughter and ridiculed the idea
of any mterference between him and his subject except that of
the British Government and the Resident under the existing
policy.
The Sultan probably understood that the Raja’s goal was a generous
settlement, at that time it was still ludicrous to apply the new idiom to
relations between Malays. (On the other hand, perhaps he was worried.)
Through tenacity and the expansion of the claim to include the district of
Sungai Raya, ruled by his cousin Raja Daud, Raja Bot succeeded in his
aims. In exchange for giving up all claims, he received $17,000, three
thousand acres of land, and confirmation of ownership of his family’s
houses and property.
The clarification of borders, and consequent redefinition of political
authority, proceeded apace. Once again, Johor participated in the new
idiom without being under formal colonial rule, and as an independent
state, developed a cadre of Malay officials with technical competence to
carry out the work. The borders between Johor and Pahang and between
Johor and Melaka were surveyed and settled in the 1890s, and much
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internal surveying was done as well. Like the other Malay states, the old
rump of the Johor-Riau empire had become something entirely different
by the end of the century. The state official in charge of surveying
recognized this when he wrote in 1894, “The truth is that I am older than
the present state of Johor.”66
The redefinition of political space and authority engendered by
mapping intersected with the principles of good government to reorder the
internal political landscape of Malay states as well. Selangor and Perak,
whièh felt the most direct intervention, showed these effects quite early.
When Birch arrived in Perak in 1874, the Sultan had abandoned his usual
residence at Batarabit to avoid cholera and was living on boats upriver. lix-
Sultan Ismall’s family lived at Kinta, but the chief himself stayed at Blanja
to be closer to his tin mines. Political authority had no permanent
residence, and Birch intended to change that. He looked forward to the
time when “the Sultan is located in his own palace, with the Resident
within sight of him, the administration of justice and all business will be
centralized there, and the Chiefs brought more together and in a public
manner.”67 Birch did not see these plans brought to fruition, but future
Residents did. By early 1877, the government had decided to move the
Residency from Bandar Bahru, which was considered inconvenient, to
Kuala Kangsar, which had several financial, political, and logistical
advantages. Its proximity to Larut eliminated the need for a highly paid
Assistant Resident in that area. It was near the home of Yusuf, the new
66Salleh bin Mohamed Perang, whose autobiographical writings are translated and
interpreted in Amin Sweeney, Reputations Live On: An Early Malay Autobiography
(Berkeley; University of California Press, 1980), 80. See also pp. 58, 66.
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Regent, giving the Resident “facilities for exercising a personal influence
over him.” Kuala Kangsar was dose as well to Knta, a mining region, and
near “the lately disaffected district of Kota Lama.” Overall, Kuala Kangsar’s
central position renders it the most convenient place for
access to other parts of Perak. Again, there is a telegraph wire
between Kuala Kangsar and the Port of Larut, which is only
seven hours distant from Penang, and... there is a telegraphic
communication between Penang and Singapore.68
Kuala Kangsar quicidy became established as the royal seat of Perak as
Malay politics coalesced around the site of British power. When
Swettenham toured the protected states in the following year (as assistant
colonial secretary), he found the place reconstructed, with new roads, a
bridge over the river, and a considerable increase in the population and
number of houses. The Regent was planning to build himself a new house,
and Raja Dris, the future Sultan Idris, had built a house near that of the
Resident.69
A similar process was underway in Selangor. In 1874, the Sultan
pulled down the stockade around his house at Langat, the effective
stockade now being occupied by the police, and allowed a road to go past
his door. Four years later, he had built himself a better house and was
building a good road, at his own expense, connecting it to the dock. Ten
years later, although the old Sultan could not be persuaded to move to the
new center at Kuala Lumpur, the governor’s visit found that town
booming and connected by rail to the port at Klang.7°
68 273/90.
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A final aspect of the redefinition of political space and authority was
the growing uniformity of relations between the Malay states under British
colonial rule. In order to define and separate the states, more was needed
than border demarcation. Ruling class spheres of influence had also to be
restricted to within state borders, something particularly evident in the
early years when rebels from one state fled into the jungles of another. The
goal was a new type of interstate relations conducted through British
mediation. Beginning informally, this new norm would eveituaUy be
enshrined in treaties and constitutions. Negeri Sembilan provides an
example of this process. After intervening in the Negeri Sembilan
succession dispute by installing a Resident in Sungai Ujung in 1874, the
British sought to regulate that area’s relations with Selangor. The Viceroy
of Selangor, Tunku Dia Udin, was informed that he was to have no
communication with the chiefs of the Negeri Sembilan without informing
the British.71 At this stage, the British were intent on installing the
Maharaja of Johor as their agent of supervision over these states. This was
reflected in the Sri Menanti confederation agreement of 1876;
And we agree that m case of any dispute or difficulty ar;smg
among our States which we are unable to settle, we will refer
for advice to His Highness the Maharajah of Johore.72
In a separate letter to the Maharaja, the governor reserved the right of the
British to intervene directly. By 1885, however, when the British had
become the colonial power, rather than overlord, of the region, Johor was
7C0 882/3.
72The agreement is reprinted in Parkinson, British Intervention, 326.
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prohibited by treaty from interfering with the politics of other Malay
states?’3
The culmination of these trends, both the internal and external
ordering of the Malay states, is evident in the federation of Selangor,
Negeri Sembilan, Perak, and Pahang in 1896. The creation of the federated
Malay States served the interests of further standardization in
administration, transportation, and economic policy. Still, it was carefully
explained to the rulers that, despite the greater authority the British
government possessed to pass legislation for all these states1 “no Raja has
any voice in the affairs of any State, but his own.”74 This was meant to
reassure the rulers that their individual sovereignties would not be
threatened by each other, but they did not fail to notice that state
sovereignty itself had been undermined. At the second conference of
rulers, a ceremonial gathering in 1903, Sultan Idris appealed to the recently
constructed notion of a standardized Malay state to protest the
overcentralization of the federation:
These States are now known as the negri negri bersekutu (the
united countries), but the matter of union (persekutuart) I do
not quite clearly understand; but you are all aware that the
States have become friendly, amicably assisting one another;
if, however, the four States were amalgamated into one,
wouid it be right to say that one State assisted the other,
because assistance implies something more than one, for if
there is only one, which is the helper and which is the
helped? A Malay proverb says that there cannot be two
73Nevertheless, Abu Bakar played out the final act of his instrumentalist role by helping
to bring Pahang into the British fold in 1887.
74Report of the Durbar (Federal Council) at Kuata Kangsar, 13-17 July 1897. CO 273/229.
(Hereafter Durbar.)
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masters to one vessel; neither can there be four Rulers over
one country.75
Despite this critical rote, both the first and second conference of rulers
displayed the success of the new standardization. Having thoroughly
disentangled the respective Malay ruling classes from each others’ political
affairs, Swettenham trumpeted the first meeting of the four Sultans in 1897
as “an event absolutely unprecedented in Malay history.”76 And so it was,
for these four rulers were assembled on British terms, as representatives of
a new kind of polity. The ensemble was political insofar as it ratified the
new federal structure, but individual relations between the respective
rulers were drained of political content. At the second conference, held in
Kuala Lumpur, one highlight for the visiting rulers was a tour of the
Sultan of Selangor’s new istana (royal residence) in Kiang. Once engaged in
alliances and rivalries in a system of regional politics, Malay rulers now
emerged from their individual states to compare notes on each other’s
houses. A British participant in 1903 noted how “the Sultans and Datohs
from different States mixed with each other freely and unreservedly,” and
concluded that such a thing “would have been impossible before the era of
federation.”77
Six years after this conference, British colonial power expanded once
again with the transfer from Siam of Kedah, Perils, Trengganu, and
Kelantan. The rulers of these states were asked to accept a British officer
and to course all their official communications with the other Malay states
75Minutes of the Conference of Chiefs of the Federated Malay States held at Kuala Lumpur
20-23 Juty 1903 Printed in the Supplement to the Selangor Government Gazette, 2 October
1903. CO 469/13. (Hereafter Conference of Chiefs.)
76Db. These meetings are discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
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through him.78 Warily, the Sultan of Trengganu questioned the clause of
the British treaty “requiring him to refrain from taking part in the
adminisfraticrn of any Malay States other than his own.” The British Agent
reassured him that “the clause was not intended to limit in any way His
Highness’s private intercourse with the Rulers of adjacent States, to several
of whom he is con ected by ties of blood or marriage.”79 Though the
formal mechanism for political interaction was left in place, the marriage
alliance was now a purely personal interaction. By this time, the dye was
cast.
The Bureaucratization of Malay Chiefs
The creation of the Federated Malay States (FMS) in 1896 was a landmark
in the consolidaon of British colonial rule. As the northern states and
Johor were then incorporated into the Residential system, it became clear
that the achievement of federation had also been something of an apogee.
These latest additions to the colonial fold successfully resisted being
merged into the FMS, and colonial policy in the decades before World War
II was preoccupied with the problems of centralization and
decentralization. But such limitations should not distract from the
conceptual revolution which was ongoing. British ideological premises—
good government and the delimitation of the Malay State—were
triumphing and being reinforced in each new addition to empire through
the new political economy. In this triumph of the British idiom, it only
remained to define the role of the Malay ruling classes in the working of
78Report of Governor Anderson’s interview with the Suttan of Trengganu, 27 May 1909. CO
273/350.
CO 273/351.
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good governmenL This task, however, signaled the beginning of a new
stage for the Malay elite: the emergence of a fundamental difference in
meaning and role between Malay rulers frajas or Sultans) and the non-
royal aristocracies (chiefs). The final section of this chapter will trace the
origins of this divergence and the eventual transformation of Maiay chiefs
into a bureaucratic elite.80
Throughout the century, the British advanced the ideology of good
government in the Malay states, first as a discourse and then in actual
practice. Ironically, just as the new idiom succeeded in displacing or
redefining Malay political idiom, the British seemed to lose interest in the
project of conversion. Instead of indoctrinating the largely quiescent Malay
ruling class further in good government, the British declined to
incorporate more than a small portion of it into the administration of the
states until quite a late date What accounts for this? Hendnk Maier has
identified a mid-century shift in British attitudes toward Malay culture that
helps explain it. Early British observers—Maler’s merchant-scientists—
approached the Malay world through the eyes of the Scottish
Enlightenment. These men measured the Malays according to a scale of
civilization and found them wanting; they were contemptuous of the
Malays for this reason but believed that all nations wcre capable of
progress. Just like the British, Malays could advance from simple
agriculture to a complex commercial society. A later generation abandoned
this belief in man’s perfectibility, becoming more tolerant and fond of
Malay culture, but believing it inherently and eternally inferior to the
801 wIll use the terms chiefs, aristocracy, and bureaucratic elite synonymously to identify
the non-royal elements of the Malay ruling class under colonial rule. I am not concerned in
this discussion with Malay aristocrats who did not successfully make the transition.
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British. “First free trade and equality of all human beings, then order and
superiority of the white race.”81 The new attitude was no 4oubt encouraged
by the very fact of formal colonial rule: scholar-administrators had control
of the peninsula and did not have to rely on the spread of liberal ideas
throtigh persuasion.
This shift in thinking was exemplified by expansionist colonial
officials like Frederick Weld who were finding their way east in the
interventionist 1870s and 1880s. It was manifest in a new articulation of the
purpose of the British presence. To Weld, Malays were incapable of good
government, the mark of civilization:
Nothing we have done has taught them to govern
themselves, we are merely teachmg them to cooperate with
us in governing under our guidance. . Moreover, I doubt if
Asiaffcs will ever learn to govern themselves, it is contrary to
the genius of their race, of their history, of their religious
system, that they should Their desire is a mild, just and firm
despotism; that we can give them...82
Even the example of the Maharaja of Johor was now discounted. Abu
Bakar was, to Weld, “an exceptional Malay ruler; he has lived all his life
among Europeans; he is intimately bound up with our own government
and has been the personal friend of successive Governors”; but “after all he
has not done much for Johor yet, and we do not know what will come after
him.” To the new generation, Malays might imitate Europeans, but they
could never be authentically civilized.
The ascendancy of this view created a paradox in British dealings
with the Malays. It called into question the earlier justification for
81Hendrik M.J. Maier, In the Center of Authority: The Malay hiicayat Merong
Mahawangsa (Ithaca, NY Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1988), 31, 3344
82C0 273/104.
831b1d.
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Intervention in the Malay states—the ideology of good government—by
denying that the Malays could actually achieve this goal. But at the same
time, It provided a new purpose for the European presence. As Malays
were no longer considered capable of meaningful progress on the scale of
civilization, they became an interesting case of an inferior culture whose
identity should be preserved as the world changed around it. To
accomplish this, “Malay society had to be primarily defined in terms of its
ancient values.”84 British rule would bestow the double blessing of
preserving an ancient culture while showering its contemporary members
with the benefits of peace, justice, and economic development.
Unfortunately, the “ancient values” of Malay society were precisely
what the colonial system sought to destroy in its quest to expand British
capital. Hence the putative preservation of tradition was actually
traditionalism, the conscious selection of appropriate ritual and idiom and
the reconstruction of Malay culture along lines that were compatible with
colonial rule. An early instance of this was the standardization of the
Malay state to facilitate trade, foreign investment, and British control, a
transformation which was presented as a strengthening of Malay
sovereignty and which was accepted as such by Malay rulers. As that
example shows, the ideology of preservation never actually erased that of
good government. The latter was too much at the heart of the whole
British project in Malaya to be effaced the desire tO preserve a political
culture condemned as unviable in the modern world. Traditionalism was
instead an attempt to put preservation in the service of civilization, to
fashion a Malay culture that did not obstruct good government.
84Maier, Center of Authority, 51.
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Traditionalism could not always resolve the inherent tensions between the
two ideologies, but it governed how the British approached the role of the
ruling classes in colonial Malaya.
In the 1870s, the still-cautious Colonial Office criticized the first
generation of Residents for taking on too much responsibility for the day-
to-day running of government in the Malay states and tried to hold them
to the treaty terms of advising. The Residents’ responses made it clear,
however, that the establishment of good government would be a British
endeavor. In Selangor, the Resident protested that the Sultan simply
wasn’t interested:
The pliant, easy-going, trouble-avoiding nature of the Sultan
of this Staterenders him at all times careless in assuming the
reins of Government, and he too willingly places his power in
the hands of the officer accredited to him.85
In Perak, Hugh Low came to a country “under military occupation, and
there was no native Government it in... [With one exception] there was
not a single native authority who had exerted any considerable influence
in former times.., we must first create the Government to be advised.”86
Despite reluctance from above, Malay government was being thoroughly
remade.
Still, the imperative to preserve Malay culture, as well as expediency
and financial austerity, necessitated a certain continuity in the ruling elite.
The ruler himself was a visible manifestation of indigenous culture and
hence indispensable. In Perak, the unpopular Raja Muda Yusuf, a man
passed over by the Malays for the throne, was made first Regent then
CO 882/4.
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Sultan after all other candidates were eliminated by death or implication in
the Birch assassination. Without a Malay monarch, indirect rule could not
be presented as a “peculiar system of Malay administration, tempered by
English honesty and justice.” The retention of the Malay ruler, however,
did not relieve the Resident of any responsibility. Low argued that the Raja
Mudà was “a man of very good natural abilities, but he has no idea of
government, except that the rakyat [subjects] were created to produce
revenues for the rajas, and to be at their entire disposal “ Without a firm
British hand guiding the ruler, good government would be impossible:
If the Raja Muda is to be led to believe that he can act in spite
of the Resident if he pleases, it will soon be seen that the
greatest dissatisfaction will prevail, and we may say goodbye
to all hopes of introducing capital and skill, whether
European or Chinese, into the country.87
Rulers could be molded, however, as attempted with the education of the
sons of ex-Sultan Abdullah in Singapore, where they had “the benefit of
obtaining an insight into civilized manners and customs, and of
recognizing the advantages which a country derives from a proper system
of government.”88 Good rulers could be recognized, as when Swettenham
praised the Sultan of Kedah in 1889 for learning to speak English.89 And
good rulers could be rewarded, as was the Sultan of Selangor, whose
acquiescence was read as loyalty. In fact, the reshaping of the Malay
monarchy would represent the culmination of traditionalism and is the
subject of the next chapter. The role of the non-royal aristocracy under
colonial rule was more ambiguous
871b1d.
88These boys, Raja OLulan and Raja Mansur, were possible successors to Sultan Yusuf. CO
882/3.
89C0 273/162.
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From the beginning, British officials were predisposed to see good,
or at least malleable, rulers surrounded by bad chiefs Birch’s first report
mentioned the “chiefs who almost always attend” Sultan Abdullah and
“exercise some influence over him.” His comments were expanded by the
governor:
Abdullah is always influenced by the Chiefs around him, and
the four mentioned in this paragraph [the Laxamana,
Shahbandar, Rajah Makota, and Mata MataJ are the most
respectable of his advisers He generally listens to the counsel
of a set of scamps, who fight his cocks and smoke opium with
him...90
Besides influencing the ruler, these chiefs and “petty Rajas” (the
desceindants of former rulers) were said to “swarm about the country and
oppress the Rakyat immediately under their control.” Their competition
with each other, according to the governor, “has been one of the great
drawbacks to progress, and will never disappear except under British
rule.”91
Swettenham made similar comments about the chiefs of Selangor,
Sultan Abdul Samad declared that “with the help of Government he will
permit no more of those quarrels amongst his Chiefs which have
depopulated Selangor, nor piracies which have intimidated honest men
from even approaching its shores and rivers.” Swettenham believed that
the Sultan was sincere in his friendship to the British government, but
that without British backing his good intentions would come to naught,
“surrounded as he has been, and would again be, were he left to himself, by
unscrupulous Chiefs, who would not only tacitly oppose him, but by open
CO 882/3.
91Ibid.
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threats would prevent him from making good his promises.”92 Twenty-
five years later, with the expansion of British Malaya into the northern
states, this British attitude was still evident. Governor Anderson met with
the Sultan of Trengganu, a man deeply opposed to the transfer of suzerain
rights from Siam to Britain, and reported that “his present attitude is no
doubt the result of the influence exerted over him by his relations and
advisers.”93
With this outlook, there was some feeling for doing away with the
chiefs altogether, especially in the wake of the Perak debacle:
Assuming... that we are satisfied that most of the principal
Chiefs of the country are disaffected towards us, and dealing
treacherously with us, the question then arises whether, in
the interests of humanity and civilization, we should not
enter into their country and break down their power. In
Malacca and Province Wellesley, no Chief possesses any
political power; indeed the Chiefs are not to be distinguished
from the people, and no one can go through the Malay
Peninsula... without being agreeably surprised at the
difference between the condition of the Malays under Native
rule and the same class of people under English rule.94
But the wholesale dispossession of the chiefs had been ruled out implicitly
when they were granted allowances. Then too, the opposite lesson was as
easily drawn from Perak: without the chiefs the government would have
no way “of gauging the strength of native feeling on questions of proposed
reform.” The aristocracy would not be ignored. Officials in Malaya were
enjoined to “make the best use of existing materials, and... to find and train
up some Chief or Chiefs of sufficient capacity and enlightenment to
appreciate the advantages of a civilized government and to render some
92Report of the Assistant Resident of Selangor, 15 December 1874. CO 882/3.
93C0 273/350.
94Gov. Jervois to the Colonial Office, 2 December 1876. CO 882/3.
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assistance in the government of the country.”95 This decision resulted in
the creation of State Councils on which representatives of the aristocracy
would sit. As there were always more chiefs than available positions, the
British were able to ensure, over time, that prominent chiefs would be
amenable to working within the new system.
More important than their contribution to administration, the State
Councils were meant to reinforce the influence of the principle chiefs
among the people. Once the Colonial Office had opted for preservation, it
became the task of state governments to bolster traditional elites, rather
than “break down their power.” Hugh Low, who developed the State
Council system as Resident of Perak from 1877 to 1889, sought “to raise the
prestige of the Council, and indirectly of its members, by appropriate
ceremonial at its meetings.”96 The rituals included a guard of honor, a
band, and guns firing a salute at the arrival of the Regent to the meeting.
Despite the addition of these foreign-inspired innovations, the State
Council meetings resembled what Eric Hobsbawm calls “responses to
novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations.”97 The
ceremonial nature of Council meetings in the soon-to-be Federated Malay
States, meetings at which no substantive discussion took place, evoked
precolonial royal audiences or muafakat (consultation), where all the
major chiefs were present and were seen to be in agreement with the
ruler.98 The chiefs’ influence on the ruler may have been exercised in
95Lord Canmrvon, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 June 1876. The letter is reprinted in
Parkinson, liritish Intervention, 313-17.
96GullIck, Rulers and Residents: Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1992), 3942.
‘7ErIc Hohsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” in The Invention of Tradition, ed.
Eric Hobshawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 2,
98See Milner, Kerajaan, 46, 74.
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private discussion, but the State Council meetings, marked by European
procedure and the presence of the Resident, were more analogous to
formal, public audiences in the batai (ceremonial hail).99 Perhaps precisely
because the new ritual had this historic resonance, membership in the
essentially powerless State Councils were valued within the Malay
community.
Only the most powerful chiefs in a state became members of the
State Councils, however, and there were consequently many chiefs left
with neither role nor means. Descendants of Sultans, even if they held no
current office, received small pensions, and those with clear claims to
traditional sources of revenue were awarded allowances, but most got little
and many got nothing. Suddenly finding themselves on the outside of the
new system and having difficulty adapting to their reduced circumstances,
many Malay chiefs became indebted to moneylenders and the colonial
government.100 Still, a new type of government needed to be constructed
in the states to ensure law and order and collect revenues. Could work not
be found for the Malay aristocracy in this endeavor?
In keeping with the mandate to preservei a strong argument was
made for continuity at the level of local administration. Frank
Sweftenham’s views on this topic were influential. Swettenham argued in
favor of retaining the jurisdiction of Malay penghutus over sub-districts
DIssent was not often voiced in public. This was a point of contention in the 1914-15
dispute between the Kedah State Council and the colonial government over whether the
Regent, acting as Sultan, would attend State Council meetings. Kedah argued that as theirs
was a working State Council, there was the possibility that the Regent would be outvoted
by the Council, and this would harm the dignity of the Sultan’s position. J. de Vere Allen,
“The Elephant and the Mousedeer—A New Version: Mglo-Kedah Relations, 1905-1915,”
JMBRAS 41,1 (1968): 88-92.
t00Gulllck, Malay Society in the Late Nineteenth Century (Singapore: Oxford University
Press, 1989), 75-77.
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(mukim) with populations ranging from five hundred to two thousand.
By employing these influential headmen, Swettenham hoped, “we should,
in engaging their servIces, enlist also their sympathies on the side of a
Government which supported them and their traditions,”101 He also noted
how successfully native headmen might obstruct justice were they not
included in its administration. But here the contradiction between
preservation and good government surfaced. Swettenham wanted at the
same time “to preserve the accepted customs and traditions of the country”
and “to teach [the Malays] the advantages of good government and
enlightened policy.” The penghutus he wanted to retain had inherited
their positions from their fathers, along with substantial property and
social standing in their villages of residence; this was the source of the
influence Swettenham wanted at the disposal of the government. The
quäliffës he sought in native officers would not likely be föünd in those
same individuals: penghutus must be able to read and write, file weekly
and monthly reports, serve as magistrates, take the census, and collect
revenue from the local population without “squeezing” (appropriating
surplus in the time-honored Malay fashion). Swettenham displayed the
contradiction at the heart of his recommendations when he considered the
relation of the police to the Malay penghutu: “Place a Police Station in this
man’s village, and what will happen? Can you place the Police under him?
Certainly not. You can’t place disciplined men under an undisciplined
officer.”
101Citations in this paragraph are from Swettenham’s “Proposals for the government of
Perak through its Headmen with a small Auxiliary Police Force” and “Some arguments in
favOur of governing Perak through its Headmen,” both written in 1876 and Included in the
1883 report, Local District Administration, commissioned by Weld In 1882. CO 273/120.
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When the situation of local administration was reviewed in the
early 1880s, it was clear that little had been done to overcome the inherent
contradiction. Penghutus did not receive regular salaries in the Malay
villages of Penang and were judged tU be “a sad failure,” “an obstruction to
justice,” “untrustworthy,” and of “little or no assistance... to the police.”02
The system of penghulu administration had “fallen into disuse” in Sungai
Ujung. In Perak, there were not very many penghulus and those in office
were not considered to be successfully fulfilling their duties, especially in
the area of revenue collection, This situation was attributed to the lack of
European supervision, which was intended to provide instruction and
financial oversight. In Selangor, the chiefs were “a useful link between the
Government under the Residential system and the rakyat/’ but were not
trusted with revenue collection. The result of these early failures is well
known. The office of penghutu was indeed retained and expanded so that
the face of colonial rule in the village remained Malay. But the substance
of the office was to serve good government. To accomplish this reshaping
of local Malay government, control of penghulu appointments and their
supervision was done by a new layer of state administration: the European
district officer. Now both the top stratum of government (the ruler) and
the bottom stratum (the penghutu) remained Malay. The middle ranges,
formerly the province of the powerftd district chiefs, were replaced by
British officers.
There was some effort to match the numerous chiefs needing
support with work needing to be done, and some underemployed chiefs
102CItaffons In this paragraph are from the reports of the Lieutenant-Governor of Penang
and the Residents of Sungai Ujung, Perak, and Selangor. They ate included in I..ocal District
Administration. CO 273/120.
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were appointed as penghulus in the early years. But most considered that
title “derogatory to one of high rank/’103 and the use of for erly powerful
chiefs to assist European district officers met with a predictable lack of
success. Most of those who held positions on account of their claim to an
allowance held those positions in name only, and were embittered by their
inability to maintain followers and command the labor of the people—that
Is, by the final defeat of the Malay idiom of power. Neither did the colonial
state in its early stages require so many personnel as to absorb the ranks of
the abundant Malay aristocracy. In fact, with certain exceptions, the chiefs
who experienced the transition to colonial rule in the western states were
something of a “lost generation!’ It was their sons, some of whom were
trained by the British, who would be in a position to rebound after the turn
of the century. By this time, of course, colonial rule was firmly
consolidated and, in the FMS, highly centralized. The tasks of
administration were becoming more complex technically and legally, and
in the ranks of administrators Malays were scarcely to be seen.
In 1903, Malay ruling class dissatisfaction with its negligible role in
state administration was highlighted at the rulers’ conference held in
Kuala Lumpur. Meant to “afford the Rulers and Chiefs of the different
States an opportunity of meeting and exchanging views in friendly
conversation,” the conference had no mandate to change policy.
Nevertheless, the agenda was supposed to reflect Malay concerns, so it is
noteworthy that the second item for discussion was the further
employment of Malays in the government service.104 Although frank
03Sadka, Protected Malay States, 276.
04Conference of Chiefs.
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Sweftenham in his opening remarks (as High Commissioner for the
Federated Malay States) regretted that the “national characteristics” of the
Malays made it difficult for them to take advantage of the opportunities
afforded them, it is dear that the obstacles were more structural. Only 874
Malays were employed by government departments (not including the
police) and an additional 587 as penghutus and magistrates in the FMS in
1903. Obstacles to the employment of Malays at the higher levels of the
civil service were said to be the severely competitive civil service exam
and the need to demonstrate knowledge of the law, in other words, a lack
of education.105 Sultan Idris of Perak pointed out the increasing interest of
all Malays in education and asked that suitable government employment
be reserved for Malays and not offered to other nationalities.
A certain changing of the guard is reflected in the remarks made at
this conference. Swettenharn, whose views on the educability of the
Malays was quite dear, was nearing retirement. Younger officers, members
of a “pro-Malay campaign,” were moved by the argument that indirect rule
mandated a greater role for Malays in the government.106 According to J.P.
Rodger, the Resident of Selangor:
It must never be forgotten that these are protected Malay
States and not British Colonies and that the British Officials
are here to advise and assist and not to supersede the rulers in
the administration of their own States.107
105Three Malay clerks in Perak the following year petitioned the government to exempt
them from passing the Senior Grade Examination on the basis of their poor educational
background. The request was denied, but helped convince the government to upgrade Malay
education. CO 273/303.
106 See P.L. Burns’ introduction to the 1971 historical reprint edition of RJ. Wilkinson,
Papers on Malay Subjects (Kuala Lumpur Oxford University Press, 1971)
10’Conference of Chiefs.
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The contrivance of a protectorate never hindered the expansion of British
dominance over Malay society. The term did accurately describe, however,
an important aspect of the task of preservation. The position of the Malay
ruling class was consistently protected, both within Malay society and
against the growing interests of Chinese and Indian immigrants. This
understanding of the protectorate also shaped the consequent expansion of
Malay education and participation in the government. When the English-
medium Malay College at Kuala Kangsar (MCKK) was founded in 19O5 it
was treated by Malay royalty and British authorities as a preserve for the
sons of royalty and aristocracy. And when, in the 1920s and 1930s, Chinese
and Indian residents of the FMS argued strongly for the opening of the
civil services to non-Malays, the British reaffirmed their commitment to
protect the special position and privileges of the Malays; in practice, the
Maláyrulingdass.
In 1910, the Malay Administrative Service (MAS) was established in
the Federated States as a junior bureaucratic service.108 Most of its recruits
came from the MCKK and were, therefore, sons of the aristocracy. This
new bureaucratic elite was the site where traditional authority met the
colonial state, where preservation met progress. Malay officers within the
MAS were always subordinate to Europeans, usually posted to remote, all-
Malay, non-productive regions, and slowly promoted. As in colonial
Africa, the British established “neo-traditions of hierarchy and
subordination” to which aristocracies had exclusive access.109 Although
1085ee Khasnor Johan’s excellent study, The Emergence of the Modern Malay
Administrative Elite (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984).
1095ee Terence Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,” In The Invention of
Tradition, 220-22.
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relegated to subordinate postures, the Malay bureaucrats enjoyed
enOrmous prestige in Malay society. Their place in the official hierarchy
gave the impression of “immense power,” which was enhanced by their
adoption of Western styles of leisure activity, dress, and transportation.
The prestige they enjoyed came more from the officers’ association with
government than with their birth.110 To the Malay public with whom they
were in dose contact, “Malay Officers personified achievement” and were
“the embodiment of progress and a testimony to the advantages of an
English education and a regular income.”111 Ideologically, the high status
of the MAS represented the adoption of the good government idiom by
Malay society.
While Malay bureaucrats in the PMS enjoyed great prestige but little
power, those in the Unfederated Malay States (Kedah, Perils, Kelantan,
Trengganu, and Johor) retained more actual responsibility and control.
These states had undergone varying degrees of self-imposed
bureaucratization in an effort to stave off European controL When the
advance eventually came, the British found, in Kedah for example, a “fully
organized central administration composed of Malays, some of them men
of considerable ability and individuality... it would be highly impolitic and
undesirable to displace the Malays.”112 This state of affairs, as well as
anticipated resistance to any loss of Malay control, resulted in the retention
of more responsibility in Malay hands in the UMS than in the FMS.
110Khasnor, Malay Administrative Elite, 176.
111Th1d., 177, 190-92.
112According to Governor Anderson, who visited the state shortly after its transfer from
Slam to Britain. CO 273/351.
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Khasnor Johan argues that there was “no significant conflict”
between the traditional ruling class and the new elite in the FMS. The
former provided most of the MAS. recruits and had considerable say in the
selection process.113 In fact, the incorporation of the aristocracies into
colonial bureaucracies was a real extension of royal power and would be an
important bridge to the continued dominance of ruling class families over
political power in the postcolonial period. As a ruling class, the royal
families and the bureaucratized aristocracies had shared interests vis-ã-vis
both the British and the lower classes. In the FMS, for example,
the Malay Officers were alert to the opportunities which
arose to use the members of the traditional ruling class as
their own mouthpiece It was not uncommon for a small
group of the more senior of the Malay Officers to get together
informally before their rulers went into conference with the
British and decide what subjects each sultan or ruler would be
“made” to raise with the authorities... In this way some of the
sultans and other aristocrats often became channels for the
ideas and aspirations of the Malay Officers.114
The pursuit Of shared interests can be seen in the unfederated states as
well. In Trengganu, the colonial government broke the ruling class hold
on political and economic power in the wake of the 1928 revolt. Aristocrats
and royal family alike were reduced to well-compensated functionaries of
the colonial state. Unlike in a federated state, however, the ruling class in
Trengganu filled most of the non-technical positions in the
administration; it used entrenched positions to protect special privileges
and economic interests. The Trengganu Civil Service was the preserve of
113Khasnor, Malay Administrative Elite, 3, 4849.
1141bid., 171.
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the old ruling class and retained the hierarchical tone of social superior
and subordinate in its relations with the public.’15
But the wielding of power through bureaucratic positions could also
be at odds with royal power. The reiatively high educational status and
administrative position of the bureaucrats bred attitudes of pride and
achievement that were said to jar the sensibilities of those at the Malay
courts, where the bureaucrats, especially the small nwnber of commoners
among them, were systematically cut own to size. The strict etiquette and
social hierarchy at court took no account of the prestige of modern
administration, education, and function. Malay officers particularly
resented performing obeisance and being required to sit on the floor,
Malay-style, while British officers were provided with chairs. Nevertheless,
these were the terms on which a portion of the Malay aristocracy was
incorporated into the workings of government. They had to be accepted,
though they represented a real limit to the achievement of bureaucratic
competence.
But for the ideology of preservation, the reconstruction of power
along bureaucratic lines might have represented the final conversion of
the Malay aristocracy to the British ideology of good government, the
conversion of kerajaan to pen tadbiran (administration) Traditionalism
demanded instead that Malay identity be tied firmly to the deference and
hierarchy of court life, an identification actively endorsed by Malay rulers.
In 1903, Sultan Idris opposed sending Malay boys to England to study, for
115Shahard Tahb, After Its Own Image The Trengganu Experience 1881-1941 (Srngapote
Oxford University Press, 1984), 222-27, and Heather Sutherland, “The Tammg of the
Trengganu Elite,” in Southeast Asian Transitions: Approaches through Social History, ed.
Ruth McVey (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 83-84.
90
education abroad “tends to denationalize them and lessens their
knowledge of their own language, religion and country.”116 The education
Malays received at the MCKK was informed by this concern, It was not
particularly challenging, focusing more on “character-building” than
intellectual development. Throughout the prewar period, MCKK
graduates had difficulty passing the Senior Cambridge Exam, qualifying for
entrance to Raffles College in Singapore, and studying the law they needed
m their MAS posts117 Quite simply, the kind of training needed to
participate more successfully in British-style administration would
inevitably produce a bureaucratized chiefly class poised to compete with
the Malay courts and, eventually, the British themselves To prevent the
fulfillment of this potential, access to transformative education was tightly
restricted and the objective of limited achievement was built into the
system of English education in Malaya.
The strength of the Malay bureaucracy was also kept in check. The
number of recruits to the MAS was low, the total corps never exceeding
ninety-one before World War U. In addition to the MAS elite, a very small
number of Malays held technical posts, while a much larger group filled
clerical positions at the bottom rungs of the administrative ladder. By 1931,
English-educated Malay government servants totaled less than fifteen
116Rj. Wilkinson, 12 December 1903. CO 273/303. The Sultan was backed up in this opinion
by first-generation British administrator Hugh Clifford, whose fictional Resident of a
fictional Pahang says of a prince educated in England, “It is a thousand pities, to my
thinking, that he was ever taken out of his proper environment The Malay guided by white
mfluence is all right, the denabonalized Malay is the devil” Saleh A Prince of Malaya
Smgapore Oxford University Press, 1989), 167
Ll7See Khasnor, Malay Administrative Elite, especially chapters 5-7.
9;
hundred.118 BritiSh ambivalence toward the chiefs and the fears of the
Malay courts resulted in the creation of an aristocracy which perfectly
reflected the contradictions between the competing ideologies of good
government and preservation.
This chapter has described the ideological transformation undergone by the
Malay ruling class under first British paramountcy and then colonial rule.
It has argued that even before the British extended formal colonial rule
over the Malay states; a British discourse of good government and
civilization had become pervasive in Malay politics. Transitions to
colonial rule provided further opportunity to entrench the British
discourse, as Malay political institutions were reshaped through a newly
imposed political economy. The new relationship of economic to political
power in Malay society was at once the result of expediency by the British
and an attempt to survive as a ruling class by Malay rulers and chiefs. At
the same time, the very definition of the Malay polity was adjusted to
accord with the needs of colonial control and capital penetration. The
result was a series of territorially defined states with distinct ruling classes
who professed the desire for progress, good government, education, and
bureaucratic positions. Ideological premises which two generations earlier
were seen as alien and English were universalized, and by the early 1900s,
seen as modern and good.
Yet the survival of the Malay ruling class was not without
contradiction. Once in direct control of Malaya, the British no longer
1181b1d., 65; William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur:
Penerbitan Universill Malaya, 1980), 120-21. ThIs number does not represent the entire
bureaucratic elite, as UMS administration was conducted In Malay.
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needed, or believed In, the ability of Maays to become civilized. Although
god government would still be brought to the Malay states, the
indigenous elite itself was no longer essential to the process. Instead, it
became representative of an ancient culture that had to be preserved while
the world changed around it. The Malay ruling class responded to the
contradiction between civilization and preservation in ways that caused a
rift to develop within it. On the one hand, it consistently lobbied the
British for the right to govern, leading to the bureaucratization of the
aristocracies. Although the achievement of the new bureaucratic elite was
sharply limited, it was clearly imbued with the modern, good government
ethos On the other hand, the rulers took to heart the British project of
preservation through traditionalism. This redefinition of Malay court
culture in the service of colonial rule will be the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 3
RITUALS OF STATE AND THE NEW MALAY RULERS
hi the previous chapter, I discussed the gradual acceptance by the Malay
ruling class of the ideological premises of British colonial rule: good
government and economic development within territorially defined,
politically distinct, and bureaucratically administered Malay states. I also
examined the contradiction caused by the British abandoning their belief in
the ability of Malays to become truly civilized. The ensuing tension
between civilization and preservation was partially resolved through the
mechanism of traditionalism, an effort to construct a modern version of
an ancient Malay culture that would not impedegood government. The
Malay elite responded to the imperatives of both civilization and
preservation. With little British encouragement, the courts sponsored the
limited bureaucratization of the aristocracy in pursuit of good government.
At the same time, the rulers developed their own position along
traditionalist lines with much stronger British backing. This chapter will
focus on the meaning and political purposes of the resulting apotheosis of
the Malay sultanate.
J.M. Guffick has recently provided students of Malay history with a
richly detailed narrative, Eulled from colonial files and memoirs, on the
development of the residential system in the late nineteenth and early
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twentieth centuries.1 Gullick presents this evidence to show that colonial
government was a “joint effort... a process to which the Malay Ruler, if he
chose, could make a substantial contribution.”2 Here and elsewhere,
Gullick offers many examples of the “partly traditional, partly Islamic, and
partly colonial” ceremonies that developed in those years.3 I agree with
Gullick that the Malay rulers made a substantial contribution, but not so
much to administration as to the development of new rituals of state. This
chapter benefits from Gulhck’s work and hopes to build on it by offering a
framework for understanding the importance of these new rituals in the
years of British influence and rule.
I will argue that the centralization of Malay states, as well
innovations in the rulers’ public demeanor and ceremonial, were projects
embraced by both the rulers and their British protectors, each for their own
reasons. The result was a hybrid royalty Which artlculted a serviceable
version of Malay culture within the structures of authority of British
colonialism. This new articulation of Malay tradition served to legitimize
both the Malay royalty in the Malay context and British overlordship of the
Malay world.
It has often been observed that what the Malay ruling class lost in
“real power” to British advisers, it made up in status, wealth, and stability.
The Malay ruling class lost the right to collect revenues from the rakyat
(subject class) and the practices of debt bondage and kerah (corvee labor); it
essentially lost the power to run the affairs of state. In return, the British
1J.M. Gullick, Rulers and Residents: Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920
Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1992).
Ibid., vi.
3J.M. Gullick, Malay Society in the Late Nineteenth Century (Singapore: Oxford University
Press, 1989), 33.
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reaffirmed the fairly rigid class system and regularized the rewards for
being in the upper class. The ambivalently regarded chiefs often had to
scramble to maintain a place in the smaller British-defined ruling class, but
the position, income, and prestige of the rulers was guaranteed. At the
pinnacle of the system, regular salaries supported the royal retinue, whose
increasingly opulent lifestyles came to reflect those of European royalty.4
To participants and observers alike, this process was ostensibly the
“strengthening” of elite Malay culture, made possible by the overlordship
of a protecting power. This was not, in fact, what was occurring.
Underneath the familiar form which Malay leadership retained, the
substance and purpose of its existence were being transformed. On the
simplest level, glamorized and visible Malay rulers helped disguise the
highly interventionist nature of indirect rule, offering proof that British
Malaya still consisted of sovereign Malayo-Muslim sultanates. More
importantly, new rituals, constructed partly of what Hobsbawm calls
“ancient materials”5 and partly borrowed from British imperial forms,
served to articulate an entirely new structure of authority. The new
traditions were thoroughly successful in establishing “continuity with a
suitable historic past,”6 while legitimizing British overlordship of the
Malay world.
It is important to emphasize that this development of a new style
monarchy was not simply imposed by the British on conquered Malay
40r of European ideas of Muslim royally. For the transfonnaffon of the Sultan of Selangor’s
residence from a large Malay house on stilts in 1874 to a Moorish palace In 1899, see
William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Universiti
Malaya, 1980), pictures facing p. 146.
5lric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” in The Invention of Tradition, ed.
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 6.
6p3jj 1.
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rajas, though imperial culture and political imperatives had great
influence. Rather, the process represented the response of Malay leaders to
the changing realities of the Malay world, an accommodation to the
cultural and economic power of the overlord in Singapore. The pace of this
transformation was set early on by the interest of individual rulers and
only later by British control over matters of succession Rulers of future
unfederated states often presented developed versions of the new personal
style even before they were under official British control. By and large
colonial officials encouraged the development of the new style, which they
interpreted as cooperation and as a sign of appreciation for their culture
and administration
The following three sections discuss the project of traditionalism in
relation to the centralization of political power before and during Colonial
rule; the invention of new royal styles and rituals in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries; and the question of initiative—British and
Malay—in this invention. The final section examines how the hybrid
royalty maintained its meaning in a reified version of traditional Malay
society, while lending legitimacy to colonial domination.
Centralizing Impulses of Malay Rulers and British Imperialists
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Malay politics in the west
coast states had been much effected by the changing economic
environment in Southeast Asia. This was especially true of those areas
where tin was mined Growing European demand for tm encouraged the
immigration of large numbers of Chinese miners, whose labor was
financed by European and Chinese capital from the Straits Settlements. In
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these circumstances, political conflict within the Malay ruling class—a
continuing feature of Malay political life—became bound up with
competition between Chinese groups and Straits economic interests.7
Escalating economic conflict and civil wars ultimately lent justification to
direct British intervention in those states.
One factor used to justify intervention was what British observers
interpreted as the “decay” of the Malay political system—the dispersal of
power from “central governments” (the rulers) to district chiefs (or
aristocrats). Although rulers obtained tax revenues from the tin trade,
chiefs could move out of the ruler’s reach to gain a far greater share of
revenues on the spot from tin, spirits, and gambling. These chiefs often
had financial stakes in the tin industry as well, backed by Straits merchants
who sought their cooperation both to ensure the success of their endeavors
and to serve as a check on the Chinese miners.8 The result in Perak, for
example, was that the development of the tin industry “meant a growing
independence among the great Perak chiefs; by the middle of the
nineteenth century most of the real power rested in their hands.”9
Although the power of the chiefs in this period was marked, it was
still within a range of power relations historically observed between rulers
and chiefs in the Malay states. Despite the beleaguered court in Perak
invoking a zaman mas (golden age) when chiefs obeyed the rulers as the
normal state of affairs, there was in fact always an “inner tension within
7IChoo Kay Kim, The Western Malay States 28504873: The Effects of Commercial
Development on Malay Politics (Kuala Lumpur Oxford University Press, 1972)
8J.M. Gullick, Indigenous Potiticat Systems of Western Malaya (London: University of
London, Athlone Press, 1958), 127-30.
9Barbara Watson Andaya, “The Nature of the State in Eighteenth Century Perak,” in Pre
Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia, ed. A. Reid and L. Castles (Kuala Lumpur:
MBRAS Monograph, no.6,1975), 35.
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the political system as each individual sultan sought to establish and assert
his position vis-à-vis his officials Sultans did not rule absolutely, rarely
did they act without consulting the powerful chiefs of their state.11
Malay history holds examples of both powerful, active rulers and
weak, retiring ones, and O.W. Wolters has illustrated how Malay society
was most successful when it had a ruler “whose sovereignty benefited his
loyal subjects and whose initiative ensured unity of purpose.” Yet he also
notes that Malay society was “riddled with centrifugal tendencies.”12 A
ruler’s political power, over and above the meaning he gave to the whole
politico-religious system, depended much on his personality, and rulers
who successfully arrogated power to themselves stand out as exceptions In
the nineteenth century, with the growing state power of Siam and the
Straits Settlements both threatening and providing an example, a growing
number of rulers centralized their own states to order to retain or increase
royal power. Baginda Omar of Trengganu (r. 1839-76) “succeeded in
overriding the territorial headmen and drawing all revenues directly into
his own hands.”13 Ahmad Tajuddin of Kedah fr. 1854-79) built a
modernized, yet still personally controlled Malay government out of the
ruins of direct rule by Siam.14 Other examples include Muhammad II
(Mulut Merah) of Kelantan (r. 1838-86) and Temenggung Ibrahim of Johor
(r. 1841-62). Even in Selangor, famous for decentralization of power,
101b1d.
1See, for example, ibid., 30; GulHck, indigenous Political Systems; and Heather
Sutherland, “The Taming of the Trengganu Elite,” in Southeast Asian Transitions:
Approaches through Social History, ed. Ruth McVey (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1978), 34-5.
l2ç Wolters, The Fall of SHvijaya in Malay History (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University PresS, 1970), 17-18.
13Sutherland, “Trengganu Elite,” 37-8.
14J.M. Gullick, Rulers and R&dents, 138.
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hereditary posts were allowed to fall vacant in an effort to reduce the
power of the aristocracy. Differences in the relative power of rulers and
chiefs, between states and over time, then, argue that the ideal Malay state
with an effective ruler at its apex was just that—an ideal. The ideal can be
acknowledged to exert a pull on political behavior without assigning to
one or another situation the label of “true” Malay political culture. A wide
range of scenarios, including both highly autonomous chiefs in the west
coast states and centralizing rulers in the north and east, can still be
recognizable as “Malay politics.”
One mechanism of increasing state power in nineteenth century
Malaya was the creation of effective bureaucracies, but this carried an
inherent risk to royal power. Through meritocracy and strict bookkeeping,
bureaucratization could threaten what was increasingly construed as a
ruler’s arbitrary and excessive power. The challenge to royal power of
native meritocracy was avoided for a time by employing foreign talent at
the ruler’s discretion—Europeans or foreign (i.e., out of state) Malays with
experience in the Straits Settlements. Likewise, budgetary control was an
area of administration left undeveloped before the British took power.
Revenues might have been collected according to increasingly routinized
procedures, but their disbursal was still in the form of grants and gift by
rulers, not subject to control by state treasuries. As Guffick notes in the case
of Kedah, budgetary control “would have imposed on the Ruler a degree of
self-denial which ran counter to the ethos of the period.”5 In short,
bureaucratization could easily become a weapon in the hands of
151b1d., 139.
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“reformist” chiefs seeking, in the name of modernization, to push back the
gains many rulers had made.
Once British control had been consolidated in a state, it became clear
that effective power would be vested in European-run bureaucracies and
exercised in accordance with the ideology of good government and
administrative competence. It was at this point that rulers encouraged the
entry of more Malays, and specifically native Malays, into their state
administrations, as discussed in the previous chapter. Insofar as any
members of the Malay ruling class could be inducted into the
administrative realm, rulers could extend their influence in the rapidly
changing political and economic milieu. This bureaucratic empowerment
of the ruling class as a whole, however, was still not without danger to the
rulers. The same process that transformed Malay chiefs into bureaucratic,
salaried elites threatened to reduce royal families to the level of primes
inter pares, or worse. Luckily, the prevailing colonial traditionalism gave
the rulers an opportunity to elaborate their authority in an entirely
different sphere, based not on the idea of administrative competence, but
by an appeal to tradition.
In precolonial Malaya, the amount of political and economic power
an individual ruler might command was not where the significance of the
ruler (qua ruler, not paramount chief) was to be found. A.C. Mimer’s study
of precolonial political reality shows the ruler to have been “the organizing
principle in the Malay world,” the center of the Malay political system.16
This appraisal is confirmed by the longevity of the institution and the
16A.C. Milner, Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve of COlonial Rule (Tucson,
ArIz.: University of Arizona Press, 1982), 94.
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desire of a ruler’s rivals to occupy, not destroy, the office. According to
Milner, “men considered themselves to be living not in states or under
goveinments, but in a kerajaan, in the ‘condition of having a raja.”17 The
“maximization of spiritual rewards,” not power or social control,
motivated men to action, and it was the raja who made these rewards
possible:’8
Subjects... received little material benefit from their Rajas:
they gained in what appear to be insubstantial ways; they
received titles and articles of attire rather than disposable
wealth.19
The ruler’s greatness was measured by his behavior and propriety,
his action in accordance with custom, and, above all, his performance of
ceremonial functions, whether in everyday life or in wartime:
The Raja... is presented [in the Hikayat DetiJ as being involved
not in day-to-day administration but in formal state occasions.
Like the ruler portrayed in the Hikayat Pahang, he was valued
more for his manners than his practical skills [W]hen
dispatching a force, the Sultan is said to address his men in a
graceful (manis) voice.20
In this political reality, ceremonial—weddings, funerals, rites of passage—
was work, not entertainment or mere trapping, and contemporary
observers noted that it was the main business of a ruler.21
British observers who expected a ruler to monopolize at once
military, economic, and symbolic power misread the contemporary
strength of tin belt aristocrats as a sign of the political system’s decay. To
those Straits Settlements merchants and officials who favored
T7IbId., 114.
181b1d., x.
19Thid., 98.
21Th1d., 45, 49.
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intervention in western Malaya, this interpretation justified their
preferred cOtirse of action. The perceived decay, as well as the overall
decline of Malay power in the region vis-à-vis the Europeans, argued the
need for European protection. An authoritative British retrospective
written on the eve of decolonization illustrates this interpretation of Malay
politics:
Too often a Malay ruler had little except fear of his divine
majesty to enforce his will, and relatives often had little
respect for that obsolescent divinity and fought him for the
throne Moreover dense forests cut up the little Malay
kingdoms mto disthcts where local chiefs did what was right
m their own eyes These difficulties were surmounted under
British protection 22
Such protection was meant to halt the decay and preserve the culture by
restoring the ruler to his rightful place at the apex of the system, though
now political and economic power would rest in (capable) British hands
through the system of residential advice within a territorially bounded
state.
In the previous chapter, I discussed how the standardization of state
structure was integral to the extension of foreign control. In conjunction
with preservation, it also proved useful to ruling families seeking to
establish dominance over chiefly competitors. While previously the
existence of a ruler had given meaning, though not modern territorial
definition, to a state, the territorial clarification of the Malay peninsula
produced newly defined states which now required proper rulers. Thus a
standardization of political leadership accompanied that of state structure,
as can be seen in the British recognition of the rulers of Johor, Pahang, and
22FJthard Winstedt, The Malays: A Cultural History, 5th ed. (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1961. First published 1947), 178.
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Kedah as Sultans. Until about 1880, the British government in Singapore
backed, and benefited from, the expanding influence of Temenggung Abu
Bakar of Johor, as well as his elevation to the title of Maharaja. As
discussed in greater detail below, by the time Abu Bakar aspired to the title
of Sultan, his usefulness to Singapore was over. Yet becawe of years of
demonstrated commitment to “enlightened” government, Abu Bakar won
from London the right to use the title Sultan. In Pahang, Bendahara
Ahmad, an autocratic ruler who emerged from civil war in a position of
supremacy over the chiefs of his state, declared hir self Sultan in 1882. He
took this step to increase his authority in an ultimately futile effort to fend
off British political encroachments which had followed commercial
investment. In 1887, with the consolidation of colonial control over his
state, the British recognized his title as well. In Kedah, British concern
about Siamese intentions was expressed through their attitude toward the
Malay ruler:
.there is no disguising the fact that, whereas we regard the
Raja of Kedah as the rightful and hereditary Sultan of Kedah,
and a decision of the Supreme Court in Penang has
recognised him as a sovereign ruler, the Siamese choose to
treat him as a Provincial Governor. A pretence might,
therefore, at any time be found for getting rid of him if
Bangkok Siamese wished to handle the revenue of the
country.23
The case of Negeri Sembilan appears to provide a counter-example,
but only at first glance. In 1909, the Yam Tuan appealed to “old custom” in
claiming the right to use the title Sultan. The British refused him that
right, holding that the two titles were not interchangeable: the position of
23Report of a consular Tour in the Malay States and Siamese Provinces, North of Penang, 6
April 1889. CO 273/160.
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Yam Tuan had been arranged in the 1898 agreement with the other chiefs
of the Negeri Sembilan, while only the British king could grant the title of
Sultan.
The title of Sultan has a certain meaning to us. It means that
the holder of the title is the absolute lawgiver in the place
from which he takes the title and the King’s permission to use
the title m this country is based on that difference24
The Yam Tuan was responding to the standardization of states and
leadership occurring all around him. With the general elevation of Malay
rulers to the office of Sultan1 he would have found his own title devalued.
The British government, on the other hand, clearly wished to retain the
distinctiveness of the Minangkabau-based polity. In practice, the Yam
Tuan’s title did not rob him of the benefits of the standardization process
and his status was equivalent to the other rulers. The standardization of
both geography and political authority—the Malay peninsula divided into
territorial states headed by Sultans—first provided a kind of grammar for
the Malays and the British to conduct relations in the era of interstate
rivalry in the Malay world. It later provided a way for the Malays to
recognize their own culture under colonial rule.
Over this period, then, Malay states became more uniform and
centralized in their structure, governance, and leadership, dtié variously to
the demands of British and Chinese investment (Johor), direct colonial
intervention (Selangor, Perak, Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang), and the
24Nos of a meeting held at Kuala Kangsar on 14 August 1909. Those present were High
Commissioner John Anderson, Yang di Per Tuan Besar (Yam Tuan) of Negeri Sembilan
(Tungku Mohamed), E.W. Birch (Resident of Perak, Resident of Negeri Sembilan at the
time of the 1898 treaty), D.C. Campbell (Resident of Negeri Sembitan), R.J. Wilkinson
(Secretary to the Resident of Perak, as translator), the Tungku Besar, the Tungku
Laksamana. CO 273/351.
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initiative of centralizing rulers fin all cases). This centralization of power
occurred throughout the peninsula and was aimed at strengthening royalty
vis-ä-vis both “domestic” (chiefly) and “foreign” (British or Siamese)
competition. In this period of rapid change, imperfectly masked by the
project of preservation, Malay royalty showed similar initiative in
elaborating the style and substance of traditional leadership.
The New Malay Ruler
Confirming a ruler’s position while completely undermining his political
and economic power was, in British eyes, the making of a “constitutional
monarch,” a head of state compatible with good government. To the
British, enhancing the ceremonial aspects of a ruler’s life while cutting off
access to the state treasury, for example, rendered him “symbolic”—
essentially powerless, but still in a better position than as an independent
ruler with little control over his district chiefs. The emphasis on a ruler’s
ceremonial role in the colonial state was consistent with this
understanding. To the Malays, however, ceremonial was the most
important work a ruler could undertake, even as some became interested
in new concerns like education. The evolution of new style and
ceremonial under indirect rule therefore had a dual effect—both to
perpetuate kerajaan through Malay political idiom and to simultaneously
legitimize colonial rule.
The emphasis on ceremonial brought changes to the rulers’ lives
which occurred in three related areas: the development of a new manner
of living greatly influenced by European models of royalty; enhanced
public ceremonial, and greater public visibility In process as well as
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product, the transformation was a joint venture, initiated by the British
desire to “strengthen” the rulers and perpetuated by the rulers themselves,
who embraced the opportunity to enhance their own position. The British
contributed with the introduction of new ceremonies and functions and
also by example, as rulers began to emulate the style of British authority
(i.e., Governors on tour)25 and to visit centers of British poweri26 The
active participation of the rulers and the enthusiasm of British officials for
Malay history ensured that the evolving new traditions retained enough
“ancient material” to• look familiar.
The Royal Person
The most basic project in the restoration of the Malay ruler was the
enhancement of his personal manner of living. Jn th mid- to late
nineteenth century, thern life of a Malay ruler was far from glamorous. In
1846, a European observer described the plain lifestyle of the powerful
Baginda Omar of Trengganu; his clothes were good but shabby and worn.
The rulers’ houses and their furnishings were much like those of their
subjects, only bigger. Their food was plain. What distinguished a member
of the ruling class was the size of his household and his ability to demand
services from the rakyat. Rulers often had more than one household; if
they had several wives, they needed to support them all in like fashion,
25The construction of British ceremonial on which the rulers were modeling themselves was
occurring at the very same time. See David Cannadine, “The Context, Performance and
Meaning of Ritual The British Monarchy and the ‘Invention of Tradition’, c 1820-1977,” in
Invention of Tradition, ed. Hobsbawm and Ranger, 101-64.
26S Charles Burton Buckley, An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore 2819-1867
(1902, reprint, with introduction by C M Tumbull, Singapore Oxford University Press,
1984), 681, 687 In the two-year period 1860-1861, Buckley mentions visits by the rulers of
Pahang, Kedah, and Trengganu. The ruler of Johor lived in Singapore at this time.
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which usually meant separate establishments for each with the appropriate
number of servants.27
The support of a ruler’s wives, his dependents, and his own
household, as well as expenditures on the state, military campaigns, and
help given to subjects in times of need was accomplished on roughly
$100,000 per year. Besides taxes and duties (import duties on opium and
spirits; export duties on padi and tin), some rulers had their own estates
and businesses. Some managed to hoard away savings of thousands of
dollars against sudden expenses. With the arrival of a British Resident, all
these sources of revenue were lost, except for privately held businesses.
State revenues were now distinguished from the ruler’s personal income,
which was drawn as an allowance.
It became a commonplace of Anglo-Malay relations that rulers
frequently petitioned for their allowances to be increased.28 The need for
more money was understandable because, though traditional claims on
their incomes decreased, under British rule there were new activities and
lifestyles inspired by trips to Singapore, Penang, and occasionally London.
for example, most rulers now outfitted their istana (residence) with
European furnishings, usually not for the Malay household itself, but for
the public rooms and areas where visiting European dignitaries would be
entertained and accommodated. Western modes of transportation
considered suitable to the ruler’s station in life—steamships, yachts, horse
27Girlljck, Malay Society, 48, 52.
28At their first interviews with returning British officials after the Japanese occupation,
even with the threat of collaboration charges hanging over them, several of the rulers were
most concerned about the resumption of their allowances, complaining about their treatment
In this regard by the Japanese. WO 203/5612 and WO 203/5635A.
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drawn carriages, and later automobiles—likewise demanded considerable
expenditure.
When a new Sultan was installed in Selangor in 1903, he professed
himself “anxious to take a more prominent part in affairs than his
predecessor did.” This meant that he would be entertaining more, so his
allowance was increased the following year to $24,000, plus a privy purse
allowance of $6000 for religious and charitable donations. At the same
time, the allowances of the rulers and their heirs in Perak and Negeri
Sembilan were reviewed, While ultimately a ruler’s allowance depended
on his support for the government and the revenues of his state, there was
also some concern to bring the allowances of the different ruling
establishments in line, so that a Raja Muda in one state, for example, was
not granted more than a Sultan in another29 By 1909, the Sultan of
Selangor wa again requesting an increase, now to $30,000. Writing in
support of this increase, the Resident attested that every penny (and more)
went to the maintenance of the ruler’s household, the ladies’ households,
his children’s maintenance, palace officials, attendants, servants, and
watchmen. Although “nothing in his expenditure savours of
extravagance,”
there is no margin to meet the various calls to which it is
right that the Sultan should be able to respond, such as
contribution in aid of Mosques, Schools, and other local
organisations affecting the well being of the Muhammedan
community and the betterment of their Institutions, neither
has he the means to meet the cost of ceremonial visits and
receptions which it may at any time become necessary for him
to incur.30
Anderson to the Colonial Office,1 September 1904. CO 273/303.
H Conway Belfield, Resident of Selangor Request forwarded to the Colonial Office on 1
June 1909. CO 273/350.
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The new responsibilities of a Malay ruler, including the English education
of his children, were considered of utmost importance. The increase was
approved.31
The personal attire of Malay rulers also changed to reflect new roles
in the states and in the British empire. Emily Innes, wife of a British
magistrate in Selangor, described an unreconstructed raja who came to tea
in 1876:
Tunku Panglima Raja wore a black silk handkerchief on his
head, stiffened with rice-starch, and twisted into a
tremendous erection, something like a bishop’s mitre, but
with the two ends sticking up like little horns on either side.
The rest of his dress consisted of a jacket, buttoned only at the
neck, and showing his brown skin from thence to the waist,
and a sarong, the twisted part of which was stuck full of krises,
that gave him a war-like appearance.32
In contrast, the Sultan himself
was usually dressed in nothing by a very scanty little cotton
kilt, or a pair of still scantier bathing-drawers, and was at first
sight hardly distinguishable from an old Malay peasant... he
wore a coloured handkerchief on his head, and on high days
and holidays a jacket of sprigged silk with diamonds over his
kilt.33
Many rulers and chiefs soon adopted the European suit for public
occasions. for reasons of modesty, a sarong was worn over the trousers to
cover the thighs, and the new style of dress was completed with a songkok
31The Sultan of Selangor’s salary had increased to $135,000 by 1946. This was well over
half the total ($205,004) spent on the entire traditional establishment of the state, i.e.,
ruler and chiefs, secretaries and other palace officials, clerks, orderlies, punkah pullers,
watchmen, state mosque officials, etc These were salaries and did not include the upkeep of
the various royal residences Selangor Estimates of Expenditure, 1946 The Ruler and Chiefs
BMA SCAO471/45.
32Emily hines, The Chersonese with the Guilding Off (1885, reprInt, Kuala Lumpur Oxford
University Press, 1974), 100-101.
331b1d., 3840.
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(rimless fez)34 Retaining distinctive Malay elements, however, including
an elaborate traditional royal costume, proved important to the British, if
not always to the rulers. When Sultan Abdul Hamid of Kedah went to
London for the Coronation in 1911 with only Western suits, he was
infonned that he could take part in the official procession only if he wore
traditional Malay clothes.35 In a parade of imperial possessions, a Malay
ruler was expected to represent oriental exotica and appear in “national”
costume, not mundane Savile Row Yet even in Malaya, and especially at
such public rituals as wifi be described below, traditional Malay attire was
an important signifier of a royal culture in which high British officials
might participate, sometimes by donning royal costumes themselves36
Like dress, the matter of what the rulers ate and drank was
Influenced by British norms and the desire to ease relations, Innes
described her guest as one of “themore civilizedof the rajas.” He drank
Bass’s pale ale, but only in “homeopathic doses” of half a glass per day, and
he ate with his fingers, explaining that “he was an old man and could not
learn new ways.” The Sultan’s son-in-law, however, the “viceroy” of
Selangor, took to the new ways with a flourish, drinking brandy and
champagne and eating ham.37 These and other contraventions of Muslim
law would eventually become problematic, but for a long time British
backing validated such public behavior.
34Guuick, Malay Society, 55-59.
35Ibid., 58.
36See, for example, the picture of George Maxwell (Chief Secretary, PMS) with the Sultan
of Selangor c 1920s Maxwell is m royal Malay dress, the richness of which threatens to
outshine the outfit of the Sultan himself. Gullick, Rulers and Residents, photo 24.
37innes, Chersonese, 100-1, 173. Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History
of Malaysia (London Mactmllan, 1982), 151, also refer to the “civilized” reputation
fostered by the viceroy, Tengku Dia Udm, who engaged in “ostentatious sherry drinking”
and kept a pack of dogs.
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Malay royalty’s enthusiastic adoption of Western styles allows us to
see the hybrid nature of the tradition being created. Why in fact would an
avowedly traditional Malay ruler want to switch from, say, elephant to
steamship? Part of the reason was simply the introduction of new products
and technologies; we should not preclude such change from a dynamic
tradition. But in these matters of personal comportment—clothing,
furnishing, diet, and transport—the rulers were presented with new
models of authority emanating from Singapore. Private English
businessmen and officials like the Governor conducted themselves in a
style calculated to impress the natives. Malay rulers rose to the challenge
and implicitly accepted British notions of what was impressive. At times
they outdid the Europeans, as in the 1880s, when the Governor sometimes
borrowed the steamship belonging to Abu Bakar of Johor, for it was much
more comfortable than the one owned by the government.38 This example
of successful one-upmanship illustrates how British imperial hierarchies
were embraced by Malay rulers who made them their own.
38GulIick, Malay Society, 55. When the first governor appointed by the Colonial Office
arrived In Singapore In 1667, he found that the paramount power In the Malay world owned
only two worn out steamships He ordered another one fused) and bought a small one locally
This governor fOrd) sought to Infuse his office with a dignity which it had not possessed
before. C. Northcote Parkinson, British Interveittion in Malaya, 1867-1877 (Kuala Lumpur:
University of Malaya Press, 1964), 10-11, 27. A later governor (Robinson) complained
bitterly when he returned from an unofficial leave and received no gun salute or guard of
honor. The Maharaja of Johor had, coincidentally, just been received with full honors. The
Colonial Office supported the governor in his quarrel with the officer commanding the
troops, noting that “it Is most undesirable that the governor should... be treated lightly in
the eyes of the natives” CO 273/96
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Public Ceremonial
Beyond the rulers’ personal lifestyle was the public ceremonial in which
they played a central role. At first the British presence seemed merely to
sanction that which was traditional, though now it was performed before
European witnesses, like this rite in Selangor:
I was present once on his [Sultan Abdul Samad’sJ homage-
day, when all his subjects, rajas included, came crawling to
kiss his hand. None of them dared approach him without
grovelling on the ground, their two hands clasped in
supplication as before a god, and anyone having to cioss the
room in his presence, crawled sideways on all-fours like a
crab. Datus, rajas, and Tunkus, who were all bold enough
when he was not by, subsided on to the floor and spoke in
timid whispers, and he gave them his hand to kiss as if it
were a great favour39
Public ceremonial was elaborated as the colonial system developed
in accordance with the needs of that system The Conference of Rulers was
a ritual conceived in direct compensation, as it were, for the loss of state
power which came with the centralization of the Federated Malay States.40
The first Conference of Rulers (or Durbar, after British Indian usage) in
1897 brought the four rulers of the Federated states together for the first
time, and the European organizers were apprehensive about protocol.
Although rulers traveled abroad and on occasion visited one another,
these visits were momentous and expensive occasions, involving retinues
numbering in the hundreds, convoys of elephants, flotillas of boats, and
the building of extensive temporary accommodations. These visits were
also apt to highlight competition between rulers, as one sought to otttdo
39innes, Chersonese, 4344.
For the more extensive use of durbars and assemblages by the British m India, see Bernard
S. Cohn, “Representing Authority in Victorian India,” in Invention of Tradition, 165..209.
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the hospitality of another.41 But there was no broader experience of
ordered relations between the rulers, who had genealogies of comparable
statusA2 According to Hugh Clifford, then Resident of Pahang, “each State
holds that its own ruling House should by right take precedence of all
others.’43 However, the gathering, hosted by Sultan Idris of Perak, was a
success. Bath party was received separately by the Sultan, a guard of honor,
and a seventeen-gun salute. At the formal meetings, the rulers were
arranged so that each sat between his own Resident and either the High
Commissioner or the Resident-General. Sultan Idris accommodated each
of the rulers and their retinues in his own istana and entertained them day
and night for almost a week. The leading chiefs of Perak provided
transportation to picnics, fish drives, and the theater. The Sultan’s wife and
her attendants embroidered pillows as souvenirs for all the guests. And
when the parties left (again accompanied by gun salutes and guards of
honor), their departures were staggered so that Sultan Idris could travel
down the road a bit with each of his guests. This ruler clearly made an
enormous effort, well appreciated by British officials, to inaugurate the
new system of inter-state relations, a gathering at which the rulers sent a
message of loyalty to Queen Victoria.44
The second Conference was held in Kuala Lumpur in 1903, and did
not depend upon the hospitality of one wealthy ruler. Because the Sultan
of Selangor did not himself reside in that city, it was necessary to build
41GuIlick, Rulers and Residents, 231-33.
42Milner, Kerajaan, 1-2.
4Annuaf Report, Pahang 1897. CO 437/2.
44Report of the Durbar (Federal Council) at Kuala Kangsar, 13-17 July 1897. CO 73/229.
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temporary accommodations for all the rulers, as well as a conference hail,
for the meeting. This was done in the Lake Gardens:
For each Sultan a commodious residence was provided in the
vicinity of one of the small streams which feed Sydney Lake,
within easy reach of the Hall and of each other. These houses
contained a roomy hail or balei1 with a private room, sleeping
apartments, kitchen, bathroom and other accessories
Surrounding the Sultans’ residences were scattered the
houses of the Members of their Councils, with the result that
there were four picturesque native villages, each flying the
distinctive flag of the State to which it was assigned.45
No problems of precedence were noted at this conference, while the
accommodations themselves seemed to confirm the standardization and
equivalency of the states in the FMS
The second conference of rulers did feature, however, the critical
speech by Sultan Idris discussed in the previous chapter The difficulty in
controlling such outspokenness and the danger that the rulers would learn
to work in concert probably explain why the conferences did not become a
regular feature of federation. Colonial advisers did encourage the
elaboration and expansion of other rituals which emphasized the ruler
within his state and which offered little opportunity for substantive
discussion, such as royal weddings and funerals. Important characteristics
of such rituals were that they could be tied closely both to tradition and to
colonial structures of authority. The celebration of a Malay ruler’s birthday,
the installation of a sultan or raja muda, or the public celebration of Han
Raya served to remind everyone that they lived in a Malayo-Muslim
state—all the penghulu of the state attended and made formal obeisance,
45Minutes of the Conference of Chiefs of the Federated Malay States held at Kuala Lumpur
20-23 July 1903. Printed in the Supplement to the Setangor Government Gazette, 2 October
1906. CO 469/13.
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traditional entertainments such as fish drives were mounted, and all eyes
were on the spectacle of a glorified Malay monarchy. At the same time, the
celebrations themselves were sometimes modeled on those of British
royalty, incorporated displays of imperial power, included important roles
for colonial officials, or were even occasioned by the investiture of a ruler
with a British decoration.46 This juxtaposition of Malay and British rituals
served to legitimize colonial rule by creating a colonial Malay tradition. In
this new tradition, Malay rituals were located within the ascendant British
empire, while the aura of “timeless tradition” rubbed off on the British
imperial project.
An example of colonial ritual which blended old with new elements
was the royal installation. The installation of Sultan Idris of Perak in 1889
was marked by an extravagance of ceremony and public celebration. The
traditional Malay rites included several days of fasting and prayer; the
invocation of divine authority; the propitiation of spirits to ensure long
life and prosperity for the new ruler; and a visit by the Sultan and his
whole family to the tomb of his ancestors. But with the encouragement
and assistance of his European advisers, a major ceremony of hybrid
Anglo-Malay character was alsO staged:
The installation ceremony, attended by the Resident and
other European officials as well as a large concourse of Malays,
took place at Bukit Chandan, which was the residence of the
new ruler Here he was publicly “invested with the ancestral
sword of state” and took his place on the royal dais
(singgasana) “with the regalia displayed on the peterana (mat
of honour) before him.” He then signed an oath of office, like
4See Gullick, Rulers and Residents, 236-38, for examples of such ceremonies. When the
ceremony Involved the Investiture of the ruler in a British order, care was taken to
emphasize the Malayness of the ruler Sultan Idris of Perak laid the foundation stone of a
new mosque when he was awarded the GCVO
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a colonial governor on taking up his appointment, and this
was subsequently published in the official Perak Gazette. A
proclamation of accession was read aloud and the appropriate
salute of seventeen guns was fired. The new ruler “descended
from the royal seat” and when he was in that less exalted
position “European officers and gentlemen were presented to
him.” The Sultan then made a formal speech. In the evening
there was a banquet and a fireworks display. The Sultan
proposed “the loyal toast,” i.e. the health of Queen Victoria,
and the band played “God Save the Queen.” The Resident
made a speech in reply.
After this ceremony there was five days of rejoicing with an
“abundance of sports and races, plays, shooting and rowing
matches with feasts for the chiefs and people who are said to
have numbered more than 15,O00.”
The author of the Straits Settlement Despatch on which the above
account was based would have found the inclusion of British officials and
rituals in this royal Malay ceremony unremarkable. When the history-
minded R.J. Wilkinson referred to this ceremony, however, he spoke only
of the Malay aspects, as if “the inevitable confusion between the new and
the old” had not yet occurred.48 Wilkinson’s influential History of the
Peninsular Matays, originally published in 1908, located the Malay
ceremony within the claims of Malay genealogy and history:
The Sultan of Perak claims to possess the very sword and seal
that were inherited by Sang Sapurba from his ancestor
Alexander the Great. The Dato’ Sri Nara Diraja of Perak is the
hereditary custodian of the ancient proclamation in a
forgotten tongue by which the herald installed Sang Sapurba
as ruler of the Palembang world. That form of proclamation is
still used (with many old-world ceremonies) at the
47Gullick, Malay Society, 334. HIs account quotes from Straits Settlement Despatch of 15
pril 1889.
4ee the discussion of the tension between preservation and change in the Introduction.
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installation of every Perak Sultan and of all his high officers
of state.49
Wilkinson continues, emphasizing the pre-Islamic origins of the
ceremony:
The coronation formula is in either Sanskrit or Pall; it suffers
from having been transcribed into Arabic characters that are
ill-adapted for representing Sanskrit sounds. Its text—so far as
it can be interpreted—reveals nothing... All that we need infer
from the Perak regalia and installation customs is that long
before the days when the “Malay Annals” were complied
(AD. 1612)—almost certainly as far back as the days of the old
kingdom of Malacca—the Malay rulers attached importance
to the possession of a seal and sword, both bearing Indian
names, and to the use of an Indian installation formula and
to a state secret suggesting their Indian descent.5°
Despite the inauthenticity of the sword, which Wilkinson judged to
be a few centuries old, and perhaps because of the very incomprehensibility
of the coronation formula, these elements of the ceremony clearly
constitute “ancient material.” But the imported elements are just as
striking and important. The oath of office, proclamation of accession,
posting in the Gazette, seventeen-gun salute, and especially the loyal toast
to the foreign overlord were clearly imported elements which located
“ancient” Malay monarchy firmly within the contemporary greater glory of
the British empire. Note that the meshing of the rituals is not seamless;
there is a transitional moment when the Malay monarch must “descend”
to the level of the European officials, who are representatives of the
overlord, Queen Victoria. In this moment, Malay monarchy is ritually
subordinated to British power.
49Rj. Wilkinson, A History of the Peninsular Malays with Chapters on Perak and
Setangor, 3rd ed., rev. (Singapore: Kelly and Walsh, 1923), 17-18.
501b1d., 19-20.
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For the Salangor installation of Sultan Suleiman in 1903, tradition
was even more self-consciously invented—no one knew the traditional
ritual, the last proper installation having been held in 1826. Additionally,
the royal regalia was redesigned; that which survived the calamitous civil
wars of the past century was deemed not nearly splendid enough for the
new court ceremony. The initiative was taken here by Raja Bat, a relative
of the ruler, who traveled to Riau in search of Bugis precedents for the
Malay parts of the ceremony As in Perak, the installation included both
Malay and European elements, and it specifically incorporated symbols of
colonial government, such as the Malay States Guides, the local defense
force Celebrations went on for a month, the guests including members of
other royal families of the peninsula.51 Royal installations had become an
important ritual of “British Malaya,” in which the common elements were
the presence oE British symbols of authority and a concern with restoring
(or inventing, if necessary) a lavish Malay past.
The Ruler’s Visibility
The defining characteristic of indirect rule is that an indigenous elite is left
visible to the conquered people, shielding the reality of foreign
domination. Thus it is not surprising that Malay rulers experienced a
gradual increase and qualitative change in their public visibility. This was
the most tentative and slowly developing change, and ts full potential
would not be realized until the postwar period. In precolonial and early
colonial times, despite the centrality of ceremony to a ruler’s life, scattered
populations and difficulty of travel meant that the ordinary people rarely
51Gullick, Malay Society, 35-6.
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laid eyes on their ruler.52 Even if the ruler held audiences where peasants
could bring their grievances, as was the case in Perak,53 it seems likely that
only those in the immediate vicinity could easily attend.
if subjects did not often gather to see their ruler, neither did rulers
travel much around their states. When Sultan Abdul Samad went to
Kuala Lumpur in 1879, it was said to be the first visit of a ruler to the
interior of Selangor in one hundred years. According to the ruler of
Trengganu in 1875, no one ever visited the interior of his state, though he
himself had already been to Singapore. And the Raja of Kelantan, that
same year, was said “never to have gone beyond his own river, nor did he
express any inclination tO dO so.”54 Thirty four years later, little had
changed; reporting on his visit to Kelantan in 1909, Governor John
Anderson remarked that “the ignorance of the Rajah and of those about
him of the interior of the country was complete.”55 This reticence to travel
on the part of those who were most able has been attributed to the expense
of bringing a retinue commensurate with dignity and safety.56 In the
absence of the ruler’s personal presence, the state’s penghutu were
considered to be his representatives, having been appointed by the ruler
and usually carrying a letter of authority from him.57 District chiefs would
also act in a ruler’s name1 though they were apt to go their own way the
further their territory lay from the court. Clearly, the distance Of the ruler
52Gulljck, Indigenous Political Systems, 137.
53Andaya, “Eighteenth Century Perak,” 29.
54Straits Times, 31 July 1875. CO 882/3.
55C0 273/350.
56Giiflick, Malay Society, 28; 42, n. 38.
Husin All, Malay Peasant Society and Leadeichip (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University
Press, 1975), 124, 128.
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had repercussions, especially in remote ulu (upriver) districts where
loyalties might swing from one ruler to another.58
Some subjects did see their ruler, however, and those were the
people who lived in the town or village where he made his home. Pious
rulers of the mid-nineteenth century usually attended Friday prayers at the
local mosque.59 Other rulers appeared even more informally. In the 1870s,
Sultan Abdul Samad of Selangor took a daily, late afternoon constitutional
around his village, visiting shops and discussing the path crop He could
often be found “seated astride on a carpenter’s bench, or else squatting on
the ground... watching a cockfight.”6°
As with personal habit, changes in public posture and visibility
depended on the predilections of the individual ruler. Sultan Idris of
Perak, an early admirer as well as critic of Western rule, rode in a carriage
with a mounted police escort when making local calls. If he went further
away, he was greeted on his return with a seventeen-gun salute and a
welcoming party of European and Malay officials.61 This ruler traveled
more before becoming sultan than afterwards, when he usually limited his
journeys to trips along the Perak river. With the other rulers as well, the
new habit of traveling around the state started gradually, and not much
before 1910, when the improvement of roads permitted it. The linking of
towns with the major villages of a state coincided with the arrival of the
automobile to Malaya in 1902. from that time on, rulers of the FMS could
easily (and in modern style) do systematic tours of their states.62
58Andaya, “Eighteenth Century Perak,” 27.
591b1d., 26.
60frj, Chersonese, 38-39.
61GuIlick, Malay Society, 37.
62Gufflck, Rulers and Residents, 238-40.
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Actually, most rulers’ trips around their states were less “royal
progress” than business trip or even vacation. Rulers sometimes traveled
in support of an administrative policy, sometimes to encourage projects in
which they took a special interest.63 Rupert Emerson, the American
observer of British and Dutch colonialism in the 1930s, called attention to
the following comment in the Annual Report for Kelantan for 1913:
His Highness the Sultan visited the gaol on more than one
occasion, opened the new hospital, and having purchased a
new motor car, travelled a good deal, with the result of calling
attention to several road troubles.64
Emerson means to point out the insignificance of the ruler’s functions in
the modern colonial state. Yet there are two important points that he
misses. First, royal legitimacy was lent to such ambivalently received
colonial institutions as jails and hospitals, which were “domesticated” to
the sultan’s realm by his visit. Conversely, insofar a hospital was seen as a
“modern” thing, the visit may have served to burnish the ruler’s image,
and have allowed him to take credit for any benefits brought by the
colonial institution. Second, the ruler’s pleasure jaunts brought him more
into the public eye than Malay royalty had ever been, a visibility which was
often important to the maintenance of colonial rule.
Royal travel—in the appropriate style—can be explained partly by
the rulers’ emulation of British practice and the pursuit of new pleasures.
But it was sometimes undertaken at British behest to cement a lini
between ruler and rakyat. Before European intervention, Malay politics
had offered to the rakyat certain representations of the ruler’s power—
63p,pj 240.
64Rupert Emerson, Malaysia A Study rn Direct and Indirect Rule (New York Macmillan,
1937), 263, n. 63.
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penghutu who were appointed by the ruler, district chiefs who could be
called to make formal obeisance Under British colonialism, the middle
strata had largely disappeared as independent actors or were clearly under
the authority of the British themselves. Without the greater visibility of
the rulers, this absence of Malay power holders, especially in the FMS, may
have rendered untenable the fiction of indirect rule. A broader comparison
can also be made with the newly invented royal tradition of modernizing
Meju Japan There, royal progressions allowed the people to be seen by
(and to see) the Emperor for the first time, and the people learned how to
behave in his sight. Thereafter, photographs of the Emperor hanging in
public and Irivate laces served to reproduce his presence and provide
constant surveillance; the people were always in the Emperor’s sight.65 In
Malaya, the sight of the ruler in the eyes of the rakyat could be equally
significant when they saw him living and travelin h a style comparable
to Europeans. According to John Butcher, the British believed that “Asians
expected their rulers to live in a style befitting their status.”66 The
colorilalists took this to heart regarding their Own standard of living, and a
status-conscious Malay society would certainly notice that its own ruler
looked as well-off as the white overlords. By positioning himself (with
British contrivance) high within the colonial hierarchy of style, while
remaining recognizably Malay, the ruler maintained the idea for the rakyat
of living in a sovereign Malay state under foreign protection.
65Thkashi Fujitani, “Electronic Pageantry and Japan’s ‘Symbolic Emperor’,” Journal of Asian
Studies 51, 4 (1992): 83940.
66Jof Butcher, The British in Malaya, 18804942: The Social History of a European
Community in Colonial Southeast Asia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979), 77.
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The transformation from old to new traditions was uneven and
often slow, but Sometimes old ritual gave way swiftly to a new type of
public posture dearly in service to the modernizing colonial state. There is
no more dramatic example of such a transformation than the behavior of
the people and Sultan of Trengganu during and after the uprising of 1928.
In April of that year, with tensions rising and peasants refusing to pay their
taxes, Sultan Suleiman agreed to travel upriver and meet with local
leaders. The British Adviser feared the consequences of allowing the Malay
delegation to proceed without British backup, but Sulaiman’s Menth Besar
(Chief Minister) “held firmly to the view that the meeting—between ‘the
Sultan and his people’—should be conducted without British officials
being present.” The Sultan was met in an upriver town by two to three
thousand of his subjects, who were curious to see him and to present their
grievances in a traditional audience.67 This was an old ritual which took
place, if only briefly, out of the control of the colonial state. It soon became
clear, however, that the Sultan could deliver no relief as he owed his
position to the British, who would concede little on the contested issues.
The uprising surged again and was put down by colonial troops. In the
aftermath of the revolt, the ruler undertook periodic visits outside his
capital in an entirely new spirit:
Suleiman’s efforts to regain popular affection were based less
on the actions expected of a traditional Malay ruler than on an
English model: the first of Suleiman’s annual tours of the
outer dlistricts, in 1929, was patterned after a British royal tour,
complete with triumphal arches and speeches.68
67Shaharil Tatib, After Its Own Image: Tire Trengganu Experience 1881-1941 (Singapore:
Oxford University Press, 1984), 156-7, 163.
68Sutherland, “Trengganu Elite,” 81. See also Emerson, Malaysia, 266-67.
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This is a dramatic example of a transformation which was by no means
complete by the end of the prewar er The public posture of the ruler
would experience significant changes during the Japanese occupation and
the Malayan Union crisis, as will be discussed in the following chapters.
Self-Invention or British Creature?
No one ruler epitomizes the standardization of state structure and
leadership better than Abu Bakar of Johor (r 1862-95), from his elevation to
the sultanate of modern Johor to the uniform he wore and his travels to
the royal courts of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.69 In fact, his adoption
of European ritual and lifestyle, as well as his usurpation of the throne,
was so striking that no one mistook him for a “restored” Malay ruler. Yet
all his innovation was in the service of maintaining his Independence as
the ruler of a Malay state administered by Malays. At the same time, his
prosperity was won through the Chinese economy and his power
legitimized by the British in Singapore.7° An examination of Abu Bakar’s
career reveals a high degree of British complicity in his self-creation.
Abu Bakar’s success had its roots in the devastation of the old Riau
Johor empire during the eighteenth century. Years of fighting, Bugis
domination, and Dutch attacks ruined Riau as a trading port, and the
founding of Singapore in 1819 marked the end of the Malay entrepôt. The
Anglo-Dutch Treaty (1824) further cut off the weakened Riau sultanate, not
under Dutch jurisdiction, from the peninsula, strengthening the de facto
69DetaIted accounts of Abu Bakar’s travels abroad can be found in Gullick, Rulers and
Residents, passim.
70See the discussion of the transformation of the maritime polity in Carl A Trockl, Prince of
Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore 1784-1885
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1979), 207-215.
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Independence of the Temenggung of Johor (as well as the Bendahara of
Pahang). Although the British had recognized a rival claimant to the Johor
throne for the purpose of obtaining Singapore, Sultan Husain and his line
were never serious contenders for either power (vis-à-vis the
Temenggung) or position (lacking the royal regalia from Riau). But the real
key to the elevation of the Temenggungs was Temenggung Jbrahim’s
“opening up” the state to economic development, which was of benefit to
himself and the British, and his acceptance of British policy imperatives,
especially his cooperation in the suppression of piracy.71
A Johor official, Mohamed Salleh bin Perang, who shared in the
prosperity of this process, tells us ibrahim’s situation in the 1840s:
Marhum Ibralum himself was impoverished, and Johor had
not yet been opened up. Marhum Ibrahim had to subsist
entirely on an allowance from the English Government, and
yet his servants were by no means few in number.72
At the time of his death m 1862, Ibrahim received the following glowing
obituary in the Singapore Free Press. It admirably summarizes his
accomplishments, as well as demonstrating the opinion of the British
official and commercial community:
This native chief, during the course of his long rule,
conducted himself with great prudence and secured the
friendship and support of the British Government, by whom
he was presented with a sword of state for his exertions in
putting down the piracy which at one period was so prevalent
in the vicinity of Singapore For many years he devoted
himself to the improvement of his territory of Johore, in
which he was very successful, the revenues at his death
amounting to a very considerable sum, derived principally
from the Chinese population that under his ëncouragëment
71For Ibrahim’s early years and economic success, see ibid., 61-84.
72An± Sweeney, Reputations Live On: An Early Malay Autobiography f3erkeley;
University of California Press, 1980), 74.
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had settled in Johore and engaged in agricultural pursuits. He
was succeeded by his eldest son, between whom and the
Bandahara of Pahang a treaty was entered into at Singapore in
June, with the sanction of the British Government, to
regulate the countries of Pahang and Johore, their boundaries,
jurisdiction and government, to prevent disputes hereafter
and to perpetuate the amity existing between them73
Salleh corroborates the ethos of Ibrahim’s administration, in which
traditional forms were used for novel purposes:
Every day... I heard the beneficial and salutary words of wise
men endowed with incisive tongues, speaking in gatherings
of rulers and ministers, and I noted their use of parables, their
good breeding, cultured manners and refined behavior; for
every other day or so, the dignitaries would all meet in
conference and consider ways and means to improve the
country, to induce more people to seek their livelihood in
occupations which would increase the state revenues, and to
improve the lot of the people of the country.74
Ibrahim’s son, Abu Bakar, followed in his father’s footsteps His
innovation was to add royal ritual to good government. When, in 1887, he
ordered Salleh, then chief of the Land Department, to “open up Muar,” he
soon made a ceremonial visit to this recently acquired territory.
On 5th August, His Highness, together with the Sultanah
fatimah and their daughter, the Tengku Puteri, arrived in
Muar on the ship Pantai. They were given a ceremonial
welcome by the officials in Muar, i e Engku Sulaiman and
myself, together with the penghulus, and some modest
celebrations were held.
On 12th August, His Highness, together with Engku
Sulaiman and myself, the Chinese businessmen, officials, and
penghulus gathered at the stone steps while His Highness
himself buried the amulet [to ensure the peace and well-being
of the new town and gave Muar the name Bandar Maharani.
73Bucktey, Anecdotal History, 688.
74Sweeney, Reputations Live On, 84.
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His Highness thus personally participated in the opening up
of Muar.75
Abu Bakar was best known for being a Westernized monarch. But
he did more than acquire a veneer—affecting a style of dress or learning to
appreciate horse racing. He thoroughly assimilated those Western
attributes which were of value to him. He had been educated in both
English and Malay fat Keasberry’s school in Singapore), he befriended
colonial officials on a personal level, and he embraced Western legal,
administrative, and business methods, hiring British firms and
individuals in Singapore and London to represent his interests.76 Finally,
he shaped his ambitions to accord not only with Malay tradition, but with
evolving British colonial tradition. From his first trip to London in 1866,
Abu Bakar knew that the highest ranked Indian princes held the title
Maharaja.77 So while his elevation to this title in 1868 was approved by the
Riau court, as having once been used by the rulers of Melakai8 it is also
evidence that Abu Bakar quite consciously positioned himself within the
British empire, the center of the world of international royalty. He
developed a court ceremonial with both Malay and British colonial
elements: “crimson and green gold umbrellas, Malays with krises, native
police, 511th guards,” and a European-style Order of the Crown.79
751b1d., 56-58.
761b1d., 5; see also Eunice Thio, British Policy in the Malay Peninsula, 1880-1910. Vol. 1.
The Southern and Central States (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1969), 108, for the
composition of the Johore Advisoiy Council in London. She also informs us that this was a
common practice of Indian princes in the 1880s.
77Sweeney, Reputations Live On, 5. Abu Bakar discovered that the title “Temenggung” was
hitherto unknown to the protocol experts in London. Gullick, Rulers and Residents, 241.
78Andaya and Andaya, History, 153.
79Gullick, Ruleis and Residents, 245, from a Straits Settlements Despatch describing
Governor Weld’s visit in 1880; Thio, British Policy, 108.
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What part did the British, who did not directly control Johor during
his reign, play in the elevation of the Temenggung? The local British
government, grappling with London’s non-expansionist policy until the
1870s, found in Abu Bakar, as his father before him, a local ally. He was
essentially to their taste and also appealed to London, having “raised
himself up to the position of an enlightened ruler of an unenlightened
community.”80 He had prestige and power and, at least initially, he
accepted British advice. Internally, he had greater control over his territory
than other Malay rulers, having started as a local chief himself.81
Externally, British governors used him as an agent of sorts, pursuing
policies they could not have pursued directly, inadvertently furthering his
ambitions, As discussed in the previous chapter, Governor Jervois
sponsored Abu Bakar’s “supervision” over the quarreling chiefs of Negeri
Sembilan.
Abu Bakar also received British backing when threatened by
supporters of the royal Riau-Johor line, The bombardment of Trengganu
in 1862 was undertaken to dislodge the deposed Sultan Mahmud of Lingga
from Kuala Trengganu and to back Johor’s candidate in Pahang. When the
Trengganu-Lingga-backed candidate, Ahmad, won anyway, the Singapore
Free Press warned: “if he lends himself to intrigues of the ex-Sultan or any
one else against Johore he will certainly involve himself in much trouble
and probably endanger his position as ruler of Pahang.”$2
From the late 1870s, however, more interventionist voices,
including Frank Swettenham’s, argued for taking direct control in the
1878 despatch to the Colonial Office, quoted in Thio, British Policy, xxx.
81Sweeney, Reputations Live On, 37-38.
82Buckley, Anecdotal History, 694.
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Malay states, rather than working through someone like the Maharaja of
Johor. Abu Bakar, in any case, was beginning to act more and more
independently of British advice and, Singapore complained, to spend more
extravagantly on himself than on the development of his state. It was at
this time that he began to press his claim to be recognized as Sultan and
found a friendlier reception in London than at home.83 Further
deterioration of Abu Bakar’s relations with Singapore revolved around the
slower rate of development in Johor compared with the states now under
direct British control, as well as the Maharaja’s influence in Negeri
Sembilan and Pahang, which was thoroughly opposed by Governor Weld.
Going on the offensive, Abu Bakar went to London in 1885, where praise
for his enlightened administration and “civilization” were still ringing in
Colonial Office ears. Negotiating a new treaty, Abu Bakar gave foreign
relations into the hands of the British (easing fears of French interference),
agreed to confine his influence to his own state, and accepted a British
Agent. In exchange, Abu Bakar was recognized as Sultan, not of the old
Riau-based empire, but of the “State and Territory of Johor.”84
Aside from the important role played by Britain, this final
transformation of the rump of the old empire into the ] odern state of
Johor ironically reveals the continuing significance of kerajaan, the
condition of having a raja. for Johor, like Pahang and earlier Perak, it was
not a sense of place but the ambition of a raja which led to the existence of
a sovereign state where earlier there had been a territory of a larger polity.
In the case of Johor, only gradually did the mechanisms of state come to
83S Thio, British Policy, xxxi-xxxvii, 23-25.
845ee ibid., 93407, for the treaty negotiations and the events leading up to them.
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reside within the borders. Nearly all government and judicial work was
done in Singapore until 1858. And the new Sultan only moved his family
to Johor Bahru in 1689.85
Toward the end of his life, Abu Bakar tried to prevent further
British encroachment by promulgating a written constitution for the state
of Johor. The British never recognized it as having any standing which
cOuld interfere with the terms of a treaty, a point which would be
significant in 1946, for it contained a clause forbidding the ruler to
surrender any part of johor to another power or nation. Yet it is also of
interest in the story of Abu Bakar himself. The document was the first of
its kind for a Malay state (only Trengganu would follow Johor’s example
before World War II) and very much the product of an invented sultan.
The preal ble states that the constitution is handed down by the Sultan,
“in Our name and on Our behalf, and for and on behalf of Our Heirs and
Successors, the Sovereign Rulers or Sultans of Johore.”86 It states also that
it is proper to consult with the ministers, chiefs, and elders of the state, and
it provides for two councils of chiefs, whose advice the sovereign will find
it “expedient, necessary, and advantageous” to take, While the constitution
betrays knowledge of European-style administration (executive vetoes and
so forth), it is essentially a modern elucidation of the ideal Malay state. It
also legitimizes the rule of Abu Bakar himself. By stipulating that each
future sovereign be “of the Royal blood, a descendant of Johore
Sovereigns,” it asserts Abu Bakar’s royal status. The constitution, for all its
novelty, should be likened to a court-commissioned hikayat, written to
850n1y capital offenses were tried in Johor Bahru; for this there was a jail there. Sweeney,
Reputations Live On, 82-83. See also Emerson, Malaysia, 202.
Emersôn, Malaysia, 203-206.
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justify Abu Bakar’s reign, further his dynasty, and lay down political
norms. Fittingly enough in this case, it was written not by Malay scribes,
but by English lawyers.
Abu Bakar, of course, had great need for legitimation. As early as the
1850s, Malay royalty of other states, especially Trengganu, resented both his
territorial ambitions and status pretensions.87 His further elevation to the
title of Sultan in 1885 presented the problem of his non-royal birth,
Interestingly, ft was not the conferring of title by a non-Malay power that
offended other rajas. Wilkinson later observed:
Royalty could be conferred, as the Chinese Emperor conferred
It on the Permaisura, or as Sultan Mansur divided up his
kingdom between his sons, or as a Sultan creates a “Junior
Sultan” (Sultan Muda or Yamtuan Muda), or as the British
may be said to have created the Suttanates of Johor, Pahang
and Ketantan [emphasis added].
But royal birth was a necessary prerequisite:
Malay popular feeling is against the powerful defacto ruler
who assumes that power confers rank. Such a man is a worm
who aspires to be a dragon... The hostility displayed to the
Mantri of Larut, to Sultan Ismail of Perak, and for many years
to the Maharaja of Johor was due to similar
misunderstandings.88
Despite Malay skepticism, the British in Singapore accepted a royal
genealogy that traced the Temenggung’s line back to Sultan Abdul Jalil (d.
1721) and which was publicized by Thomas Braddell, one of Abu Bakar’s
English advisers.89
87TrockI, Prince of Pirates, 120.
Wi1kinson, Peninsular Malays, 62-63.
89Buckley, Anecdotal History, 4546. Wilkinson found “certain doubtful features about this
pedigree. It Is probable that these families [the Temenggung’s and the Bendahara’s] are
descended from a brother, not a son of Sultan Abdul Jail!, as they would otherwise have
borne the royal title of Tengku.” Wilkinson, Peninsular Malays, 82.
132
Direct British control over Johor was an inevitability which Abu
Bakar was able to defer until after his death It was his son Ibrahim,
reigning until 1959, who experienced that loss of independence. Carl Trocki
has suggested that thrahim’s lack of administrative experience upon
ascending the throne was calculated by Abu Bakar who, anticipating the
impending takeover, foresaw that Johor would need “not an administrator
but a respectable figure-head who could uphold the dignity of the office of
Sultan and who knew the kind of people a sovereign ought to know.”90
That the British were essentially sympathetic to this project can be seen in
their treatment of Ibrahim: his perceived stature as “independent”
sovereign was indulged, his demand that the British resident be termed
“general,” not “British” adviser was honored, his expensive travel abroad
was tolerated; and so forth, After the creative and abetted self-invention of
Abu Bakar, his son Ibràhim reverted to type—a “ceremonial” ruler of
British Malaya.
Colonialism and the Reification of Malay Tradition
The colonial invention of Malay royalty was a continuing process. As late
as World War U, pressure to conform to a certain model of royalty can still
be discerned in evaluations of rulers written during the war to facilitate
later investigations into Malay collaboration.91 These short biographical
notes reveal how successfully the rulers, as a group, had transformed
themselves. Interestingly, the transformation was not entirely contiguous
with a ruler’s friendliness to the British. Sultan Ibrahim of Johor, for
90TrockI, Prince of Pirates, 202.
91W0 203/5612.
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example, was “said to be and-British,” and “European officers generally
disliked serving in Johore because of itis uncertain temper and liability of
being persistently vindictive to whom he might happen to take a dislike.”
But these attributes were contextualized within the larger, royal qualities
he possessed: “masterful and autocratic... assertive of his own authority.”
And he was given the highest cornplirnet of being judged to possess
“considerable practical ability and acumen.” Abdul Aziz of Perak earned an
unqualified character endorsement which bears quotation at length:
Educated in Malaya, speaks English well At one time served
m the FMS government service, was a keen volunteer, first as
a private, later as a commissioned officer. Well liked by the
European community in his state and enjoys European
society. First-class shot and good tennis player. Interested
himself greatly in the Boy Scout movement in his state. In
1941, at the start of the campaign, with other Pérak chiefs
made interest-free loan of $30,500.
The Yam Tuan of Negeri Sembilan was considered “a good example
of the modern generation of educated, progressive and intelligent Malays.
He understands his responsibilities and is interested in his people’s
welfare.” In contrast, Suleiman of Trengganu (who died during the
occupation), while acknowledged to be “loyal to his British connection,”
did not generate much enthusiasm, probably on account of his old-style
qualities: “Quiet and dignified, languid in movement and speech. Never
an assertive character.” Ironically, it is this characterization which accords
best with the portrait of Malay kingship described by Mimer in Kerajaan.
And it is a measure of the success of the colonial invention that his
opposite, a man overflowing with “modern” interests—tennis, education,
scouting—could be understood to constitute a traditional leader.;
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This redefinition of tradition, a joint British-Malay initiative, was a
product of the attempted preservation of Malay culture in a changing
world. Initially, the analysis of weakness and decay explained the Malay
failure to achieve good government and lent justification to the British
presence. Later, British concern with Malay culture increased along with
the nineteenth century articulation of racial theories. According to
Hendrik Maler,
Differences [between 11nations” or “races”] were no longer
formulated in terms of the scale of civilization but in terms of
a racial hierarchy in which the white man held a superior and
unassailable position, having a knowledge of society and
nature that even Malay aristocrats were supposedly never able
to grasp92
In this context, British admiration for the aristocratic nature of Malay
culture emphasized preservation over progress:
Improvement now meant primarily the imposition of order
and the care of material well-being—these were the keys to
the restoration of Malay identity, to the stabilization of Malay
culture.93
Having access to Chinese and Indian labor for the crucial project of
“opening up” thern country, British Malayophiles were free to pursue the
freezing of Malay culture in an invented past. The strengthening of the
Malay rulers was part of this project, as were the commissioning of royal
hikayat (histories) and state histories and the authentication of the Sejarah
Melayu (Malay Annals) as the defining text of Malay political life.94 Malay
92Hendrik M.J. Maier, In the Center of Authority: The Malay Hikayat Merong
Mahauangsa (Ithaca, NY Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1988), 53
93Maier, Center of Authority, 54.
941n addition to fact that it was well-known throughout the peninsula, Maier points but
that the $ejarah Melayu’s simple language and accessible (to a European reader) narrative
“evoked reality in a manner that was fairly familiar to dominant British concepts of
historiography.” Center of Authority, 42.
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culture became a sort of fragile, if admirable, specimen which was to be
protected from the harshness of the modern world.
But this was nOt mere cultural “butterfly collecting” for the
amusement of the foreigners. There was a powerful, if unconscious,
connection between British understanding of their own power and the
status of the Malay rulers. John Butcher, studying the social history of the
British in Malaya, found that “implicit in British thinldng about their rule
throughout the Empire was the principle that their power was based on
prestige rather than military might.”95 There is no doubt that the glorified
Malay monarchy, restored under the aegis of British protection, added
immeasurably to that prestige. And the development of hybrid Anglo-
Malay ceremonial held a special appeal for middle-class British officials.
Protecting a traditional court culture allowed them to indulge their
aristocratic fantasies and enter into Malay royal circles at the highest level.
As the centerpiece of the process of cultural restoration, the new
Malay ruler looked so natural and authentic that most observers saw only
the obvious—strengthened monarchies. Yet a fundamental change had
taken place: the rulers now belonged not only to the Malays, to Malay
political culture, and to the Malay past. Through their articulation of new
structures of authority, they belonged also to the present and future of
British colonial rule. Yet their new meaning within the colonial system
did not invalidate their older position at the center of the Malay world. On
the contrary, the two meanings became heavily intertwined. The rulers’
participation in their own invention helped to institutionalize and
95Butcher, The British in Malaya, 77.
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legitimize British control, which in turn bolstered their real—not merely
symbolic—standing as Malay monarchs.
An important element in maintaining this standing was the idea of
loyalty, along with its corollary, the suppression of dissent. Loyalty to one’s
ruler was said to be a Malay characteristic, an assertion backed up by
reference to the origin myth of Malay political culture. The story in the
$ejarah Metayu tells of a pact made between Sri Tn Buana, the first royal
ruler of the Malays, and Demang Lebar Daun, a representative of his
subjects. The agreement is this: the raja will always treat his subjects well,
will punish them in accordance with Muslim law, and will never defile,
shame, or ill-treat them His subjects will always be loyal, even if they are
oppressed. Should the ruler break his word, his kingdom will be destroyed
by God, but rebellion is not sanctioned.96 More “evidence” of this Malay
characteristic came from the popular story of Hang Tuah, the Melaka-era
hero who remained loyal despite the injustice of his ruler. Frequent
repetition has made this a truism of Malay culture, but it should not be
accepted uncritically, for two reasons. first, it has been argued that the
$ejarah Metayu is a ruling class text in which the assertion of Malays’
absolute loyalty to their rulers is an effort to indoctrinate, rather than a
description of an existing situation.97 Second, the Hang Tuah story should
probably be read as prescribing an ideal relationship within the ruling
class—the proper conduct of a chief to his ruler. A modern exemplar of
this type of loyalty was Abu Bakar’s land official, Salleh bin Mohamed
96Chandra Muzaffar, Protector? An Analysis of the Concept and Practice of Loyalty in
Leader-led Relationships within Malay Society (Penang: Aliran, 1979), 3-4, 6.
97Abdul Rahman Hj. Ismail, “Kewibawaan Mutlak Raja dan KetaatseHaan Mutlak
Rakyat Kepada Raja,” Kajian Malaysia 3, 1 (June 1985): 32-57.
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Perang. Slandered, mistreated, and pensioned off by Sultan Ibrahim (who
wished to be rid of his father’s old retainers), Salleh hinted at his
displeasure by proclaiming his loyalty:
I most solemnly enjoin upon my children and my
descendants down through the generations that they should
never allow even to cross their minds the idea of wishing ill
upon their own raja Because down through the generations,
our ancestors have all been bound by an oath of loyalty to the
ancestors of the Sultan of Johor and have vowed to serve
their interests.. •98
Ordinary subjects (rakyat), however, make few appearances in texts like the
Sejarah Metayu. It was thus understandable, no less convenient, that Hang
Tuah was usually fmis)read aS the exemplary subject and has become an
icon of Malay culture.
Nevertheless, deference to authority was an important aspect of
court culture, and maintaining this deference became part of the colonial
preservation of Malay society. Within the ruling class, the concentration of
power in royal hands corresponded to a decline in the position of chiefs.
An early element in this decline was European intolerance of “piracy”
which, even before direct intervention, eliminated a source of revenue for
chiefs amassing a following to challenge a ruler99 Once British control had
been extended to a state, often by taking sides in a succession dispute, a
ruler could demand attendance at rituals of obeisance, which now occurred
with more frequency.’°° The British presence also changed the nature of
98Sweeney, Reputations Live On, 69.
99Andaya and Andaya, History, 131.
1According to Wilkinson, “Historically there is not much authority for the mengadap
[audience at which the ruler receives the homage of his chiefs] to which so much attetition
is paid at the present day.” R.J. Wilkinson, “Sri Menanti” (originally published 1914) in
Papers on Malay Subjects (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971), 380.
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those rituals, as suggested by limes’ remarks on Abdul Samad’s “homage-
day”:
When it was over the Sultan remarked to us that now, since
the white man had come into his country, he was no longer
afraid for his life on homage-day; but that formerly, when
there were many ambitious rajas who would have liked to
become Sultan, he was always expectmg that one or other of
them would seIze the opportunity of stabbing him. He told us
that such things formerly often happened when Sultans were
receiving homage, as on no other occasion were well-known
dangerous characters allowed to come so near the royal
person101
Even as Malaya changed around the Malays, loyalty to the ruler and
deference to his leadership remained unquestioned tenets of traditional
Malay society. Further, loyalty to the ruler was effectivelyextendedto
include the colonial overlord. This extension was most plainly manifest
when peasant or rulmg class revolts were labeled derhaka (treason) by
rulers forced (or eager) to “take sides” and who relied ever more heavily
on British backing thereafter. Over time, the British insinuated themselves
conceptually as well as ritually, as revealed in this reminiscence of “the
Malay”:
Love of his ricefields when the young rice is pale green in
water which reflects the sunrise and sunset, until the golden
grain is ready for the knife, of his village house, brown thatch
among the coconuts, silver at night and murmuring by day,
leads up to loyalty to his chief, loyalty to his Sultan, and
loyalty to those Englishmen who take the trouble to know
him and understand him.102
Thus did the British imagine themselves as part of tradition.
101lpiies, Chersonese, 4344.
102Theodore Adams, “The Malay in Malaya,” Asiatic Review 40, 141 (1944), 98.
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This chapter has described how the structure of Malay leadership was
standardized to accord with an ideal Malay political culture considered by
the British to be in decay. The articulation of a court tradition through the
creation of new state ritual was the prime accomplishment of colonial
traditionalism, which sought a way to preserve Malay culture while
radically changing the political and economic milieu in which it lived. The
rulers themselves are understood, in this analysis, to have embraced this
project whole-heartedly as a way of enhancing their position both within
Malay society and in the new imperial context. In return for this
coliaboratic)n, and ostensibly in order to preserve Malay culture, the
colonial state protected Malay rulers as never before from challenges
within their own society. The rulers, even if unwittingly, acted as
frontmen for that state: their very presence, articulated through new
rituals and visibility, attested to a traditional, not colonial, foundation of
society, an4 their monopoly on political activity thwarted the development
of Malay critiques of colonialism.
Looking at the Malay ruling class as a whole, we see a crucial
difference between the colonial transformations undergone by rulers and
chiefs. The hybrid Malay ruler encompassed two superficially similar
models, western constitutional monarch and Malay ceremonial raja. In the
British imperial, as well as the Southeast Asian, context, the two fit
together neatly, the Malay ruler as vassal to the British overlord. The
preservation of the chiefs was more ambiguous. They came to be identified
partly with tradition, like the rulers, and partly with good government, as
salaried members of the colonial state. Both the Malay College Kuala
Kangsar, with its English public school ethos, and the Malay
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Administrative Service, in which Malay chiefs read English law, were a
way of harnessing tradition in the service of change, a way of creating “the
modern Malay.”
A rift had developed within the Malay ruling class, even while the
new bureaucratic elite remained contiguous with and dependent upon
traditional Malay rulers and their courts. The interests of the two groups
usually coincided because together they could most successfully pursue the
small amount of power and considerable amount of prestige available to
them in the colonial system. Yet when open competition between ruler
and chief, so indicative of precolonial Malay politics, had the opportunity
to reemerge, it would become obvious that the colonial experience had left
the chiefs with an advantage. In the differentiation of the ruling class, the
rulers had become invested in the preservation of tradition and the
aristocrats m a good government ethos which was rapidly gaining prestige
with the public. As long as colonial rule continued to validate
traditionalism, aristocratic ambitions would remain in uneasy abeyance.
But should circumstances change, the bureaucratic elite would be able to
lay claim to a new kind of leadership in Malaya, one based on the
qualifications associated with good government and progress. In the next
chapter, I will discuss prewar changes within Malay society which strained
the credibility of the traditional leadership and the momentous disruption
of British colonial rule which brought traditionalism to the point of crisis.
Chapter 4
CHALLENGES TO TRADffiONALISM
Conventional colonial wisdom held that Malays were a tradition-bound
people and that nothing much had altered that until World War U
introduced dramatic changes. According to R.O. Winstedt, “before the
Japanese war the passing of the old order was almost imperceptible.”1 As I
have argued above, the old order was not what it appeared to be. Beyon4
that, however, change was indeed taking place in the 1920s and 1930s,
especially in connection with urbanization and education. To understand
the effects of the Japanese occupation and the postwar restoration of
colonialism on the ruling class, we must read them against a background
of changes taking place in Malay society before the war, even in the heyday
of traditionalism.
The following four sections examine these successive challenges to
colonial Malay traditionalism. In the first, I discuss how increasing
opportunities for education led to a dramatic growth in the size of the
Malay reading public. Before the war, this public began to articulate
critiques of the condition of Malay society, though these were rarely
directed openly at the Malay ruling class or the British..
In the second section, I discuss the impact of the war. The
interruption of British colonial rule for three and a half years did not
1Richard Winstedt, The Malays: A Cultural History, 5th ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1961), 3.
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destroy traditionalism, but it did seriously destabilize it. By promoting anti
colonial rhetoric and political activity, the Japanese allowed suppressed
criticism of the ruling class to see the light of day. Just as importantly, the
priorities of Japanese administration changed the balance of power within
the Malay ruling class in favor of the chiefs, who were placed in more
responsible positions, while the rulers lost their sovereign status and
ceremonial roles.
The third section introduces the conditions of postwar Malaya
which provide the setting for the remainder of this study. Economic
disruption, political violence, and civil disorder all extended the instability
of the occupation—and consequent threat to traditionalism—into the
colonial restoration. Most importantly, British attitudes toward the Malays
and Chinese upon reoccupation made it clear that the pro-Malay policies of
the prewar years, especially the protection of the ruling elite, were a thing
of the past.
In the final section, I look specifically at the returning British
government’s policy toward political and press freedom. Much of my
analysis in the following chapters is based on the “public transcript” of
Malay-language newspapers in the years 1945-1947. Here I examine the
development of parameters for acceptable political expression in this
period.
Change in Prewar Malay Society
The careful preservation of a purportedly traditional ruling class could not
deter political, economic, and cultural change from occurring in the lower
realms of society. During World War I, while the Malay ruling class made
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appropriate gestures of loyalty and support for the Empire, other Malays
speculated about Turkey’s entrance into the war and England’s possible
defeat. By the 1920s and 1930s, commodity production for the global market
had reached down to peasant villages of rubber smaliholders, and the
consequences of the worldwide depression were felt everywhere.
Undoubtedly the greatest changes in Malay society were occurring in the
urban crucibles of colonial cities. The narrowing horizons of the kampung
economy, secular education, and ease of transportation brought growing
numbers of Malays to the cities.
By 1931, about 11 percent of the Malay population throughout
British Malaya was urban.2 This low percentage (which had risen from 9
percent in 1921), as well as the overwhelmingly non-Malay character of the
largest cities, can easily obscure the significance to Malay society of even
limited urbanization under colonial conditions. When the aggregate
numbers are broken down, it becomes apparent that in the Unfederated
States of Kelantan and Trengganu, largely Malay cities were developing,
and even in Johor and Kedah, the proportion of Malays to the total urban
population was about 30 percent.3 Jn the cities of the Straits Settlements
and federated States, where the Malays were only about 12 percent of the
population, they nevertheless underwent an experiential change which
would have consequences throughout society.
Urban Malays may be said to have “slipped through the cracks” of a
system designed to preserve a two-tiered social structure of ruling class and
2Btffish Malaya: A Report on the 1931 Census (London, 1932), p. 48. Urban areas are defined
as towns with a population greater than 1000, 36 See also Census of Bnttsh Malaya 1921
(London, 1922), 4142.
The urban areas of Kelanlan were 69.3 percent Malay, Trengganu 81.5 percent, Johor 29.3
percent, and Kedah 33.1 percent. 1931 Census, 48.
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agrarian subject class. In the city, Malays experienced a decidedly non
traditional society characterized by Western lifestyles, new occupations,
and ethnic heterogeneity. Men found employment in the growing motor
industry (mainly as drivers and messengers) and in public service (as
clerks, police, and laborers). A small professional class, working in
education, law, and medicine, was also urban-based.4 Wage-earning urban
Malays, with salaries and leisure time to spend, participated in a popuiar
culture of commercialized art and entertainment. New forms of theater,
music, and dance were joined by film and radio as popular pastimes.5
Emblematic of the new social, commercial, and cultural cosmopolitanism
was bangsawan, a popular Malay opera incorporating elements of Parsi
theater from India. These foreign elements made bangsawan a target of
criticism from Malay intellectuals who increasingly artict ated Malay
identity against a background of growing Chinese strength in Malaya.6 In
the cities, awareness of the economic strength and number of foreign
immigrants was inevitable, as Malays interacted with them in public places
of entertainment and recreation, like dance halls, cabarets, and sports clubs.
It was in the cities, at first, that more Malays became literate in their
own language. In early census surveys, in fact, literacy was measured only
in urban areas. In 1921, male literacy was found to range from 30 to 50
percent in most towns. And although literacy rates were higher in the
Straits Settlements and Federated States, three in every five Kota Bharu
4IbId., 49, 264-65, 289-90, 313-14.
5Wan Abdut Kadir, Budaya Popular Dalam Masyarakat Melayu Bandaran (Kuala Lumpur
Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1988), 221-23, 227.
6Tan Sool Beng, Bangsawan: A Social and Stytistic History of Popular Malay Opera
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1993).
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(Kelantan) boys between the ages of 5 and 15 were attending schooL7 The
link between urbanization, education, and new occupations can be seen in
the 1926 establishment of a federal Trade School in Kuala Lumpur, meant
to train mechanics, fitters, machine workers, and other technicians.6
Despite an overall reluctance to train or educate Malay commoners beyond
the level of basic literacy and elementary agriculture, Director of Education
Winstedt was forced to acknowledge the different experience of urban
Malays:
Although the school is open to pupils of all nationalities,
Malays are given first consideration, the original intention
being to provide trammg for, and to open up a career to, those
town Malays who up to the present have had nothing more
to look forward to than an existence spent as a peon or a
messenger.9
By 1931, when literacy was measured universally, it was estimated
that over half the local-born Malay population in the Straits Settlements
and Federated States was literate. In addition, nearly 80 percent of boys in
these territories were then being educated, a process that the compiler of
the census expected would yield nearly universal male Malay literacy in
the next generation.1° The 1920s and 1930s saw primary education of all
kinds spreading beyond urban areas. In addition to government and
private secular education, religious schools increased in number with the
growing demand for education; their curricula came to resemble those in
secular schools with the introduction of modern teaching ideas from the
7BritLch Malaya 1921, 109-110.
8PhIlip Loh Fook-Seng, “A Review of the Educational Developments in the Federated
Malay States to 1939,” J$EAS 5, 2 (1974): 23536.
9clted In Ibid., 236.
10female literacy lagged behind considerably, amounting to only 7 percent of the adult
population But progress was reported in the 20 percent of girls currently attending school
1931 Census, 93.
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Middle East.11 The graduates of these schools created the market which
made possible a dramatic growth in publishing activity in the 1920s and
especially the 1930s, Following the spread of literacy outward from the
cities was the influence of newspapers and magazines, driven by
advethsmg and benefiting from improved communications and regional
marketing.12 It was the growth of these publications that fostered the
development of a modern Malay public discourse. Like the liberal public
sphere which emerged in Europe in the eighteenth century, it was
characterized by the participation of the literate population and by
“people’s public use of their reason “13 This developing public manifested
itself in both newspaper discourse and new forms of social organization,
both of which articulated responses to the significant changes occurring in
colonial Malay society.
Foremost among the topics discussed was the challenge posed by
foreign immigration and the need for Malay society to respond through
education and self-improvement. The earliest critique of Malay
“backwardness” came early in the century from the Islamic reform
movement (Kaum Muda), a group which included Malays and immigrant
Indonesians, as well as Peranakan Arabs and Indians who identified with
and claimed to speak for the Malays. This reform movement, while
imbibing ideas and impulses from abroad, was formulated in Malaya
largely in response to the impact of colonialism on Islam. The terms of
Khoo Kay Kim, “Malay Society, 18744920s,” JSEAS 5, 2 (1974): 184-89.
12WaI.L Abdul Kadlr, Budaya Poputar, 232k
13Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a
Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 27. See Anthony Mimer, The
Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya Contesting Nationalism and the Expansion of the
Public Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), especiatly chapter 5.
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indirect British control left only residually-defined Malay custom and
religion in Malay hands, and British encouragement of a bureaucratized
traditionalism had led to “an authoritarian form of religious
administration” in which the royal houses controlled “extensive
machinerles] for governing Islam.”14 Reformists rejected the arbitrary
control of the elite and insisted on the use of reason (akat) in interpreting
Islamic practices (i.e., regarding usury and education for women) in order
to improve Muslims’ position in the world.15 Their analysis attacked the
traditional practices which were fossilizing Malay society and put the
reformers in direct conflict with the traditional Malay elite. Adding to this
intrinsic conflict, the reformers began to articulate a new idea: that rulers
and traditional leaders had responsibilities towards their people in the
areas of education, economic development, and self-awareness, and that
they should be helping Muslims to change in a changing world. In this
regard, the reformers found the Malay leadership to be a complete failure
and criticized it as well for being “dissolute and self-indulgent.” In
responding to this defiance, the Malay elite was backed by colonial
authority. Reformers were barred from speaking in many peninsular
mosques, and reformist journals published in Singapore and Penang were
denied entry into several states. But although the reformists were blocked
from developing mass support amongst the peasantry, the critical public
discourse they initiated did not disappear. This rational discourse,
concerned with the cultural and social improvement of the community
(umat), was perpetuated by newspapers and in them by particular modes of
14Wllhiam R Roil, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur Penerbitan
UnlversiH Malaya, 1980), 72-73.
151b1d., 78.
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analysis. For example, M-Imam (1906-1908), the fir5t organ of the Islamic
reform movement in Malaya, differed from earlier Malay newspapers (the
first of which appeared in 1876), which had largely translated overseas and
local news from the English press. M-Imam concerned itself wholly with
problems of the community, initiating critiques of Malay backwardness
and disunity—both themes which continue to have relevance to this
day.16 After the demise of Al-Imam, other Kaum Muda journals picked up
those then es: Neracha and Tunas Melayu in the 1910s, At-Hedayah, At
Ikhwan, and Idaran Zaman in the 1920s, and finally, Saudara in the
1930s,17 The limitations of the early papers were characteristic of the newly
postulated public they spoke to their circulations were small and the size
of their literate public was insufficient to sustain them for long runs. By
the 1930s, however, Malay literacy had reached a critical mass capable of
supporting a wider public dialogue. Especially notable in this regard was
the overnight success of Sahabat Pena (Brotherhood of Pen Friends), which
started as a write-in feature on the children’s page of the Penang newspaper
Saudara in 1934.18 Attracting members and letters from all over the
peninsula and even Borneo, Sahabat Pena had, within six months, far
outgrown its founders’ intentions to become the first national forum for a
literate Malay public to air its concerns and exchange ideas.
Meanwhile, another innovation had appeared on the Malay social
landscape. The first organization for the promotion and propagation of
161b1d 57.
175 William R. Roff, “KaumMuda—Kaum Tua: Innovation and Reaction amongst the
Malays, 1900-1941” in Papers on Malayan History, ed. K.G. Treggoning (Singapore: Journal
of South-East Asian History, 1962), 166, n. 14, 179.
t8Roff, Malay Nationalism, 212-22.
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Malay language and literature appeared in Johor in 1888.19 Organizations
of this type were formed in reaction to the growing marginalization of the
Malays and their culture in the government and economy of colonial
Malaya. They were unofficial, that is, not associated with the colonial state,
and because of that had to tread carefully around the political prohibition.
Nevertheless, this independence allowed them to play a crucial role in
generating the political and cultural ideas and language of twentieth-
century Malay society. First, they encouraged the development of a new
literature independent from the ruling class, a literature which was
influenced more by Middle Eastern and Indonesian innovations than by
the mediocre English-language training received by the elite. Second, their
membership consisted largely of Malay teachers, people who helped to
increase Malay literacy and, in turn, provide a growing audience for the
critical discourse developing in the Malay newspapers. Finally, they
established the significance of language and literature in developing a
Malay national consciousness. By the 1930s, newspapers like the Singapore
Warta Malaya were calling for the standardization of Malay vocabulary and
spelling and for a writers’ federation across the peninsula2°
In the 1930s, several of these trends came together: growing
awareness and discontent with the position of Malays in colonial society,
rising literacy in Malay (and to some extent in English), new occupations in
the urban areas, and a boom in newspaper publication. At the same time,
Malay associational life increased with the establishment of Malay
19Th1s paragraph is based on Rustam Sani, “Badan-Badan Bahasa dan Sastera Melayu:
Satu PerspekUf Sosio-Polifik,” paper given to me by the author.
20Zulkipli bin Mahmud, Warta Malaya: Penyambung Lidah Bangsa Melayu 1930-1941
fUangi, Selangor: Jabatan Sejarah, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1979), 99.
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Associations organized along Western lines, with elections, committees,
meetings, and so forth.21 Among the ranks of the educated, the colonial
rendition of traditional Malay society was becoming increasingly
uncompelling. The aristocracy, not as alienated from the mass of society as
the rulers, could not fail to notice and some were, in fact, susceptible to the
same feelings of disaffection. One notable example is Onn bin Jaafar (the
postwar founder of UMNO), who veered from his expected career path in
the johor administrative service to advocate, as a journalist, greater Malay
representation in government and educaffon Another example is the
Putera Kelab, a youth organization founded in Kelantan in 1929 by a small
group of Islamic-educated low-ranking government servants who wanted
to move beyond literary and cultural uplift activities and who began to
criticize the Malay establishment in the pages of their newspaper, Akhbar
Putera. The Kelantan administration (both Malay officials and the British
Adviser) soon became openly hostile to the group, forbidding government
servants from reading the newspaper, and the enterprise came to an end.
Another journal published by the same group a few years later prompted
the government to require all editors to swear loyalty to the ruler.22
These prewar attempts to reverse the stagnation of Malay society by
graduates of all educational streams—Malay and English, secular and
religious—attest to the growing strains of colonial traditionalism. Yet two
factors limited their effectiveness. First, the way the critiques were
formulated demonstrates how successfully “traditional Malay society”
shielded colonial reality. Most prewar discontent was articulated in one of
21Roff, Malay Nationalism, 182.
22Thoo, “Malay Society,” 192-94.
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two ways. The first was criticism leveled at Malay society itself (and less
commonly at Malay leadership). Thus Malays were urged to overcome
their backwardness by attention to language, industriousness, education,
and cooperation within the community.23 The second type of campaign
was the constant reminder to the colonial power that its responsibility was
to the Malays, not to immigrant Asians who were themselves making new
demands. The combining of self-criticism with a continual petition for
more English education and more positions in the colonial system
essentially conceded that progress would come from the British on British
terms. for example, the Singapore newspaper Warta Malaya, under the
editorship of Dato Onn, reminded the ruling class of Johor that it was the
people’s affection for them that was responsible for the peace and security
of the state (a foreshadowing of Onn’s later success as a populist) and
pressed the British, in a tone that was not unfriendly, to fulfifi their moral
obligation to educate and incorporate more Malays into the administration
of the country.24 The recipients of these positions would inevitably be the
well-born, who would perpetuate their privileged access to the colonial
state.
Only one nexus of secularly educated young men and politically
motivated religious reformers seemed to understand the relationship of
colonialism to the Malay ruling class and to be hostile to both.25 The
23 Is this strain of self-criticism which continues in Mahathir’s The Malay Dilemma
(Singapore: Times Books International, 1970) and in his later efforts to construct “the new
Malay.”
24ZuIkipIi, Warta Malaya, 76-79.
FIrdaus Haji Abdullah mentions the connection between the Kesatuan Melayu Muda and a
madrasah (modern Islamic school) in northern Perak in Radtcal Malay Politics Its Origins
and Early Development (Petaling Jaya Pelanduk Publications, 1985), 18 More generally, he
argues that radicalism (i.e., nationalism) owed its origin as least as much to modernist
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Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM), Young Malay Union, was founded in 1938
as the first Malay organization to transcend state boundaries. The 4M
was explicitly anti-British and anti-ruling class, though it was stymied in
expressing its views by the pervasive and ingrained prohibition on
political activity upheld jointly by the rulers and the British. Clandestine
meetings and veiled fictional satire only gave way to outright criticism in
the months before the Japanese invasion, and for this the leaders of the
organization were jailed.26
Second, I would argue that this increasingly complex and
challenging public life limited its effectiveness by refusing to cross the line
into the politicaL Conceiving themselves as literary, welfare, or cultural
organizations may have served to protect fundamentally political aims, but
with the exception of the KMM, none were willing to break the taboo
against interfering campur tangan) with the rulers’ monopoly. This is not
merely a semantic distinction. For example, support for the Malay
language manifested itself in an enriched literature and vocabulary, but
could not hope to make its achievements official through control of the
state. Later, when these ideas were expressed in explicitly political ways,
they would manifest themselves in calls for Bahasa Melayu to be
enshrined constitutionally as the national language. Further, political
terms and ideas had been entering the Malay language through newspaper
editorials since the time of the First World War, and political movements
in other Muslim countries were well known to educated Malays.27 But to
Islam’s combination of religious devotion and worldly concerns as to the more often cited
secular preparation received at the Sultan Idris Training College.
26Roff, Malay Nationalism, 229-35.
27Mohd Taib bin Osman, The Language of the Editorials in Malay Vernacular Newspapers
Up to 1947 (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1966), 3. New terms, in both
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embrace politics would inherently have entailed the destruction of
traditional/colonial structures of authority which sheltered the educated
Malay elite. Thus educated leaders refused to embrace party politics as a
means to their desired ends and so left the mass of rural Malays outside the
expanding public discourse, mired in a discourse of blind loyalty to
hereditary rulers. This important adherence to a traditionalist conception
of Malay public life prevented the development of critiques of colonialism.
The more disaffection grew and change seemed inevitable, the more
tenaciously tradition was defended by the British and the Malay ruling
class, especially the rulers and more court-oriented members of the
aristocracy. The defense was especially efficacious in discouraging political
activity, sometimes with the help of the police, but often solely by the
power of public disapproval. In many cases, social or literary organizations
like the Sahabat Pena were hounded by accusations of secret political
activity. Others, like the state-based Malay Associations of the late 1930s,
which were in fact proto-political organizations dominated by English-
educated members of the aristocracy concerned with Malay progress,
scrambled to disavow any political intentions. Meanwhile, the British and
the more complacent members of the ruling class reassured each other of a
certain unchanging quality inherent in “the Malay” Writing to inform
Europeans about Malay court etiquette, a self-described “courtier and tutor
to the royal family of Kelantan” introduced his brief survey by invoking
timeless tradition and displaying stubborn ignorance of his countrymen’s
demands for change:
English and Arabic, often found their way into the Malay papers in connecUon with
International events For example, swsah (Ar, politics or policy) appeared in 1925, hxzb
fAr., political party) In 1932. IbId., 13.
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The rules of this unwritten code preserved from time
immemorial, are strictly observed It is therefore the duty of
Malay parents to teach their children how to behave before
elders and superiors so that the humblest Malay may be fit to
be a follower or companion of royalty and the aristocracy
Although education of the higher kind is not regarded as of
paramount importance, a knowledge of Court language and
manners is thought to be a sme qua non even by illiterate
Malays.28
Ten years later, in 1944, a senior British official who had worked closely
with the Malay ruling class before the war and who would do so again
afterwards, saw Malay society as apolitical and unchanging
Those of us who have worked and played with Malays know
and think of them as individuals, charming, courteous,
friendly, loyal, courageous, democratic, yet welcoming ancient
constituted authority imposed on them by custom and
religion, democratic, that is, in a different way from British
democracy based on the vote.29
The colonial power had so convinced itself of the traditional and eternal
nature of its protectorate, that it would be thoroughly surprised by the
second reordering of Malay politics that began under the Japanese
occupation.
War and Occupation
The temporary interruption of British colonial rule during the war (1942-
1945) allowed the simmering changes in Malay society to come to a boil,
producing a situation with which colonial Malay tradition would
28Dato’ Muhammad Ghazzall, J.P., D.P.M.K., (Data’ Bentara Luar of Kelantan), “Court
Language and Etiquette of the Malays,” JMBRAS 11, Pt 2 (1933) 273 I have given the
author’s name as it appears in the publication. Note the combination of British and Malay
status markers.
29Theodore Adams, “The Malay in Malaya,” Asiatic Revtew 40, 141 (1944) 99 Adams’
prewar career In Malaya extended from 1908 to 1936, the last four years of which was spent
as Resident of Selangor. After the war he became an adviser to the rulers.
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eventually have to come to terms. The occupation facilitated the visibility
and viability ofa political challenge to traditional leadership. It also
changed the balance of power between preservation and change within the
ruling class itself, giving new government responsibilities to the
bureaucratic elite and stripping away the ceremonial trappings of the
traditional rulers.
Without British backing, the rulers’ monopoly over political activity
vanished. Malay nationalists, jailed by the British before the war, were
freed by the Japanese to organize militia and denounce the British. for a
brief period early in the occupation, the KMM was the privileged political
organization of the peninsula, enjoying an access to Japanese officers and
growth in membership which extended its influence throughout Malay
society.?0 Even after its brief ascendancy had passed, its members staffed
Malay-language propaganda organs and joined Japanese-led militias. (The
significance of both of these will be discussed in chapter six.)
For the first time, political aspirations could be spoken of openly and
without “making obeisance” to tradition. Two examples will serve to
illustrate the change. KMM leader Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob held a meeting
soon after the British surrender at which he criticized the fragmentation
and state-based orientation of existing Malay organizations and stated as
his goal the unity of all Malays without reference to region or state. The
group discussed the ideals it should pursue, including unity, humanity,
liberty, democracy, fraternity, and honesty (rendered in English). When
30Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya Reststance and Socwl Confiwt Dunng and
After the Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 2941—1946 (Singapore: Singapore University
Press, 1983) Is the best overall account of the occupation. For the KMM and their attempts to
move toward independence under the Japanese, see especially pp. 101-23.
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words were sought in Malay to convey these aspirations, the meeting
decided on bersatu (unity), setia (loyalty), percaya (belief), bergerak (to
move), and mara (progress).31 The context in which it appears suggests a
new conception of loyalty, one invoking not blind obedience to the
traditional ruler, but rather adherence to set of principles. In another
example, a magazine under the editorship of Ishak Haji Muhammad was
able to say (with Japanese encouragement, of course) that Malays had lived
under colonialism, exploited and oppressed by capitalists and European
governments.32 The analysis was not new, but the very words were newly
expressed, no longer under the cloak of satiric fiction.
The Japanese occupation also restored fluidity to the balance of
power between rulers and chiefs. The bureaucratic elite experienced an
enhancement of position and responsibility, because, despite the brief
ascendancy of the KM?vI, the Japanese administration of Malaya depended
heavily on institutional continuity. At the highest levels of government,
royalty and the aristocratic elite were fully represented in advisory
councils, boards, courtrooms, and delegations.33 Throughout the
countryside, rural Malay administrators continued in their jobs, many
receiving promotions to replace British officers who had fled.34 According
to Cheah Boon Kheng, Malay administrators gained valuable experience in
practical leadership, joining community work projects and doing manual
31A. Samad Ahmad, Sejambak Kenangan: $ebuah Autobiographi (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan
Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1981), 152-53.
32”Menyusun Masyarakat Baru,” Semangat Asia, June 1943. Cited in Abdul Latiff Abu
Bakar, Ishak Haji Muhammad: Penutis dan Ahil Potitik Sehingga 1948 (Kuala Lumpur:
Penerbit UniversiH Malaya, 1977), 95.
335ee CO 273/669/50744/7 for examples from Selangor, Kelantan, and Johor.
34Cheah, Red Star, 29-32 See also Muda Mohd Taib A Rahman, “Pendudukan Jepun di
Trengganu,” In Sejarab Masyarakat Melayu Moden, ed. Khoo Kay Kim fKuala Lumpur:
Jabatan Sejarah, Universiti Malaya, 1984), 1U.
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labor after office hours “instead of keeping their hands clean as in prewar
days.” This experience has been interpreted vital in increasing the political
self-confidence of the bureaucratic elite, enabling it to act decisively after
the occupation.35 Just as importantly, it served to strengthen the
identification of Malay chiefs with good government and progress. As
British superiors disappeared and district administration continued, Malay
bureaucrats proved that self-government was possible.
At the same time, the Japanese occupation represented a direct blow
to the standing and public posture of the rulers. Although no rulers were
physically harmed, the policy of the new government effectively
dismantled the careful construction of ceremonial rajas who embodied
Malay tradition within British imperialism. The Sultans were not
recognized by the Japanese as sovereign rulers, and their stipends were cut
by as much as two-thirds,36 abruptly ending their public life of extravagant,
Western-style living. They tried to remain aloof from the occupiers, but
were often forced to make speeches which had been composed by the
Japanese.37 They were required to participate in “grow more food”
campaigns by working the soil themselves,36 the sort of activity that could
enhance the stature of a leader who was involved in solving problems (i.e.
chiefs), but that would do little for one whose very style of life was meant
to symbolize the status of a whole community. Further, the nature of the
35Cheah, Red Star, 43.
36Yoji Akashi, “Japanese Military Administration: Its Formation and Evolution in
Reference to the Sultans, the Islamic Religion, and the Moslem Malays, 194145,” Asian
Studges (April 1969) 95-96
37lntelligence Bulletin No.33(13 October 1945). WO 203/2155, WO 203/5635A.
38QJri Kee Ozm, Malaya Upside Down (1946. Reprint, Singapore: Federal Publications,
1976), 47.
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rulers’ connection with European colonialism was made explicit by the
Japanese, as illustrated by this propaganda broadcast from late 1942:
The British in Malaya treated the Malays very badly, as
though they were aliens, while foreigners dispossessed them.
They are now rid of the intrigues practiced by the British, who
bribed the Malay Rajahs to praise the British The Japanese
have eliminated the evils of the old system of conferring
distinction on figureheads, and in its place there is
nationalism and the Co-prosperity Sphere.39
The emergence of critical voices, the increasing responsibility of the
chiefs as administrators, and the decline in stature of the rulers were all
tremendously destabilizing to the power of the elite qua traditionalistic
ruling class. The first danger emerged from Japanese unwillingness to
referee the plural society as the British had, Malay administrators acting as
district officers found themselves for the first time in positions of authority
over Chinese and Indians, as well as Malays. In these positions they were
forced to carry out Japanese orders, like those recruiting laborers for the
Siam-Burma “death” railway, that left them targets of retribution by the
Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army (!vWAJA), the largely non-Malay
resistance force. Inevitably, they also betrayed their own communities to
the demands of the occupying power. Cheah Boon Kheng has argued that
the entire local Malay establishment, from district officer to penghutu
(subdistrict chief) to ketua kampung (village head), was implicated in the
fulfillment of rice and labor quotas.4° All Malays in positions of
responsibility, whether bureaucrats or KMM, experienced the hostility of
peasant villages in this time of upheaval and violence. Good government
39Extract from Monitoring Report, Penang Radio, November 5, 1942. Co 273/669/50744/7.
40Cheah Boon Kheng, “The Social Impact of the Japanese Occupation of Malaya (1942-
1945),” In Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation, ed. Alfred W. McCoy (New Haven:
Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1980), 83-84.
159
is always being measured by its achievements, and by that measurement,
the bureaucratic elite failed as often as it succeeded. When, in early 1945, a
cycle of ethnic attack and retaliation began, only religious figtres were
prepared to offer any practical leadership; the bureaucrats were unable to
protect their people, or themselves, from attack,
Another danger involved elite willingness to cooperate with the
Japanese occupiers. The issue of Malay collaboration with the Japanese is a
complicated one. On one level, the entire Malay community had an easier
relationship with the Japanese than did the Chinese, who were punished
for their past contributions to the Chinese war effort and their vigorous
resistance to the occupation of Malaya. Malays were favored over Chinese
and Indians in appointment to administrative positions and in
recruitment to the Koa Kunrenjo (leadership training schools).4’ As
mentioned above, Malay visibility in local government positions invited
the accusation of collaboration from the Chinese resistance movement.
And finally, it was believed by the exiled British during the war that the
fifth column activities of the tiny KMM represented a more widespread
“betrayal” by the entire Malay community. Consequently, upon their
return, the British made it known that the activities of all Malays in public
life, from Sultans to penghulus, would be scrutinized on suspicion of
collaboration.
Alfred McCoy has suggested that “wartime allegiance was a matter of
little importance to the Southeast ASian wartime leaders.”42 This was
especially true of Malay leaders when accusations of collaboration came
41Th1d., 82.
42Mfred W. McCoy, “Introduction,” In Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation, 5.
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primarily from outide the community. According to Cheah Boon Kheng,
the numerical preponderance of Malays among the MPAJA’s victims, the
mutilation of victims’ bodies, and Chinese distrust of those Malays who
did join the resistance all fostered an inter-class alliance of Malays against
Chinese.43 In this context, an MPAJA or even British accusation of.
collaboration was meaningless, and from the Sultan of Selangor to the
nationalist editors of Seruan Rakyat, Malays refuted the widespread
charges of collaboration.44
Within the Malay community, however, the issue acquired some
significance as postwar class politics began to take shape. When the British
returned, they were intent on restoring Malaya’s economic profitability.
This made institutional continuity a priority and encouraged them to
overlook administrative collaboration once Malay officials had been
cleared of acts of betrayal leading to Britiáh deaths. KMM activists,
however, were branded collaborators by both the British and the Malay
community. Clearly, it was not pro-Japanese activities, but anti-British
ones that defined collaboration charges after the war. The KMM’s
motives—using the Japanese occupation to win Malaya’s independence
from Britain—could not be lauded as long as colonial restoration
proceeded. Yet more than thirty years after the departure of the British, the
legacy of this definition survived. In 1989, the daughter of the recently
deceased wartime vice-president of the KMM, Mustapha Hussain, made
public his memoirs “so that Malaysians and historians alike can judge for
43cheah, “Social Impact,” 91.
44The Sultan of Selangor, in a speech to penghutus and village heads, observed that the
Japanese had given orders that people had had to obey, for fear of losmg their lives or
property. BMA PR 1/7. See also “Malaya Political Climate,” No. 5, 1-20 December 1945.
WO 203/5660.
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themselves whether my father was a hero or a Japanese collaborator.” In
the memoirs, Mustapha distances himself from KMM president Ibrahim
Yaacob, who “always had a grand design for Malaya—he wanted a republic,
but my father felt that the sole aim of K?vlM was to liberate Malaya from
the Japanese and from any form of colonialism and imperialism.” Further,
Mustapha’s daughter emphasized that her father had not tortured other
Malays and had, in fact, saved the life of many highly placed Malays using
special powers conferred on him by the Japanese.45 Four decades after the
war, collaboration had become a question of betraying the Malay elite. The
British were not mentioned; neither was the connection between the
Japanese military and the end of British colonial rule.
The significance of elite collaboration did not go completely
unnoticed, however. British colonialism had prepared Malay rulers and
chiefs to perform ceremonial and administrative tasks under the
supervision of foreign overlords. The Japanese changed little about day-to
day administration at the local level, providing an important source of
continuity which should not be overlooke4 amidst the violence and
dislocation of the war years. Because the Japanese preserved the colonial
state, and enhanced Malay positions in it, Malay bureaucrats were not to be
found in the resistance. In continuing to serve, they revealed their loyalty
to that state—regardless of who was at its head. This easy shift from British
to Japanese rule was remarked upon by some, like the Malay who wrote to
the Straits Times in 1946 in favor of “cast[ing] overboard the whole cargo of
45”A Daughter’s Crusade for an Unsung Hero,” (Kuala Lumpur) Sunday Mail, 2 ApriL 1989.
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worthless fossils who posed as wise owls but who hooted to the tune of any
overlord.”46
But this was a superficial collaboration when compared to the deep,
or structural, collaboration by which the traditional elite, especially the
rulers, flourished under British colonial rule. When the British Military
Administration (BMA) arrived in 1945, it interviewed all the rulers to
ascertain whether the proper person was on each throne and to evaluate
each for collaboration. In these interviews, the rulers related experiences
which showed the impossibility of meaningful collaboration between the
Japanese regime and traditional Malay rulers whose very identity derived
from the British colonial milieu The experience of the Yam Tuan of
Negeri Sembilan is emblematic. The Japanese took away all his cars except
one. They would not let him live at his istana for several months, and
then they would not allow him to fly his flag. They forced him to attend
functions at the state capital, and in attending those functions he was not
allowed to have his royal umbrella-bearer with him. At all the functions
he attended, he had been made to sit on the floor with the clerks. The
Sultan of Johor was also forthright about his experience and seemed
particularly affected by it. The Japanese took away all his European clothes,
and his istana was used as a boarding house. He had been paid nothing at
first, then $8,000 per month, and then $20,000, “which,” he said, “is the
same as the British Government paid me.” These exact words were
thought by the British interviewer to be “worthy of special note” because
the Sultan’s monthly allowance was actually paid from Johor state funds.
Before the war he would never have said that his allowance was paid by
46SWaits Times, 4 February 1946.
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the British Government The experience of foreign occupation had
dampened the independent spirit of Ibrahim of Johor.47
Colonial Restoration
British troops returning to Malaya in September 1945 found that although
there had not been large-scale destruction, the physical infrastructure of the
country was in a serious state of disrepair. Water, electric, and gas supply
systems, drainage and irrigation canals, sewage systems, roads, bridges, and
transport would all require extensive renovation before Malaya could be
brought back to prewar standards of living.48 Public health had also
suffered with increased incidence Of malaria, tuberculosis, and venereal
disease, the breakdown of urban sanitation leading to typhoid, smallpox,
and cholera, and the hospitals’ lack of all basic supplies to care for
patients.49 There was the great problem of recovering, caring for, and
repatriating 100,000 Allied prisoners of war and internees. Besides
Europeans interned in camps in Malaya, there were some 10,000 Javanese
in Malaya and 30,000 Malays, Chinese, and Indians found on the Burma-
Siam railway. Not forgetting the thousands of Japanese troops requiring
repatriation, this amounted to a serious dislocation of population which
would take years to correct.50
47intelligence Bulletin No.33(13 October 1945). WO 203/2155, WO 203/5635A.
48fS.V. Donnlson, British Military Administration in the Far East, 1943-46 (London: Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956), 155-6, 161.
49T.N. Harper, “The Politics of Disease and Disorder in Post-War Malaya,” Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies 21,1 (1990): 98.
50Vlce-Admlral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, Post Surrender Tasks. Section E of the
Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia,
1943-1945 (London Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1969), p v, Donnison, British Military
Administration, 279-80.
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But the most immediate threat to both public health and order was
the severe rice shortage which was already causing widespread
malnutrition.51 The shortage of rice and other consumer goods in Malayan
markets combined with a currency crisis to leave the economy in a serious
state. Inflation due to the overproduction of currency and the undersupply
of goods had already been a feature of life under the Japanese. As the end of
the war neared, British leaflets were dropped announcing that the despised
Japanese “banana” currency would not be recognized upon reoccupation
People responded by buying up everything in sight, trying to use up the
soon-to-be-worthless currency. The price of rice more than doubled from
July to August 1945 Inflation rose hourly52
Problems of infrastructure and the restoration of institutions like
the postal service would largely be on their way to recovery by the end of
the military administration in March 1946 Inflation, shortages, low wages,
and strikes were more intransigent, involving international food
allocation and the struggle between local labor and British economic
interests. In these areas, neither the DMA nor the civilian government that
followed was successful in restoring the conditions of prewar society. These
persistent conditions of economic instability and class (as opposed to
ethnic) conflict should be understood as underlying postwar Malay politics
as much as they did the growth of the Malayan Communist Party. Uke the
prewar development of an urban educated class of Malays and the wartime
shifts in ruling class influence, postwar instability weakened the hold of
51Donnlson, British Military Administration, 159.
52G’j, Malaya Upside Down, 38, 43, 181, appendix C.
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traditionalistic understandings of Malay society and directly threatened
those who benefited from them.
Contributing significantly to postwar instability was a high level of
crime and political violence. The complete breakdown of order which
came with the British withdrawal in 194142 had seen widespread looting
and robber gangs preying on the population. Many of those who took
advantage of the disorder were army and police officers armed with rifles,
shotguns, bayonets, kris (daggers) and parang (knives).53 Rural crime and
violence—including anti-Japanese resistance—continued throughout the
occupation, prompting the Japanese to respond with large-scale
mobilization of young Malay men into organizations given military
training and practice.54 During the transition back from Japanese to British
rule, disorder was even more marked, with violence being committed by
bandits, Malay religious cults, Chinese secret societies, communists, and
Kuomintang (KMT) guerrillas.
By 1945, violence and militarism were common not only in
connection with crime,55 but had also become part of political life. This was
53Thid., 17-24.
54Cheah, Red Star, 33. See also chapter six below.
55Vlolent crime, espedalty murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping, continued to be
widespread throughout the BMA period. According to statistics later compiled by the
Federation of Malaya government, there were seventy-six incidents of murder in January
1946 alone. (These statistics do not reveal the actual number of murder victims. One incident
may involve multiple deaths, as in cases of ethnic violence.) The monthly average of
murder Inddents for the rest of 1946 was thirty-one. The total for 1946 was 421. The monthly
average dropped in 1947 to eighteen, totalIng 220 IncIdents in the year, and continued to
drop in the first half of 1948 to eleven incidents per month. During the latter half of 1948,
coinciding with the MCP uprising, the average shot up again to fifty-nine incidents of
murder per month. The total number of incidents involving murder in 1948 was 465. Similar
patterns and higher numbers were found for armed robbery. Thus, for only a relatively brief
period of time did the residents of Malaya begin to enjoy a more secure environment.
Department of Public Relations, Federation of Malaya1 ‘Political Crime in Malaya
Vigilant Efforts of Police” 4 February 1949 Statistics compiled by the Records Branch of
the Criminal Investigation Department, Kuala Lumpur.
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partly due to the vast expansion of the “political” in the everyday life of
Malaya under the Japanese, who had inculcated militaristic mass
nationalism against European colonialism in the service of Japanese
interests. It was also partly due to the occupation itself—to find violence in
a mass political culture under military occupation comes as no surprise In
Malaya, the occupation polarized the population into patterns of resistance
or accommodation. This polarization largely occurred along ethnic lines,
and as the end of the occupation neared, erupted into clashes between
Malays and CMnese, As noted above, most rural Malays felt they had no
stake in the communist-led MPAJA’s resistance movement, which was
perceived as a purely Chinese force. Malays largely tried to stay neutral or
actively betrayed MPAJA camps to the Japanese.57 Resistance forces began
to react to these betrayals with attacks on Malay villages in Johor in April
1945, and Malays responded with increasingly ferocious attacks on Chinese
villages. The ethnic violence culminated in horrific incidents of retaliatory
mass murder committed by both sides during the interregnum between
the Japanese surrender and the British landings in August and September
1945. During this time the MPAJA took over from the retreating Japanese
forces in many parts of rural Malaya. In towns and villages under MPAJA
control, “collaborators” of all ethnic groups, but especially Malay and Sikh
policemen and Malay public officials, were subject to “people’s trials,”
which often resulted in torture and death.58
Several points warrant attention. First, the Malay-Chinese killings
compounded the violence and dislocation prevailing when British troops
56See Cheah, Red Star, chapters 5-8.
57Ibid., 45, 68, 70.
581b1d., 178-79.
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landed. In Johor, for example, ethnic/political violence produced an
additional 14,000 refugees.59 Although this period represented a peak, such
civic disorder had become commonplace over the past three and a half
years and would not be quickly or easily reversed. Second, this period saw
the identification in Malay minds of “communist” with “Chinese” and the
rejection of both as intrinsically foreign and harmful to the Malays.
Japanese propaganda had encouraged this identification, as had the use of
Malay volunteer troops against Chinese guerrillas during the occupation.60
It was at this time that the communist-led resistance lost nearly all its
Malay members.61
Finally, in August 1945, Malays not only feared that the Chinese
would take over the country, but that they would do so with British
approval.62 The British stay-behind Force 136 had worked mainly with the
Chinese resistance. Malay guerrillas, numbering only about 500, were not
contacted until late in 1944 because the British suspected Malay
collaboration. When Admiral Louis Mountbatten became Supreme Allied
Commander, he turned the favor of the British from KMT to Malayan
Communist Party fMCP)/MPAJA guerrillas, preferring the MPAJA’s
Malayan outlook to the Kivif’s Chinese nationalism.63
When fighting broke out between Malays and Chinese in April,
Force 136 informed Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command, and in July
leaflets were dropped urging people to stop fighting. The message, in Malay
59Mountbatten, Post Surrender Tasks, 302.
60Cheah, Red Star, 68, 34.
61Cheah Boon Theng, “Some Aspects of the Interregnum in Malaya,” Journal of Southeast
Asian Studies 8, 1(1977), 70.
62Chh, Red Star, 225.
See Oeah, “Some Aspects of the Interregnum.”
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and English, warned those who had “attacked and oppressed their
neighbors in accordance with the wishes of the Japanese” that they would
be punished when the British returned.64 This was the first intimation that
the British would return without the pro-Malay attitude Which had
defined prewar colonialism. Other messages, both broadcast and in leaflets,
contained thinly veiled political messages about the improved status of
non-Malays:
It will be impossible to restore at once the prosperity that the
war has destroyed, but from the moment our first ship arrives
in Malaya, we can begin to rebuild together a new and better
country, which will be a real homeland for those who live in
it.65
The last phrase of this message would be understood by all in Malaya to
signify more rights for domiciled Chinese and Indians and was understood
by Malays as further evidence that the British had become “pro-Chinese”
British actions when they finally landed did not quiet Malay fears.
Essentially powerless to stop the ethnic political violence, the British left it
to the Malays to be “united in their struggle to prevent Chinese political
domination of their country.”66 Malay leaders did little to restrain the
violence that represented the protection for which the British could no
longer be counted on to provide. It is important to understand the violence
in this way, and not as a Japanese-inspired aberration, as the colonial
government and the Malay leadership later professed publicly. Without
this demonstration of ruthlessness and ferocity—Chinese casualties died by
the knife, and children were not spared—it is unlikely that public
64Psychologlcal Warfare leaflet dated July 20, 1945, WO 203/4015, cited in Cheah, Red
Star,p. 221-2.
65Psychological Warfare leaflet (no date). WO 203/4015. Emphasis added.
66Cheah, Red Star, 23240.
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demonstrations later on by the reputedly “peaceful Malays” would have
been taken seriously.
Distrust between British and Malays colored the political
atmosphere of the initial months of the restoration. Mountbatten himself
observed that “the Malays, as a community, had not in the first instance
been completely hostile to the Japanese.”67 Tales of Malay fifth column
activities had been rampant following the British defeat in 1942, though
most cases investigated afterwards turned out to be baseless.68
Nevertheless, Malay morale was low following the punishment of low
level officials by the MPAJA; now British suspicion was focused on the
upper levels. The removal of several Japanese-appointed rulers in the
early days of the BMA reinforced the policy69 In retrospect, the period of
suspicion appears quite brief. As noted above, the imperatives of
institutional continuity and stability enabled bureaucrats to resume their
positions. However, they had to make way for returning British
bureaucrats—who now wore uniforms. The BA, as a military
administration, ruled directly, another blow to the ruling class, at least
conceptually. Senior Civil Affairs Officers7° took the place of Residents in
67Mountbatten, Post Surrender Tasks, 301.
68The Ashley Gibson Report (1945, DMA PR 1/6) concluded that the vast majority of the
population was loyal and that Malay peasants could not have been expected to fight the
Jajanese once the British had withdrawn.
6cheah, Red Star, 271-2, 276-77.
70Much of the responsibility for restoring Malaya’s administrative machinery felt to the
Civil Affairs Service. Major-General H.R. Hone was Chief Civil Affairs Officer fCCAO)
for Malaya Under Hone, the Civil Affairs Service was broken into two divisions, Singapore
and Malaya, both headed by a Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer fDCCAO) The
peninsular division was further subdivided into nine regions, each headed by a Senior Civil
Affairs Officer (SCAO). These nine regions corresponded to state boundaries and the SCAO
position was thus analogous to that of the prewar Resident Essentially, the CAS was
charged with recreating a civilian administrative structure, but as a military service it was
unhindered by prewar constitutional restraints In instructions given to Mounthatten by the
Secretary of State for War, the CCAO was clearly charged with a “dual responsibility” for
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each state and had “direct and complete responsibility for adrninistiative
action in all fields in contra-distinction to the position occupied by British
Government officials in the States prior to the Japanese invasion—
especially in the Unfederated Malay States.”71 British officials had, of
course, been very powerful before the war But their “influence” had
always been wielded within the restraint and polite fiction of a protectorate
relationship of advice. Now the gloves were off. Rulers no longer received
advice; state councils were suspended. The British representative was in
uniform and in direct control. This was unprecedented in Anglo-Malay
relations and was certai y meant to establish a new norm. In the early
period of colonial restoration, these new British attitudes were perceived as
serious threats by the Malay elite72 in dangerous time, the elite felt it could
no longer count on British protection
Political and Press Freedom under Restored Colonial Rule
The inability of the BMA to fully restore prewar sodety represented
insecurity to some. But it also presented the opportunity of looser control
over public speech and action. Making a virtue of necessity, BMA officials
heeded world opinion (especially in the United States), social
consciousness at home, and the political forces released by the war to
encourage a fully developed rhetoric about preparation for self-
both the necessities of war and the active resumption of “good government.” Directive from
the Secretary of State for War Reprinted in Mountbaften, Post Surrender Tasks, Appendix I
71Extracts from a Directive by the Supreme Allied Commander Reprinted in Mountbatten,
Post Surrender Tasks, Appendix K.
72According to the official historian of the British Military Administration, “the enquiries
prescribed for the detection of those who had collaborated with the Japanese, and the
resultant delay in making full and immediate use of recovered officials, were felt to spring
from a wounding under-estimate of Malay loyalty and ability.” Donnison, British Military
Administration, 156.
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government.73 To a colony like Malaya, whose foreign earnings would be
essential to Britain’s own postwar recovery, the government returned with
strategies for updating the colonial social contract, which included a
loosening of political control and a new concern with social welfare. T.N.
Harper shows how, in a “new conception of Empire,” postwar policy
moved from a rhetoric of protection to one of partnership, iziviting local
participation in voluntary organizations which were to act as a form of
political advancement leading to eventual self-government.74 It was
argued that the major obstacle to self-government in Malaya was the
fragmentation of the population into different polities base4 on ethnicity.
Thus, a “moderate” nationalism, characterized by common loyalty among
the population, was to be nurtured, while “political extremism” was
discouraged.
In order to shape postwar social and political development in this
way, the colonial power needed to establish legitimacy with the public and
assert control over the public discourse. Not yet willing or able to
undertake substantial social spending to bolster its position, the
government depended on tools ranging from propaganda to censorship
and repression. But in a postwar atmosphere of heightened political
awareness, in which the government was likely to be reminded of the
Atlantic Charter at every turn, heavy-handed repression was unacceptable.
Freedom of speech and association were the order of the day. Legislation
731b1d., 333, 335.
74”Social policy was a means by which the state attempted to equip itself for its new
vocation of partnership and was a method by which a rather timited administrative
system attempted to transform itself into a polity.” The fatal flaw was the attempt to
separate the social from the political, which eventually came into conflict with groups
which saw the social as political. Harper, “Politics of Disease,” 113.
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restricting societies, trade unions, and the press was allowed to lapse. A
newly established public relations department used propaganda to try to
create an informed citizenry with Malaya-centered loyalties and civic
consciousness. It was to be an “experiment in democracy.”75
This policy for shaping political development in Malaya was evident
from the beginning in the self-proclaimed liberal policy of Supreme Allied
Commander Louis Mountbaften. hi a directive to the BMA, he
emphasized the “understanding and sympathy” with which the people of
the country should be approached. Military rule was not to be an affair of
“absolute autocracy”:
On the contrary, it must be the policy of the Military
Administration to exercise its powers and discharge its
responsibilities, in so far as this may prove possible, with the
cc perafion and support of the local population... The more
the people themselves can be associated with the mechanism
of government, the mo;e successful and effective it will be It
is therefore my direction that a liberal and enlightened policy
shall be followed by the Military Administration.76
Mountbatten was convinced that this was the only way to restore the
public’s “confidence in British good faith, fair dealing and impartial
justice.” He went further by explicitly extending this philosophy to political
expression:
The first guiding principle to be observed is that no person
shall suffer on account of political opinions honestly held,
whether now or in the past—even if these may have been
anti-British—but only on account of previous crimes against
criminal law or actions repugnant to humanity.77
75Ibid., 100-101.
76Mountbatten, Post Surrender Tasks, 319-20.
7’ThId., 319.
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In practice, political liberties were sometimes respected because of
policy confusion and often restricted by Mountbatten’s own qualifications
of the policy. Early in the restoration, local residents tested the strength of
the government’s control over assembly. In November 1945, the Kuala
Lumpur police noted that “certain sections of the community” were
disregarding the prewar enactment which required prior permission from
the chief police officer for all processions and assemblies. No previous
notice was being given, and there was, therefore, no opportunity to
prohibit gatherings in advance. Neither were the police enforcing this
enactment, for which violators could incur a fine of $100 or a six month
imprisonment. The police requested a clarification of policy, and later that
month the BMA notified the public that the Processions and Assemblies
Enactment would be strictly enforced.78
In the realm of expression, that which was deemed “purely political”
and was not critical of the BMA was most likely to be left unchallenged.
This was the case when authorities allowed Indonesians in Singapore to fly
the Indonesian flag, despite escalating hostility between Indonesian and
Dutch refugees.79 But expression or activities which challenged the
performance of the BMA or sought fundamental political change were
deemed to be an “abuse” of “privileges.” This attitude was crystallized with
regard to strikes. In a warning banning a general strike planned for
February 15, Mountbatten outlined the government’s position:
Since it was established in Malaya more than five months
ago, the British Military Administration has not only allowed
but encouraged nil freedom of speech and of the Press, in line
78BMA DEPT 17/63.
79BMA ADM 8/21.
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with the Civil Governments of the United Nations, who
fought and won a war to preserve liberties of this kind
The Administration, however, has no intention of allowing
advantage to be taken of this, nor that civil disturbances
should be fomented, hatred of the Administration aroused, or
the just processes of the law impeded in any way.8°
Mountbatten made a distinction between economic strikes and those with
a political basis. The former were considered “a normal democratic
procedure,” but the latter would not be tolerated.81 The distinction was, of
course, meaningless where the largest employer was the government and
the chief organizer of labor, the MC?, was the government’s only serious
political rival. But, as Harper points out, the government’s chief economic
function before the war had been control of the migrant labor supply;
losing control to the MC? represented “the most serious kind of
anarchy.”82
The curtailment of liberties was most clear-cut and unapologetic
when applied to labor activity, but would eventually have an effect on
association generally. In late January 1946, intelligence reports could not
even approximate the number of societies functioning in Malaya, so rapid
was their proliferation. A conservative estimate ran to several hundred,
although many of these were deemed insignificant or merely branches
receiving direction from a larger organization. Nevertheless, the
government no longer received notification of the names of principle
officials, the number of members, or the location of headquarters.
Significantly, this was perceived to lie a problem in sorting out the trade
Mountbatten, Post Surrender Tasks, 304.
811b1d., 302-3.
82Harper, ‘Politics of Disease,” 95.
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unionists from the so-called “purely political” activists, two categories
which were not supposed to mix.83
As the DMA period neared its end, so did the experiment in
democracy. Although Mountbatten would not revive repressive
legislation (like banishment) during his tenure, by early March civil affairs
officers began to redraft Registration of Societies legislation for use by the
civil government. Organizations would no longer be “legal unless declared
otherwise,” and where the Societies Law was ineffective, it would be
backed up by sedition and banishment laws.84
A parallel progression from tolerance to repression can be seen in
the government’s relations with the vernacular press. With the
encouragement of the Department of Publicity and Printing, prewar
newspapers resumed publication, and in an atmosphere of confusion
surrounding the applicability of prewar press regulations, new ones quickly
joined their ranks. (The table on page 176 showing circulations of selected
newspapers indicates the great revival of independent press activity during
the DMA period.) In Singapore, the prewar paper Utusan Melayu resumed
publication on October 1. In Kuala Lumpur, Perubahan Baharu reverted to
its prewar name, Majtis, and resumed publication on the same date.85 In
Ipoh, Ahmad Boestamam and some associates who had worked for a
Japanese-sponsored paper during the occupation appropriated the English-
language press (Perak Shimbun) to start Suara Rakyat, which became an
PR No 65(30 January 1946) WO 203/6426 Mountbatten, Post Surrender Tasks, 3034
Minutes of SCAOs Conference,; March 1946. BMA SCAO 67/46.
M of 31 October 1945, there were also in publication in Kuala Lumpur two English-
language papers (Malay Mail and Malaya Tribune), two Tamli papers, one Chinese paper,
and one Punjabi paper.
176
organ of the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP).66 The opportunity of gaining
control of a fully stocked printing press was only available very early in the
reoccupation; soon, new publications would be forced to deal with the
government because of a shortage of newsprint.
Table 1. Selected Estimates of Newspaper Circulation
during the British Military Administration87
October 1945 January 1946
Singapore Singapore
Utusan Melayu 2,000 Utusan Melayu 6,000
Straits Times 30,000 Straits Times 25,000
Nanyang Slang Poh 40,000
Kuala Lumpur Kuala Lumpur
Majl;s [no figure Ma)hs 2,000
available]
Seruan Rakyat 1,000
Malay Mail 3,200 Malay Mail 4,400
Mm Sheng Pau 10,000
Penang Penang
Warta Negara 5-600 Warta Negara 2,000
Straits Echo 5-6,000 Straits Echo 9,500
Modern Daily News 10,300
(Chinese)
Ipoh Ipoh
Suara Rakyat 3,000
[No information] Voice of the People 8,000
Malaya Tribune 5,000
Boestarnarn, Carving the Path to the Summit, trans. William R. Roff (Athens,
Ohio: Ohio University PresS, 1979), 6.
Total estimated daily newspaper circulation in early 1946 was 317,000. October 1945
figures for Singapore can be found In BMA PR 2/19 and for Kuala Lumpur and Penang in BMA
PR 1/8. The Janualy 1946 figures were found In DMA PR 2/30.
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The government actually favored the early re-establishment of the
local press. Au active press had several advantages. first, in the early days
of reoccupation, the BMA was itself unable to produce a daily tabloid in the
five or six languages necessary to reach all inhabitants of Malaya.88 Second,
monitoring of the local press allowed the department to track public
opinion and political developments.89 Third, an active press allowed the
BMA to place announcements in their pages. Besides official
announcements, of which the authorship was clear, publicity officials also
quietly supplied press’ releases to editors. In February 1946, 215 items were
handed out, of which 130 found their way into print. This was considered a
successful way to influence public discourse in the government’s favor:
As necessarily no acknowledgement of the source is made by
papers when publishing material issued by this office, it is not
generally appreciated how much of the content of the various
papers is sponsored by this office.9°
This practice continued into the Malayan Union period, as recalled by the
first director of Public Relations in his memoir: “One day in early April
[1946] I sent a copy of a four-page Kuala Lumpur paper to [Malayan Union
Governor] Gent in which ninety percent of the news had been supplied by
‘PR.”91
Memorandum on Planning, February 1945. WO 203/4037.
Jn January 1946,49 newspapers and periodicals were being monitored. Report on
Department of Publicity and Pnnhng, January 1946 DMA PR 1/8
90Report on Department of Publicity and Printing, February 1946. DMA PR 1/8. It was felt
that the British effort in Java in this regard was not as successful, and as a result, the
papers in Malaya reflected “a great deal of exaggeration and distortion of news from Java.”
The activities of the Netherlands Indies information services and Indonesian publicity
organizations were considered responsible, and British officials there were urged to give
more frequent statements to the press. WO 203/4410.
91Tan Sri Dato Mubin Sheppard, Taman Budiman: Memoirs of an Unorthodox Civil Servant
(Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1979), 145.
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Despite this influence, the government was very quickly irked by
“extreme” anti-BMA views appearing in left-wing publications. Why then
was there no early censorship of the press? The brief answer is a shortage of
resources and an assessment of what could realistically be accomplished.
Given the BMA’s initial inability to produce a daily newspaper in all the
languages Malaya required and its consequent reliance on the local press,
this planning memorandum concluded:
I doubt whether it is a practical proposition for the editors of
local newspapers to submit all their copy for censorship prior
to publication. This, I believe, is not the policy which is
adopted by British authorities in regards to newspaper
publications, and in any case, it is doubtful whether we can
provide sufficient staff to undertake the complete pre
censorship of all matter. A delay of even 12 hours in
censorship would probably cripple any newspapers run on
commercial lines 92
Another clue can be found in the political situation encountered by
the British in reoccupied territories As the BMA’s “every action [was]
suspect and liable [to] misinterpretation,”93 it was hoped that the
combination of propaganda and tolerance toward self-expression would
convince the public of British good will. Clearly, given the events of the
last four years and the tenor of opinion at home and in the United States, a
greater range of opinion in the colonies, especially nationalism, would
have to be tolerated. Further, without freedom of speech, it would be
difficult to gauge public opinion, and the whole project of “partnership”
between a maturing public and an enlightened colonial government
would be impossible.
92W0 203/4037.
93W0 203/4437.
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But the biggest influence on BMA censorship policy was probably
the Supreme Allied Commander himself. Once there were no possible
operational repercussions arising from uncensored mails or press,
Mountbaften would not condone censorship on political grounds:
We are fighting for freedom of the press, and although
censorship is always necessary in war on the grounds of
security, I could never agree to any political censorship being
exercised in my name, unless overridden by His Majesty’s
Government in a manner which would clear me on this
charge.94
The result was a qualified freedom of the press—more lenient than before
the war in its tolerance of explicitly political opinion. Nevertheless, in
accordance with the BMA policy of reviving prewar legislation,95 the
public was given notice that the Printing Presses Ordinances and
Enactments of the Unfederated States, Federated States, and Straits
Settlements would again be enforced. These required printing presses to be
licensed and publications to be registered.96 Notified on 11 November 1945,
presses and publishers were given until 15 November to comply.
The reimposition of prewar regulations was perceived by BMA
officers and the public alike as requiring publishers to receive “permission”
to produce a newspaper However, the regulations at best allowed the
94Undated memorandum from Supreme Commander. WO 2O3/4437
95M a military government, the DMA’s authority derived from the Chiefs of Staff in
London and was based on military necessities However, as in all reoccupied British
territories, prewar laws were revived. According to Donnlson, this protected the
administration from “the charge of wielding dictatorial powers.” It also saved it “the
formidable task of building up a legal system from nothing, and ensured that the law to be
administered.., should, fundamentally at least, be familiar.., to the people living under it.
Donnlson, British Military Administration, 289. In practice, however, chaotic conditions
and a severe shortage of personnel made uniform enforcement of laws impossible Thus, the
revival of prewar legislation was conditional on what the CCAO considered “practicable”
96Lzcenses for printing presses would be signed by the DCCAO or the SCAO, registration of
newspapers by the Registrar of the Supreme Coutt. DMA PR 2/1.
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government to keep track of all existing and new publications and did not
in themselves afford BMA officers much actual control over what was
published. On the Peninsula, the relevant legislation was Chapter 89 of
FMS Laws 1935; it required the licensing of printing presses and the
registration of publications, but did not permit the government to refuse
permission to publish The legislation of the Straits Settlements did
contain an additional clause which could have facilitated such control over
the press.97 But both in Singapore and on the Peninsula, where prewar
legislation could have been strengthened by proclamation, the Chief Civil
Affairs Officer exercised restraint in accordance with the wishes of the
Supreme Allied Commander. This was a matter of some discussion as
those further down the chain of command sought clarification of
government policy:
There is no confusion between licensing of presses and the
registration of papers nor under existing regulations has the
Registrar power to refuse to register a newspaper. Whilst it is
true that the GOC [General Officer Commanding, or CCAO]
has extraordinary powers as you say, the legal Situation at
present is that use is not being made of such powers
[P]rovided the Printing Press is registered and provided the
newspaper (which includes most publications vide a
definition of “newspaper”), is registered—this department has
no legal right to withhold permission to publish.98
Thus the parameters of official policy allowed for no political censorship,
despite the legal ability of the government to impose it.
Thereafter, limitations on freedom of the press can be understood as
falling informally into two categories. The first applied to publications
97Memorandum, J.N. McHugh, Asst, Dir., Publicity and Printing, Kuala Lumpur, to HQ,
Seremban, 26Januaiy 1946. BMA PR 2/1.
98Excerpts from letter, J.N. McHugh to Col. JS. Dumeresque, Publicity and Printing,
Singapore, 19 December 1945. BMA PR 2/1.
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which were deemed seditious and the second to those which were
considered merely objectionable. “Seditious” publications usually adopted
a hostile attitude to the BMA early itt the administration and tended to
criticize the government in the following terms: the BMA did not consider
the welfare of the people, did not abide by the Atlantic Charter, interfered
with freedom of speech and assembly, and was determined to bring back
conditions of colonial rule.99 In response to these attacks, the government
subjected these papers to harsh official action. In October1 The Guardian of
Taiping was “suspended for publishing seditious articles.”00 In
November, the Mm Sheng Pau offices in Kuala Lumpur were raided, the
editor and president being detained, and the Chtu Kua fit ?oh of Ipoh was
suspended.101 Such actions continued in early 1946, with the development
of a protocol for warning and suspending newspapers:
At the meeting of the Security Committee held yesterday it
was decided that the proper way of dealing with Newspapers
which publish seditious or nearly seditious matter will be to
call for the Propnetor and Editor and warn them that the
repetition of any such matter will result in the suppression of
the paper under Regulation 18 of the Emergency Regulations
Such warning to be confirmed in writing. If after such a
warning any further objectionable matter be published, then
the Newspaper should be suppressed for such period as may
be considered proper in the circumstances by Order of the
DCCAO [Deputy Chief Civil Affairs OfficerJ.102
99Cheah, Red Star, 261.
t00Portnightly Report No.4. CO 273/675/50822/56/3.
101Th1d. Weekly Intelligence Review No. 59. WO 203/2076. It Is noted in Weekly
Intetligence Review No.60 that the Modern Daily News of Penang, “which is in noway
deterred by the fact that the BMA has taken strong action against newspapers in Kuala
Lumpur and Ipoh, continues to publish scumlous allegations against the BMA” WO
203/2076.
Undated minute (probably February 1946). BMA PR 2/24.
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It is not clear what made a publication fall into this category.103 But
certain characteristics of “seditious” papers can be observed. First, a
predominance of attacks on the DMA. Second, communist affiliation.
Third, Chinese proprietorship. MC? propaganda offered an immediate
challenge to the DMA and its effort to influence public discourse, As a
result, early BMA political intelligence focused almost exclusively on the
Chinese and failed to delve deeply into political developments in the
Malay community This was m spite of an early understanding of the
degree to which the whole country had changed in the intervening years:
Singapore and Malaya have changed, and more than anything
have changed psychologically The people basically are the
same, no doubt, but the conditions they have had to endure,
the forces to which they have been subjected, have brought a
new set of reactions to the forefront.104
Further:
Certain sections of Malays and Chinese have become, as a
result of Japanese occupation, increasingly politically
conscious and articulate, and now they are permitted to
organize themselves and to express their feelings freely, while
talk and overstatement, some of a seditious nature, are apt to
be indulged in on the Chitese side.105
This otherwise astute observer, the one who was largely responsible for the
government’s understanding of political change in Malaya, did not see any
outward manifestations of Malay political sentiment:
The activities of the Chinese in the political field are plain
from the number of associations existing and meetings held
and the spate of printed matter issuing from their presses, the
103ProvIng sedition in a court of law seems not to have been a key factor, as papers were
apparently suspended without actually being prosecuted. Ibid.
1U4WO 203/5660.
105Forthlghtly Report No.4. CO 273/675/50822/56/3. Emphasis added.
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slogans pasted up on the walls in every town and village.
These are things that strike the attention of any observer.106
It was perhaps this focus on Chinese communist activities that
caused even radical Malay newspapers to fall into the second category of
publications subject to some form of censorship—those which were found
to be politically objectionable, but not seditious. While not meriting
suspension, they were still subject to the efforts of local officials to
discourage, within policy limits, publications they deemed potentially
harmful. For example, Ahmad Boestamam recalled being summoned to
BMA offices almost daily to make written, though not published, apologies
for Suara Rakyat editorials deemed “harsh and improper.”107
Some use was also made of the severe shortage of newsprint to
discourage publication of objectionable newspapers. The initial aim of the
military administration was to have sufficient newsprint to allow for an
increase over prewar circulation, as vigorous press circulation was felt to be
important in counteracting Japanese propaganda.’°8 But as with other
commodities, newsprint was quickly in short supply and high prices
continued into ;949.109 The shortages sometimes proved to be a de facto
1The author of these passages, Victor Purcell, was the Principle Adviser on Chinese
Affairs and received some criticism from Brigadier A.T. Newboult (DCCAO, Malay
Peninsula) for offering an unbalanced perspective. Purcell admitted that he didn’t know
Malays well, but maintained that there was no indication of articulate political thought or
activity beyond ‘an amorphous mass of prejudice and suspicion,” unworthy of review. See
memorandum by AT Newboult, 22 January 1946, and Victor Purcell, “Malaya Polbca1
Climate,” No 7, both In WO 203/5660 Other government officials were more familiar with
the Malay community, but like Newboult, who accompanied Sir Harold MacMichael to
collect the Sultans’ signatures on the new treaties, they were matnty concerned with pushing
through the Malayan Union proposal During the BMA, no one besides Purcell was
responsible for assessing the overall political atmosphere. His early series of reports,
entitled “Malaya’s Political Climate,” seem to have been quite influential, his language
and analysis is reflected In later, local intelligence reports
107Boestamam, Carving the Path, 13-14.
108Donnlson, British Military Administration, 244.
CO 273/675/50822/56/2; MU 6730/47; P13, No.13(1947).
184
means of controlling the press, because govermnent assistance was
necessary for many papers to begin publication.’10
In October 1945, meetings between government publicity officers and
press representatives were held in Singapore to discuss the newsprint
situation. The government declared its intention to cooperate with the
press in locating and collecting stocks of newsprint and in devising a fair
system of allocation. Part of the collection process included getting
possession of newsprint from those who had “looted” it or bought it from
the Japanese. But fear of losing access to newsprint led the left-wing presses
to keep what “illegally” obtained newsprint they had.111
To help regulate the situation, the government agreed to assist in
supplying newsprint, and imposed a temporary four-page limit on daily
papers. “[A]nxious that the circulation of all papers should go up as high as
possible” and concerned about new publications laying claim to existing
stocks, Publicity also proposed a standstill on new publications until the
shortage eased.112 But the latter policy was challenged within the
government and rejected on legal and political grounds. It was argued that
newsprint was not a requisitioned commodity, so there was no legal basis
for denying it to new publications.’13 further, it was feared that a ban on
l’0In late September, for example, the publishers of the Malaya Tribune notified the
government of its intention to resume publication and requesed paper, its stocks having been
lost to the Japanese. DMA PR 2/19.
111ThI situation eventually led to Newsprint Order #127 of 12 January 1946, whith
required anyone in control of newsprint to report it to the authorities and forbade removing
It without written permission This order was based on Emergency Regulations of 1939 DMA
PR2/19.
112Mjjutes of meeting 1 October and 9 October 1945. DMA PR 2/19. Present at the 9 October
meeting were representatives of two Tamil, one Matayalam, four Chinese, two English, and
one Malay newspaper (Utusan Melayu).
113Memorandum from Col Thomson, Publicity and Printing, Singapore, to CCAO, 5 October
1945. DMA PR 2/19.
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new publications would be seen as censorship. To Publicity and Printing,
benevolent molder of public opinion, it was important that “political
considerations [not] influence the decision on the birth of a new organ.”114
Although newsprint never became an officially controlled
commodity, Publicity and Printing remained responsible for its control and
fair distribution. But despite the fourpage limit which applied equally to
all newspapers, not all presses enjoyed the same access to newsprint. It was
clear that government presses had enough, and while the most severe
shortages were experienced by the independent vernacular press.115 Pro-
government, English-language papers like the Malay Mail were supplied
with additional paper when they ran short.116
Being a competitor in the propaganda war, the department had
difficulty maintaining the neutrality required to distribute resources
“blindly.” The temptation to use newsprint as an informal means of
censorship was great, as can be seen in the experiences of two different
publications. in Kelantan, the Majlis Ugama Islam wanted to resume
publication of its prewar journal, Pengasoh [Guardian], in April 1946. The
Resident Commissioner of Kelantan requested paper supplies from Kuala
Lumpur, noting that there were currently no Malay publications in
Kelantan. He also described the journal in question: it had enjoyed wide
circulation before the war and was concerned only with educational,
cultural, and religious matters, not politics. The request. for paper was
approved.”7 Those who proposed a weekly magazine named Berjuang
14MInutes of meeting,; October 1945. DMA PR 2/19.
115tter 11 December 1945. DMA PR 2/19,
6Letter from Malay Mall to DMA Setangor, 17 December 1945. DMA PR 2/19.
17Memoranda, April 1946. BMA PR 2/1.
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tStrugglel had a different experience. In January 1946, Mohamed Mustaza of
the MNP notified Publicity and Printing, Melaka, of his intention to
publish, seeking “advice and assistance.” As this was one of the cases that
prompted officials to seek clarification of polky, it allows us to ace the
steps taken to discourage the publication of an anti-Brifish paper.118
The Senior Civil Affairs Officer, Melaka, Lt. Col. Luckham, informed
HQ, Seremban, of Mustaza’s request, including the publisher’s description
of the proposed magazine a thirty-two page weekly to be published m
rumi (romanized Malay), of a semi-political, literary, and cultural nature,
with a print run of 75O In Luckham’s view, the paper would be explicitly
political in nature, following the style of the MNP’s Ipoh English by-
monthly, Voice of the People, which advocated the union of Malaya with
Indonesia. While Seremban sought clarification from Kuala Lumpur,
Luckham informed Mustaza, in an interview on 6 February, that hIs
publication was “unnecessary.” In a letter to Seremban, he explained that
the magazine would have no value except as “propaganda” and that
Mustaza had been given the justification of newsprint shortage Luckham
was challenged from both sides for this action. Mohamed Mustaza
followed up his interview with a letter arguing that his publication was
important “for our nationalist cause.” He noted that Indians and Chinese
were allowed to promote their nationalist causes through print, and any
discrimination against the Malays was “wholly unjust and undemocratic.”
if his publication was to be barred, he requested the reasons to be given in
writing. At HQ, Seremban, Major J.M. Gullick wrote to the head of
Publicity and Printing asking whether refusal on the grounds of newsprint
11The following discussion is based on correspondence in BMA PR 2/1.
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shortage was not, in fact, contrary to existing policy. Further, he asked,
should permission “be refused to an extreme Malay Nationalist
publication as such?” A month after the initial refusal, the MNP
representative was still pressing for permission to publish, and the policy
came down from the Chief Secretary In Kuala Lumpur on 11 March. The
Straits Settlements Ordinance that could be used to prevent publication,
Sec. 6A of Cap. 38 as amended by Ord. 38 of 1939, was a war measure not
currently in use. Therefore, if both the press and the publication were
registered, the MNP should be allowed to publish. But the letter concluded:
“It should be pointed out again that newsprint is in very short supply and
there is no guarantee as to when a supply will be available.”
By this time, military administration and the censorship restraint of
Mountbatten were drawing to a close. Mountbatten’s policies had provided
a window of press freedom in keeping with the new liberal, “public
relations” philosophy of colonial government, but this approach had failed
to persuade Chinese communists and Malay nationalists to welcome the
restoration of British colonial rule. Those who were responsible for long-
term policy in Malaya were as eager to bring back stringent press
regulations as they were to reintroduce the registration of societies. The
Straits Settlements ordinance referred to above, a war measure used in the
crackdown on radicals before the Japanese invasion, was reimposed with
the resumption of civil government on 1 April 1946.
Straits Settlements Ordinance, Sec. 6A of Cap. 38 as amended by Ord.
38 of 1939, require4 publishers in Singapore to obtain a special permit or
license to print a newspaper (which could be refused), in addition to
registering the press and paper On the peninsula as well, press regulations
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were given more teeth, and permission could be refused at any stage, from
the setting up of a printing press to the publication of a specific
newspaper.119 However, the censors did not refuse permission to every
publication of a political or nationalist nature. The conservative, but
political, Penang daily, Warta Negara, was praised for being “excellently
balanced,” and incurred no censorship. The Semboyan Baharu, a radical
Penang weekly, was also permitted to continue despite its publisher’s
membership in the MNP and the five hundred dollars the publication
receIved from the McP. This decision may have reflected a careful
balancing—on the one hand, the willingness to apply censorship where
deemed nece5sary, and on the other, an evaluation of the journal’s
potential impact:
This journal is critical of the Sultans and the British...
[B]ecause of its criticism of the Sultans and its affinity with the
MC?, its influence with Malays is not considered to be
great.12°
Nevertheless, all publications were now subject to scrutiny and suspension
at the government’s pleasure. Thereafter, the permitted parameters of
legitimate political discourse would again be defined explicitly in the
interests of imperial preservation.
This chapter has argued that in the 1930s and 1940s, those invested in
traditionalism as a way of surviving British colonial rule experienced a
119Por example, the application of one Wu Kherk of Kuantan to start a printing press was
denied in April 1946. The grounds were “that Wu Kherk was not a suitable person to be given
a license,” given his connections with the local Malayan Communist Party. His appeal,
argued on the basis of British justice and the fact that no charges had been made against
him, was rejected without comMent the following month MU 521/46.
120Exttact from Malayan Security Service, Penang, 15 May 1946. MU 521 /46, Vol. II.
189
succession of challenges to their position. Education, urbanization (limited
though it was), and growing awareness of the size and strength of the
Chinese community in Malaya before the war produced urgent criticism of
Malay backwardness and calls for more education and more representation
in the administration of the states. Many of these calls came from members
of the aristocracy whose bureaucratic positions made them the
embodiment of progress in the Malay community At the same time,
traditionalistic prohibitions on political activity muffled critiques of
colonial rule and the Malay ruling class itself. Despite these pressures for
change, the British and most of the ruling class worked to preserved a
mutually beneficial construction o traditional Malay society. There
matters stood as long as the colonial order favored adiHon and rewarded
the coordinated efforts of the two segments of the ruling class.
When colonial order broke down, the interests of rulers and chiefs
began to diverge. Under the Japanese occupation, Malay bureaucrats
experienced both opportunities and dangers from which they had been
shielded under British rule. The Malay rulers’ experience was less
ambiguous; deprived of the allowances and material accouterments which
defined their ceremonial status, the rulers ceased to represent the Malay
nature of their polities. Deprived of British protection from Japanese
indignities, the rulers were truly glad to welcome the colonial power back
to Malaya. But both rulers and chiefs quickly discovered that the old order
had not truly returned. The British investigated all highly placed Malays
on suspicion of collaboration and, in the face of calamitous Malay-Chinese
violence precipitated by the waning of Japanese power, revealed the end of
their prewar pro-Malay policies.
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Recognizing that nationalist aspfratiois could no longer be simply
suppressed, the colonial power also experimented with loosening controls
over “moderate” political activity and expression. As will be discussed in
the next chapter, this new policy opened a floodgate of criticism against the
Malay ruling class. But it also exposed the British Military Administration
to an escalating challenge from communist-organized labor and a critical
left-wing press. Unable to control the public discourse through its own
propaganda alone, the British government reintroduced restrictive
legislation controlling association, labor, and the press. Despite the
experiment with liberal policies, the apparatus for the coercive restoration
of the old order had been in place from the beginning of reoccupation. It
was reactivated at the end of military rule, was deployed selectively for two
years, and would later be fully engaged with the counter-insurgency against
the MCP beginning in June 1948, This study turns now to the public
discourse of the years 1945 through 1947, which operated within the
parameters of imperial preservation described above, parameters which
gave the ruling class renewed hope of establishing hegemony over postwar
Malay society.
Chapter 5
ARISTOCRATIC ASCENDANCY AND
THE USE OF TRADIflON
The interruption of British colonial power in 1942 abruptly suspended the
articulation of traditionalistic Malay culture. The loss of colonial
protection, the conditions of Japanese occupation, and the new legitimacy
of nationalism combined to prevent a simple restoration of that culture
after the war. One of the most significant changes was that “politics” was
no longer the preserve of Malay royalty, an elite arena for wringing
concessions from the colonial power. Postwar politics was an activity
which took new forms—no longer merely bureaucratic, but violent,
massive, and theatrical. The new politics, an activity which would define
the Malays’ standing in the postwar world, will be discussed in detail in the
next chapter. The connection this new politics had with the politics of the
Malay past and with colonial traditionalism will be the focus of this
chapter.
There were many novel things about postwar politics, the newest
being the construction of a new participant, “the Malay people.” Yet the
dominant actors were still those belonging to the ruling class, giving
postwar politics, for all its novelty, a strong thread of continuity with the
precolonial past: the removal of British backing for rulers would allow
chiefs to rebound, acknowledging the rulers’ status while competing with
them for access to wealth and power. Yet this elenent of continuity, when
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examined, also reveals the ongoing significance of colonial constructs of
Malay tradition.
Before the war, the use of both rulers and chiefs by the colonial
administration had served to legitimize and stabilize colonial rule, but at
the same time created rifts within the ruling class. The imperial
glorification of the sultans and their heavy investment in tradition set
royalty apart from aristocracy, which sought qualifications in the
competing idiom of good government. from the rulers’ perspective, the
elaboration of the ceremonial raja was an outgrowth of past tradition and
of benefit to them personally in the new colonial order. To the chiefs, the
process was disinheriting, for despite their eventual compensation in
federal and state bureaucracies, a gulf in status, wealth, and meaning was
created. Colonial rule stratified the Malay ruling class, and the competition
that reemerged was between groups positioned very differently vis-à-vis
the challenges of the postwar period.
Political and ethnic violence from the middle of 1945 was the first
challenge. It was followed shortly by postwar constitutional changes which
aimed to centralize political power in Kuala Lumpur and create a common
Malayan Union citizenship, simultaneously erasing the rulers’ sovereign
status, the chiefs’ source of power in state bureaucracies, and Malay special
privilege as a whole. Finally, a radical nationalist movement, nurtured by
the occupation, now organized and published its views with fewer
restrictions than in the prewar period. I will argue here that an important
aspect of the aristocratic elite’s response to these threats was the
manipulation of ideas of tradition and progress to create a late-, and
eventually, post-colonial political arena which retained a privileged place
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for itself. The inefficacy of traditional leadership in the period 1942-1945
had problematized Malay tradition, bringing the question of its relevance
In a changing world to the point of crisis. As the bureaucrats had
undoubtedly performed better during the war than the ceremonial rulers,
this crisis gave the aristocracy an opening to emphasize its own
qualifications to lead Malays into the future. At the same time, the threat
of Malay radicalism encouraged this elite not to destroy the legitimacy of
tradition altogether, but to create yet another version of tradition in which
it could assert its power over its rivals. With the focus of public discourse
on the status of the Malay rulers and the formal loss of their sovereignty,
the preservation of tradition was linked to the very survival of the Ma. ays
in the modern world. And the Malay aristocracy was able to exploit its good
government credentials to gain control over the meaning and utility of the
Malay rulers from the British.
In the following pages, I will first review the Malayan Union
proposals and the course of the political contest between mobilized Malays
and the British government. I will then examine in more detail the
postwar discourse through which the Malay rulers were re-invented for
the post-colonial nation. This discussion will focus on the manipulation of
certain concepts—protection, progress, and loyalty—which took place in a
series of overlapping discourses in the Malay and English press.
The Malayan Union Struggle
During the war, British planners in London took advantage .of what was
considered to be a clean slate to draft proposals for a centralized colonial
state with a common citizenship Eager to ehmrnate the administrative
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inefficiencies of the prewar structures, the British were also under
considerable pressure from the United States to move toward self
government and eventual independence for their colonial possessions.
The Malayan Union proposals were meant to solve both problems. By
replacing indirect rule with centralized British control, Malaya could
quiddy be returned to economic profitability. Politically, the creation of a
common citizenship was meant to open up government positions to the
Chinese, in recognition of their economic contribution and resistance
against the Japanese, and to create a “Malayan” public to take the place of
the prewar Malay, Chinese, and Indian publics with their varying levels of
political consciousness and geographical orientations. It was this new
Malayan identity which the government hoped would find expression in
the postwar atmosphere of relaxed political and press control and which it
hoped to prepare for eventual self-government through the granting of
Malayan Union citizenship. In order to establish the new constitutional
arrangement, the British quickly signed new treaties with the Malay rulers
of the peninsular states, in which the rulers ceded jurisdiction to the
British crown, and in January 1946 made the Malayan Union proposals
public.
These two fundamental changes—Chinese citizenship and the loss
of the rulers’ sovereignty—were quickly perceived by Malays to constitute
major threats to their community and became the rallying points of the
anti-Union campaign that eventually succeeded in reversing British policy.
As the instigation for the first mass political movement by Malays and for
the founding of Malaysia’s future ruling party, the United Malays National
Organization (UMNO), the anff-Malayan Union campaign has earned a
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place as the central “struggle” of postwar Malay nationalism, both in
popular conception and in the academic literature.1 From the perspective
of pEewar critiques of the plural society, however, this judgment is
questionable. far from turning back the challenge of foreign demands for
representation, the Malay leadership eventually agreed to limited Chinese
and Indian citizenship rights under the subsequent Federation of Malaya
agreement and even broader rights when the Federation achieved
independence in 1957. The Malay mobilization did succeed in restoring the
sovereignty of the Malay rulers, however, and that is the reason the
struggle is accorded such stature in the national mythology. It provided the
arena in which modern Malay political practices were defined and political
leadership over the postcolonial nation wan. This involved ideological
struggle within the Malay community which was far more significant to
the futuie of the country than the brief victory over British constitutional
proposals.
The remainder of this section provides a brief chronology of the
Malayan Union crisis, from the first months of the British reoccupation to
the inauguration of the federation of Malaya. The period from September
to December 1945 was one of uncertainty for the Malay ruling class,
consolidation for the colonial regime, and opportunity for Malay
1Two academic studies which make the present work possible are James de V. Allen, The
Malayan Union (New Haven Yale University Southeast Asian StudIes, 1967) and A J
Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics During the Matayan Union Experiment, 1945-
46 (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Monograph No. 8, 1979).
A more recent treatment is Albert Lau, The Malayan Union Controversy, 1942-1948
(Singapore Oxford University Press, 1991) Th rulers’ position under the Malayan Union is
also discussed In Afiffin Omar, Bangsa Melayu. Malay Concepts of Democracy and
Community 1945-1950 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1993) and Simon C. Smith,
British Relations with the Malay Rulers from Decentralization to Matayan Independence,
1930-1957 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995).
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nationalists. The latter formed the Malay Nationalist Party in October in
Ipoh, Perak. While it did not immediately achieve a national presence, it
began organizing in several states and published newspapers in both
English and Malay. Meanwhile British envoy Sir Harold MacMichael
traveled from state to state signing new treaties with the Malay rulers. The
public did not yet know that the rulers had signed their sovereign status
and that of their states over to the British crown, but they were
nevertheless criticized for signing new treaties without consulting “the
people.” During this time rumors about the Malayan Union were
circulating, evoking reactions ranging from cautious optimism to outright
opposition.
In January 1946, the British government released details of the
Malayan Union proposals and the content of the new treaties. The ground
swell of Malay opinion against both the rulers and the British increased. In
the following two months, prewar elite state-based associations re
established themselves, and their newspapers (as well as the MNP’s)
furiously debated the proper response to the situation. These associations
took united action with the Pan-Malaya Malay Congress which met in
early March. The Congress supported the restoration of the rulers, rejected
the Malayan Union proposals, and endorsed the widespread political
demonstrations that had been occurring in the states since December. The
Congress, like its successor UMNO (established in May), was an umbrella
organization. At first UMNO inciu4ed the MN? and other left-leaning
groups, but they were outnumbered by the conservatives, a situation
which led to their departure by June. By early 1946, the MN? had
developed enough of a following to concern the British who welcomed the
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appearance of UMNO, despite its opposition to the Union, as a
conservative counterbalance to the nationalist party.
On April 1, the British Military Administration handed over to
civilian government—the Malayan Union. The Malay rulers boycotted the
Malayan Union installation ceremonies at the urging of UMNO leader
Dato Onn bin Jaafar and Malay opinion was consolidated against the
Union. The rulers all renounced the treaties and retired British officials,
including Frank Swettenham, mounted an attack in London. The
following month British MPs L.D. Gammans and D.R, Rees-Wililarns
conducted an informal parliamentary mission and were greeted by huge
demonstrations coordinated by UMNO. The governor of the Malayan
Union, Sir Edward Gent, one of its architects, had by this time been
persuaded that the Union was a mistake. Shortly afterwards, once Gent’s
opinion had been endorsed by Governor General Malcolm MacDonald, the
British government agreed to negotiate with the Malays.
Dato Orin went on a triumphal pan-Malaya tour following the
announcement of the Malay victory, but from June through November
1946, while UMNO and the rulers conducted secret negotiations with the
British, UMNO suffered a loss of public momentum This was exploited by
the MNP, as well as the Chinese and Indian communities. The latter had
earlier been indifferent to the Malayan Union because it did not include a
timetable for elections or independence; they were now outraged at being
locked out of the process of deciding the future of the country. In
December 1946, draft constitutional proposals for the Federation of Malaya
were published. The Federation would restore the rulers’ sovereignty, the
individuality of the Malay states, and Malay special position, while
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granting limited citizenship to the foreign communities and providing an
effective central government.2 Anti-federation opinion mounted during
the following year among nationalist Malaya, moderate Chinese and
Indians, and the MCP. It was during this time that the nationalist Malaya,
in the umbrella organization Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (PUTERA), pursued an
affiance with the non-Malay leftwing All Malaya Council for Joint Action
(AMqA). Against UMNO’s wishes, the British sought opinions from the
country at large, especially the non-Malay communities, through a
Consultative Committee. The AMCJA/PUTERA boycotted the committee
and Malays were forbidden by UNO to give their opinions through this
forum, on the grounds that UMNO had already represented their Views.
Nevertheless, fifteen Malay organizations and individuals testified, as well
as many non-Malaya.
In July 1947, the revised constitutional proposals, substantially the
same as the draft proposals, were published. The secret negotiations and
long delay had hurt UMNO’s credibility and the nationalist groups had
gained in popularity. In October the nationalist Malay opposition joined
with that of other communities in opposing the federation, an action that
culminated in a one day hartal (strike). In February 1948, the Federation of
Malaya was inaugurated. The following June, counterinsurgency measures
began against the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which had taken its
struggle underground. During the so-called Emergency (1948-1960),
progressive organizations and publications in all the communities were
banned.
2Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics, 92.
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Rulers and Chiefs in the Malayan Union Struggle
Rather than reviving the status quo, the end of the occupation and the
return of the British to Malaya had only increased The problems of the
Malay ruling class. The effect of the Malayan Union on the rulers was most
devastating. In order to put the new constitution into effect, the whole
basis of British power in Malaya had to be changed legally. Turning its back
on indirect rule and the enabling fiction of sovereign Malay states under
British protection, the colonial power, through its emissary Sir Harold
MacMichael, bluntly demanded “full power and jurisdiction” in each state.
As noted in the previous chapter, the rulers had expressed almost uniform
pleasure at seeing the return of the British. The exceptions were those
Sultans who had been appointed to their positions by the Japanese,
through either the death or deposition of their British-appointed
predecessors. These rulers were prompted deposed or voluntarily stepped
down. AU the rulers were made to understand, in interviews immediately
following British reoccupation, that their actions during the war would be
examined for collaboration and only when the British were satisfied with
their conduct would they be confirmed in their positions. MacMichael’s
mission was, in practice, the final stage of the examination and the rulers
were essentially coerced mto sigmng the treaties relrnqulbhrng sovereignty
to the British crown. There was no room, or time, for negotiation. No
opportunity was given them in MacMichael’s two to four day visits to
consult with their suspended state councils, which had the effect of
isolating the rulers from the more legally-minded bureaucrats who would
certainly have raised constitutional objections. They all signed. The
returning British administration, following the new policy devised in
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London, considered the rulers symbolic, archaic, and, athough partly
British creations, now inconvenient and dispensable
The rulers’ compliance with the new treaties elicited an
unprecedented level of public criticism, which will discussed in sOme
detail below. MacMichael’s journey through the Malay courts in late 1945
was publicly followed and the acquiescence of the rulers presumed, though
the contents of the treaties were still secret. Nevertheless, the citizenship
provisions of the Malayan Union had been hinted at as early as July, and
the rulers’ presumed agreement to them began to elicit public criticism in
December. When the White Paper on the Malayan Union was published
on January 22, 1946, it became known that the rulers had also agreed to
transfer sovereignty of their states to the British crown. Very quickly, the
outrage expressed in all sections of the Malay press demonstrated that the
prewar barrier protecting the rulers from criticism would not be reinstated
British and Malays alike professed shock at the vehemence of feeling that
was expressed, and the moment has justifiably been remembered as an
important one in modern Malay history. It should, however, be clear by
now that it was not, as it seemed, a purely traditional taboo that fell
Indeed, precolonial society could not have imagined a “letter to the editor.”
The articulation of criticism must be understood as arising, in the first
instance, from the changes in Malay society outlined in chapter four, and
more immediately, from the failure of British authority which left the
traditional rulers to their fate.
The Malayan Union threatened the bureaucratic elite as well, in
ways that corresponded exactly to the dual basis of their authority in Malay
society. First, the prospect of a centralized administration and competition
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from non-Malay citizens threatened the bureaucrats’ vested interests in the
state and federal bureaucracies.3 Chinese political violence was already
immediately endangering; now the Chinese threatened to pose a long-term
political challenge to the Malay elite as well. Second, the downgrading of
the rulers wotild deprive the aristocracy of the legitimizing power of
traditionalism. This was a serious blow at precisely the moment a rival
leadership, radical and nationalist, was emerging Japanese toleration of
Malay nationalist rhetoric and sponsorship of anti-colonial organizations
had given birth to postwar party politics. Before the Malay ruling class had
found its political bearings in the postwar arena, elements of the old KMM
had reassembled themselves into the Parta; Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya
(Malay Nationalist Party or MNP). By December 1945, the Ivll’JP had already
held a national congress.
Of these two threats to the bureaucratic elite, an expanded
citizenship was the more direct danger. In fact, it was arguably of more
importance to Malay society as a whole and what the anti-Malayan Union
struggle was actually about.4 Yet much more was written in Malay
newspapers about the attack on traditional leadership. This was because the
threat posed by Chinese and Indian immigrants was seemingly clear and
unproblematic, having been the center of public discourse throughout the
1930s. Nearly everyone in Malay society, whether peasant, laborer, or
bureaucrat, agreed on that threat. The leadership issue, however, was far
from transparent and could represent different things depending on one’s
class and political status. The British action signaled a change in Ithe way
3IbId., 50-84.
4lnterview with A. Samad Ismall. See also Petita Malaya, 26 Apr11 1946.
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traditional authority would be constituted. It also released the Malay rulers
from the meaning they had embodied in the imperial hierarchy—short
sighted though this was in terms of colonial restoration—and thus freed
them to acquire new meaning in Malay society. As such it presented an
opportunity to whoever could gain control of both the rulers and the
discourse surrounding their evolving meaning. It was in this context that
the potential cleavages within the Malay ruling class were finally
actualized.
Before the war, the Malay bureaucratic elite had participated in a
coherent body of tradition. The ruling class was kept whole by
commonality of experience and interest, The overlap in experience
occurred mainly in the realm of ascriptive status and privilege, but also in
the realm of bureaucracy, when, for example, a ruler served in the MAS
before being elevated to the sultanate.5 It was also in the interest of the two
segments of the ruling class to cooperate in order to win concessions from
the colonial system and to maintain their status in Malay society at the
expense of both peasants and a slowly growing urban class. Poterttial
cleavages remained latent, but their potential was visible in the tension
between tradition, or the legitimation conferred by the past, and progress,
or the utility of bureaucratic competence in the modern world. Before the
war, the bureaucrats were completely routed by the legitimacy the British
vested in royalty as a symbol of a purportedly unchanging and
conservative society. Neither could the bureaucracy’s lifestyle, as
emblematic of progress, rival that of the rulers. The accouterment of the
5Tuanku Abdul Rahman, for example, who would become the first king of thdepdent
Malaya, was a District Officer in the 1920s and 1930s.
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Malay royalty—steamships, motorcars, and golf—was supremely modern;
it was their unassailable place in society, used for colonial purposes, which
had become atchaic.
During the Malayan Union crisis, the bureaucratized aristocracy
exploited this archaism to manipulate tradition to its advantage. For the
first time, Malay traditionalists differentiated between vital and harmful
tradition. In this new articulation, only the restoration of the rulers to their
traditional (i.e. prewar) status could guarantee the continued existence of
the bangsa Melayu (Malay race). This formulation also meant, though, that
Malays could not survive in the modern wprld without tradition,
specifically one which privileged certain members of society over others.
The aristocratic defense of the rulers’ status should be understood
essentially as a new round of traditionalism aimed at preserving the ruling
class as a whole, rather than as an anti-colonial or nationalist response.
The bureaucratic elite found at the same time, however, that it could
differentiate itself from the rulers on the basis of modernity and progress.
To further this end, its press organs, Majtis and Warta Negara,
characterized “blind loyalty” as a harmful tradition, one out of step with
modern ideals. They participated in, even led, the widespread criticism of
the rulers’ behavior. For a short time, discourse in nationalist and
conservative papers was indistinguishable on this topic. Radical papers
even cited Majtis editorials on the rulers, showing that the bureaucratic
elite played an important role in validating this violation of tradition. The
radical and conservative papers would part, however, when the
conservatives successfully labeled further violations as traitorous.
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In the following sections, I discuss the bureaucratic elite, its actions,
and its press organs, as the author at the center of political discourse,
because its recasting of tradition has proved to be a vital component of
postwar Malay politics. (Even then, it will be clear that ideas expressed in
the radical press, also discussed here, provided much of the tension
necessary to this achievement.) But the audience addressed was not
constant. The focus of discourse changed as the intended audience shifted
among the British authorities, the rulers themselves, and a newly
constructed Malay political public. Arguments meant to resonate with a
British audience mainly sought to reassert the terms of the original treaties
and emphasize the idea of protection, while the struggle for supremacy
between rulers and aristocracy, as well as the aristocracy’s effort to
legitimize itself to the general public, revolved around conceptions of
progress, loyalty, and the people.
The Crisis of Protection
It was crucial to the conservative agenda that the violation represented by
overt criticism of the rulers be justified by appeal to another tradition—the
idea that the rulers owed their subjects protection and had failed them. The
aristocrats’ appropriation of the role of protector, on the basis of this’
purported failure, was first analyzed by Chandra Muzaffar.6 The
appropriation was an important step in the legitimation of the aristocrats
as modern political leaders in the eyes of both the British and the Malay
public. In this section, I will argue that the tradition of protection, by 1945,
6chandra Muzaffar, Protector? An Analysis of the Concept and Practice of Loyalty in
Leader-ted Relationships within Malay Society (Penang: Aliran, 1979).
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in fact owed its relevance almost entirely to colonial traditionalism and
that it was its very imbeddedness in the colonial relationship that made it
useful for the bureaucratic elite.
in his discussion of protection and loyalty in Malay society, Chandra
Muzaffar argues that in precolonial society, “the Sultans were seen as the
ultimate protectors,” and that in the colonial period, the British
successfully projected an image of themselves as “assisting in the
protection of the community.” According to Chandra, when the rulers
appeared to have “failed to protect the position of the Malays” by signing
the MacMichael treaties in 1945, the bureaucratic elite was able to gain
predominance “as protectors in the feudal tradition.”7 While this account
rightly interprets postwar bureaucratic ascendancy as an appropriation of
tradition, I believe it incorrectly traces the lineage of protection. The
protection that the aristocracy claimed to provide during the Malayan
Union crisis did not derive from classical tradition, but rather from that
version of Malay tradition which served colonial power.
One does encounter in classical literature the occasional royal
injunction to “protect the rakyat [subjects].”8 But by all accounts, the
dominant terms of the ruler-ruled discourse were loyalty and treason,
justice and injustice. Chandra himself, in his discussion of the Melaka
period, focuses exclusively on loyalty, and the pact he discusses in the
Sejarah Melayu between ruler and subject does not even mention
71b1d., 62-63.
8Mssa Melayu, cited in Barbara Watson Andaya, “The Nature of the State in Eighteenth
Century Perak,” In Pre-Colonut State Systems m Southeast Asia, ed A Reid and L
Castles (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Monograph no. 6,
1975), 23.
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protection.9 Even more telling, perhaps, are Malay proverbs, the only
window we have on what ordinary Malay peasants may have thought.
These sayings reflect not a positive feeling of loyalty, but merely the
unopposable power of the ruling dass—”whoever may be raja, my hand
goes up to my forehead all the s e”10—and the danger it posed to
ordinary people.—”wheñ elephants fight, the mousedeer dies in the
middle.”11
In fact, the idea of protection had always been more relevant as a
link between “international” relations and a ruler’s position within Malay
society. Gaining the protection of an larger, outside power had a long
precedent in Malay history. Before the British, the protecting powers were
China and Siam. In the fifth and sixth century, Malay rajas became vassals
of China, participating in the tribute trade in order “to amass wealth as a
means of asserting their authority in the fragmented and restless Malay
society.”’2 This was true even of Melaka at a time when “submission to
China was valued in South East Asia because it implied equality among
the South East Asian rulers” and helped preserve Melaka’s independence
from Java.13 The fact of such vassalage was often obscured, as in the
Sejarah Melayu, but real nonetheless:
The compiler of the Sejarah Melayu, referring to Malacca in
the fifteenth century, was embarrassed by the notion that the
Sultans were subordinate to China and was at pains to
disprove it. Nevertheless, formal admission of vassal status,
9Qiandra, Protector?, 1-32, especially 34.
101b1d., 18-20.
‘1Jto Kwame Sundaram, A Question of Class: Capital, the State, and Uneven
Development in Malaya (New York Monthly Review Press, 1988), 31-32, n 77
I2O.r. Wolters, The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1970), 37.
13Th1d., 155.
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because of the great rewards from the China trade, was part of
Malay history.14
The terms of such a relationship, though formally that of suzerain
and vassal, accommodated some flexibility in practice. For example, early
in the fifteenth century, the Chinese emperor was powerful and actually
offered protection to Melaka. At other times, the tribute was offered simply
as a pretext to gain the economic advantage of trade. With a less remote
suzerain, the terms required more delicate manipulation. The triennial gift
of bunga mas dan perak (gold and silver flowers) from the northern Malay
states to Siam was variously interpreted as a sign of vassalage or
friendship. According to the Merong Mahawangsa fKedah Annals), the
bunga mas was a gift, sent voluntarily, to secure the protection of a more
powerful, but essentially equal, fellow monarch.15 The Siamese view,
explained to Henry Burney in 1826, interpreted the same components—
bunga mas, protection, good relations—as required tribute and Siamese
kindness.16 The vassal’s interpretation was not mere wishful thinking;
Malay monarchs preserved their sovereignty in important ways. One of
these was avoiding the trip to Bangkok to be confirmed in office and do
personal obeisance before the Thai monarch. Such summons were evaded
by feigning sickness or sending a royal representative. Other evasions were
variously successful, depending on the waxing and waning of Siamese
power!
14Ibid., 40.
‘5James Low, trans., Merong Mahawangsa (The Keddah Annals) (Bangkok: The American
Presbyterian Mission Press, 1908), 253-55.
16Burney was the Military Secretary at Penang who negotiated the Anglo-Siamese Treaty
of 1826 which recognized Siamese suzerainty over Kedah and British protection over Perak
and Selangor Burney Papers (1910-13, reprint, Famborough, England Gregg International
Publisher, 1971), 227.
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By the eighteenth century, European powers were participating in
this system which ordered not only inter-state and trade relations, but also
affected ruling class rivalries within states, In Perak, for example, the
ruler’s affiance with the Dutch East India Company, to whom he granted a
tin monopoly, allowed him to concentrate economic and political power
vis-à-vis his chiefs.17 Less successfully, Malay states like Kedah began to
appeal to the protection of a third party—the British—to counter Thai
demands.
It is useful at this point to summarize the status of “protection” in
the Malay world on the eve of British intervention on the peninsula In
accordance with traditional Southeast Asian politics, protection from
outside powers had often been actively sought by rival factions to
strengthen their internal position. In a situation where the suzerain’s
power was constantly expanding and contracting, vassalage, whether
sought or imposed, could be a flexible condition. Protecting powers
included other Malay rulers, Chinese, Siamese, and Europeans. Although•
many of these powers were culturally foreign, their relationship with
Malay political authority was often incorporated into Malay cultural
expression, serving to domesticate the relationship. The presence of
Siamese royalty as brother monarchs in Kedah’s Merong Mahawangsa, for
example, both legitimizes Siam’s domination and the Malay ruler’s
acquiescence and defines the relationship in Malay terms, providing
criteria for rebellion if necessary.’8 Can this experience be taken as a model
for the way Malay rulers sought to deal with the British? Like the Siamese,
17Andaya, “Nature of the State,” 26.
18Low, Merong Mahauangsa, 253-55.
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the British were militarily dominant and could not be ignored, but they
were potentially useful as allies, i.e. protectors, against Siamese
encroachMent. In fact, the rulers of both Kelantan (1822) and TrEngganu
(1869) tried to gain the formal protection of Britain years before they were
transferred, without consultation, from Siamese to British control.19
Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, there was a
qualitative change in the nature of protectorate relationships.
Administrative modernization made the Siamese presence constant and
more intrusive, while Britain pursued increasingly defined relationships
through treaties. These treaties grounded British power in protectorate
agreements with sovereign rulers—the enabling fiction of indirect rule.
The extent of British power, which remade the face of much of the Malay
peninsula economically and demographically, is evident and in striking
contrast with earlier protectorates. Yet despite the tightening of the terms
of protection, Malay monarchs retained the presumption of sovereignty.
This was illustrated most dramatically in Sultan Abu Bakar’s independent
relationship with Queen Victoria and his successful legal argument in 1894
that as an independent sovereign, he could not be sued in British courts.20
More generally, Unfederated states used rulers’ sovereignty to delay the
posting of British residents and to resist incorporation into the fMS. Even
in the Federated states, where colonial power was strongest, the Malay
ruling class found some maneuvering room in the manipulation of
British commitment to the concepts of protection and indirect rule. This
19Barbara Watson Mdaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia (London:
Macmillan, 1982), 117, 121-22.
20Rupert Emerson, Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule (New York: Macmillan,
1937), 199-202.
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can be seen most clearly in the maintenance of what was construed as
traditional Malay society. Thus, because it enabled the ruling class to
perpetuate privilege and wring concessions from the British, the idea of
protcHon retained relevance before the war.
The biggest change in the experience of protection in the colonial
period was the growing relevance of the idea within Malay society. It is not
surprising that one aspect of traditionalism should have been the
arrogation by the ruler of the status of protector The most powerful
justifications for authority in this period came from the colonial power,
which described itself as a protectorate. And colonial rule itself introduced
new elements into the Malay world from which Malays saw themselves in
need of protection, notably the unprecedented scale of immigration. There
was, then, in addition to the conventional idea of protection from outside
attack, a new aspect—the protection of Malay society as a whole from the
changes occurring around them. The apotheosis of the rulers was a
manifestation of this protection, as was the reservation of government
service positions to the Malays. The rulers were not, in fact, protectors, but
protected.
During the 1930s, awareness of their disadvantaged status vis-à-vis
immigrants became widespread in educated Malay society, and the
contradiction between the British as protectors of the Malays and as
constructors of the plural society became unavoidable. Ishak Haji
Muhammad, an MAS dropout, began to develop a critique of British
protection which called attention to Malay royalty’s role in the charade:
The British, who steer the administration of the Malay States,
have placed them under the protection of a flimsy yellow silk
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umbrella. When it rains, they get soaked, and when the sun
beats down, they shrivel up in the heat.21
At the same time, less iconoclastic thinkers continued to press the British
to honor the terms of the agreement. Abdul Rahim Kajal is best
remembered for honing distinct ons within Malay society between Metayu
jati (true Malays) and those of Arab and Indian descent. Here he reminds
immigrant Asians, and the British, that the colonial power is obligated
only to the Malays:
if they’re still dissatisfied, the government can inform these
foreigners that the “protection” of the Malays isn’t like the
protection of the deer in the forest by the game warden, who
sees to it that the deer isn’t killed by hunters but allows it to be
preyed upon by other enemies such as the tiger.. •22
The experience of Japanese invasion and occupation, ethnic
violence, and British reoccupation with plans for Malayan citizenship
wiped out any illusions that Malay society was under effective protection,
by the British or by the rulers. The British had, in the first instance, failed
to provide the most basic kind of protection, forcing them eventually to
dismiss accusations of large-scale fifth column activity on the part of the
Malay peasantry:
It should be remembered that their attitude, as typical
peasants and landowners who had been discouraged as a
matter of policy from warlike activity over a long period, was
largely influenced by the fact that, as the British withdrew and
could offer no protection they had to make the best of a bad
job with the Japanese It could not be expected that they would
actively fight the Japanese once the British had withdrawn.23
21The yellow silk umbrella Is a symbol of Malay royalty. Warta Mad, 28 November 1937,
quoted in Abdul Lallif Abu Bakar, Ishak Haji Muhammad Penutis dan Audi Poittik
Sehingga 1948 (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiff Malaya, 1977), 62.
22Majtts, 4 January 1932, quoted In William R Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism
(Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan UniveralU Malaya, 1980), 171.
AsMey Gibson Report 1945. BMA PR 1/6.
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Mountbaften himself acknowledged that the withdrawal of British
protection had an effect on “the confidence of the people in the might and
justice of the British Empire.”24
Indeed, after the occupation, all Sectors of the Malay press openly
criticized the British, sometimes linlUng their failure in 1942, the
vulnerability of Malays to Chinese attack, and the effect the Malayan
Union was expected to have. The MM’ organ Suara Rakyat declared
British failure a betrayal, while the nationalist Seruan Rakyat angrily
demanded that the British protect the rights of the Malays in their own
country in order to preserve the peace.25 The conservative press now, too,
took a jaundiced view of protection, treating the idea sarcastically—”this
peninsula has been ‘protected’ by the British for seventy years”—and
questioning the granting of equal rights to recently arrived immigrants
who offended and looked down on the Malays—”Is this the kind of justice
the Malays and Malay states get from British protection?”26
But this proclamation of British failure by the conservative press did
not lead it to discard the idea of protection. Instead, attention was drawn to
the nature of the original treaties, with their emphasis on sovereignty and
protection, in denouncing the new constitutional order. It was, according
to conservatives, still necessary for Malays to be under the protection of the
British until they developed the ability to govern themselves,27 an
argument which handed control over the pace of Malay progress back to
24VIce-Admlral Earl Mountbatten of Burma, Post Surrender Tasks. Section £ of the Report to
the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, 1943-
2945 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1969), Appendix K: Extracts from a Directive
by the Supreme Allied Commander.
2Suara Rakyat, 16 January 1946, Seruan Rakyat, 23 December 1945
26A’vfjlia, 27 November 1945.
27M3jtts, 24 October 1946.
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the British and tended to equate protection of the Malays with protection of
the rulers.28 What accounted for this appeal to the norms by which the
colonial power had originally justified its authority? Given its experience
under colonial protection before the war, it is easy to conclude that the
ruling class was asking for the return of its own protected status within
Malay society. But it was also a way of alerting the British that as a class it
would remain loyal, as well as a means of stating the terms of
reconciliation. After the war, ruling class ambitions for English education
and administrative postings were overtaken by the advent of
revolutionary politics, within Malaya (Chinese communists and some
Malays) as well as in the wider region (Indonesia and Vietnam). After an
initial period of complacency regarding Malay capacity for revolution, the
British took the threat very seriously. But, surprised and distrustful of the
aristocracy’s unprecedented mobilization of the peasantry against the
Malayan Union and confused by the outpouring of opinion in the Malay
press, the British did not immediately recognize their natural allies in the
conservative “nationalists.”29 The appeal to protection was an appeal to
the dominant discourse of prewar colonialism, in which the British might
recognize their allies. As suggested by James Scott, “for anything less than
completely revolutionary ends the terrain of dominant discourse is the
28A letter to the editor appearing 3 January 1946 in Seruan Rakyat, an organ of the Selangor
branch of the MNP, which broke from the national organization because of the latter’s
support for the Malayan Union, asked “Will it [the Malayan Union] protect the rights of
the Malays who are the indigenous people of Malaya or will It do just the opposite? Will it
give full powers to the Sultans and Malay masses or to the other side?”
9”it Is difficult even for experienced officers fully to gauge the effects of the war and
Japanese occupation on the Malays, both individually and as a race.” PlJ 1,30 April 1946.
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only plausible arena of struggle.”° Avoid revolution, this appeal said, by
reStoring us to leadership and finally taking seriously our aspirations.
For the Malay rulers, the protection of a powerful outsider had been
an historically valid alliance which allowed them to further their position
and ealth in the Malay world. Unfortunately for them, British
imperialism changed the international context and the Malay world itself,
rendering their accommodations suspect, something that suddenly became
visible in the signing of the new treaties. The rulers’ purported status as
protectors of Malay society, derived as it was from colonial protection of
their own position, was irrevocably destroyed. In postwar discourse, the
idea of protection itself was no longer applied to their actions; penaung
(protector) and naungan (proteHon) were used only in relation to the
British. Bitter condemnation of the rulers, in both the nationalist and
conservative press, was based instead on the notion of accountability—a
fledging idea that had been suppressed before the war. Because of what the
rulers had done, editorialists wrote, they had shown they could not be
relied on; they had let the people down.31 Their actions were likened to
selling their states (menjuat negerinya) and for that their powers should be
suspended (dipecat).32 Worst of all, according to one letter writer, was that
the posture assumed by the rulers showed the world the weakness of the
Malay community, which extended even up to their Sultans:
Our esteemed rulers apparently haven’t got the spirit to
defend their own true rights. Rather, when the slightest bit of
pressure is applied, our esteemed rulers retreat.. .33
30James C Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance Hidden Transcripts (New Haven
Yale University Press, 1990), 103.
31Maflis, 12 December 1945 and 23 January 1946.
325eijn Rakyat, 11 December 1945.
33Seruan Rakyat, 3 January 1946.
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Soon the idea that the rulers had signed under duress and coercion
began to gain credence, as the rulers defended themselves and details of the
MacMichael mission became public.34 One letter writer from Johor even
suggested that the rulers had no choice but to sign because they were
obligated, by treaty, to take British advice.35 But despite this amelioration of
the judgment of betrayal, the position and meaning of the rulers in Malay
society could not return to the status quo and was henceforth open to
acquiring new meaning, as will be discussed further below. In fact, shifting
the blame from Malay rulers to British overlords, claiming that the Sultans
were deceived,36 only served to reveal the colonial un4erpinnings of the
traditional Malay raja. The rulers had not been toppled from their status of
protectors. They had been exposed as British creatures.
Tradition vs. Progress
The aristocracy, then, did not usurp the role of protector from the rulers.
Instead, it appropriated the role of protecting the rulers, and the Malay
tradition they represented, from British efforts to destroy them with the
Malayan Union. The aristocracy’s credentials for protecting tradition came
from its administrative experience. Just as they had assumed district officer
positions during the war1 aristocrats were ready tofill roles after the war
that the British no longer could or would perform. As the Malays most
associated with progress, they were able to move comfortably in the highest
levels of the plural society created by the British and were qualified to
34For examples, see Majils, 12 December 1945 and 26 February 1946; Utusan Melayu, 24
January1946 (DMA PR 3/7/Vol. 1).
35Straits Times, 2 March 1946.
36Maj11s, 21 Pebruary 1946.
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safeguard Malay interests there. Yet, on these very grounds of progress, the
aristocrats now faced competition from those who would sweep away the
traditional world altogether. The radical nationalist press attacked
traditional privilege and challenged the aristocracy’s very claim to
represent progress. This tension between the claims of tradition and
progress was resolved (and ruling class privilege safeguarded) by
successfully linking the preservation of tradition to the Malays’ survival in
the modern world. In the process, the Malay rulers would come tobe seen
as guarantors of Malay interests in the contemporary nation.37
Since the Kaum Muda introduced the idea early in the century
Malay backwardness and its antithesis, progress, had been at the center of a
discourse of self-criticism. Because calls for progress usually focused on
cultural goals suth as education and the development of the Malay
language, they did not violate the political taboo, After the war, some still
thought along those lines, like “Melayu” from Johor, who wrote to the
Straits Times disavowing any wish for constitutional reform or self-
government, demanding instead “education on a far greater scale than
Malaya has hitherto known.”38 for more Malays, though, the time for
overtly political progress was felt to have arrived, and that belief lent new
urgency to old debates. The quality as well as quantity of Malay education
was now scrutinized; political progress could not be made as long as
colonial education equipped Malays to become only “coolies and
messengers.”39 Most of all, political progress meant unity; Malays needed
37See, for instance, Chandra, Protector?, 64.66; Tan Liok Ee, The Rhetoric of Bangsa and
Mtnzu Community and Nation in Tension, The Malay Peninsula 1900-1955 (Clayton,
Victoria: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988).
38Straits Times, 22 January 1946.
39Letter to Seruan Rakyat, 8 January 1946.
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to overcome their division into separate states wfth separate rulers so they
could achieve progress.4°
A broadening conception of progress placed Malays explicitly in an
international realm of sovereign nation-states. This view had been
encouraged by both Allied war propaganda touting democracy and self-
determination and Japanese propaganda criticizing Western imperialism.
Warla Negara argued that the first All-Malaya Malay Congress was proof
that Malays were now politically aware; it linked the Malays to “the
awareness of communities all over Asia which now asserted their
humanity, ... wanted to hold power in their respective states and would no
longer be deceived by colonialists or Western Imperialism.”41 The Ally-
promoted idea that the world consisted of nations which should each
enjoy rights of self-determination was used specifically in arguing against
the Malayan Union to a British (and international) audience, and thus
often appeared in the English press. “A Kelantan Malay” wrote to the
Straits Times on the occasion of a large antl-Malayan Union
demonstration:
[The Malays] have arrived at that stage of political
development where they will not stand idly by when their
interests and integrity are at stake. Like other peoples, the
Malays have a right to exist in the land which has been
undisputedly theirs.42
Opponents of the Malayan Union immediately perceived
themselves to be acting not only on a national, but on an international
Utusan Melayu, 24 October 1946 (BMA PR 3/5).
41Warta Negara, 2 March 1946, quoted in Ahmad bin Masjidin, “Malayan Union Dan Kaca
Mata Warta Negara,” m Sejarah Masyarakat Metayu Moden, ed Khoo Kay Kim (Kuala
Lumpur Jabatan Sejarah, Unlversifi Malaya, 1984), 201.
42$Waits Times, 23 february 1946. Emphasis added.
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stage. The rulers had long ago perfected the art of jumping over the heads
of local authorities and appealing to London,43 Now various Malay
organizations took up a new weapon—the telegram—and printed copies of
their messages in the pages of local press. One protester was KM. Sultan
Maraicayar, editor of the “Islamic Voice of Malaya,” a Penang English-
language monthly with a circulation of 3,000. Maraicayar cabled President
Truman, “in the name of the Atlantic Charter and Abraham Lincoln,” as
well as the Secretary-General and other high officials of the United
Nations, basing his appeal on democracy, human rights, the sanctity of
treaties, and the “rights of small nations.” Finally, in February 1946, he
cabled both the British Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the
Colonies:
Malays downright opposed against Malayan Union, Sultans
bound by sacred treaties with Britain. Voice of Malays to be
heard not flouted. Consult Malays before action against them.
Long live the king of England. Editor WM.
Telegrams along these lines were sent by many Malay groups to the British,
United States, and United Nations governments, and the English press
covered the Malays’ protest on these terms. The Straits Times quoted
Utusan Melayu’s editorial denouncing the Malayan Union as violating the
principle of self-determination. It also printed the text of telegrams sent to
the British government by conservative Malay organizations and the
rulers. These letters argued against the Malayan Union treaties on the basis
of Malay sovereignty, public opinion, and the principle of representative
government and were read publicly during the British Parliamentary
43Especially during the Selangor succession dispute in the mid-1930s. See Mien, Matayan
Union, 7.
44BMA/ADM 8/64.
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debate on the subject.45 Malays made direct contributions to this discourse
in the English papers, one writer accusing the British of interfering in the
rights of small nations.46
It may well be argued tat this was simply a tactical appeal to the
dominant discourse, in this case international rather than colonial. It is
true that the majority of these arguments appeared in the English press,
but there were many in the Malay press as well. Papers like Warla Negara
and Majtis printed the texts of the telegrams. Pelita Malaya attacked the
Malayan Union for being undemocratic, and Seruan Rakyat said it violated
the Atlantic Charter.47 if the Malayan Union were established, according to
one editorial, not only the Malays, but the principles of justice championed
by the United Nations, would suffer.48 International principles did become
more problematic for Malays when they were not being used as a stick to
beat the British. Democracy, for instance, carried the uncomfortable
implication of voting rights for Chinese and Indian residents. Despite such
limitations, however, the pull of progress was irresistible. The rest of the
world was on the move—not just the West, but neighboring countries of
Asia as well, if Malays hesitated they would be left behind again, this time
in an atmosphere which might be fatal.
Neither could the rhetoric of international principle be wholly
contained to the anti-British struggle. When the rulers fell, it was not hard
to see who would rise, rhetorically at least, to fill the breach. The new
primacy of “the people” in relation to the rulers thus can be read as an
45Stratts Times, 25 January, 5 Februaty, and 15 March 1946.
46Straits Times, 25 March 1946.
47?elita Malaya, 25 May 1946 and Senrnn Rakyat, 6 November 1946.
Warta Negara, 12 March 1946 (DMA PR 3/6/Pt. 3).
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implementation of progress occasioned by the Malayan Union crisis.
Rakyat Metayu jetata (the Malay masses or common Malays) were now
regarded as paramount in Tanah Melayu (the Malay states, lit. Malay land):
For the treaties to be valid, they would first have to be agreed
to by the Malay masses, because this country is the property of
the Malay people together with the Sultans.49
The contention that the treaties were invalId without the people’s
agreement was a common one.50 Majtis argued that secret treaties with the
rulers, signed without consulting the people1 were directly opposed to
democracy, the ostensible principle of postwar British rule.51 Eventually,
the rulers themselves began to respond cautiously to this new rhetoric, the
Sultan of Pahang, for example, telling the Straits Times, “I am one of the
people and, therefore, for the people.”52 In this the Malay rulers were
repeating the experience of their fellow European i onarchs, who had
learned to identify with “their” people over the course of the previous
century.53
Disgust with the rulers’ capitulation and the new currency of ideas
like democracy and rights resulted in a temporary and superficial
consensus between the conservative and radical press. Both Majtis and
Utusan Melayu, for example, endorsed the view that the people’s rights
over their country and destiny were not dependent on the rulers; the
49Seruan Rakyat, 1 January 1946.
SOs,n Rakyat, 4 February 1946; Warta Negara, 2 and 3 January 1946 fUMA PR 3/7/Vol.
1).
51Majtis, 26 January 1946.
52$traits Times, 21 February 1946,
53Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing Traditions Europe, 1870-1914,” in The Invention of
Tradition, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983), 282.
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people’s rights could not be canceled because of the rulers’ misdeeds.54
Likewise, the articulation of a new relationship between raja and rakyat
(subjects, now people) was to be found throughout the political spectrum.
Seruan Rakyat instructed the rulers not to ignore the wishes of the people,
while Majtis demanded that they “join with the people with one voice to
demand the rights of the Malays.”55 According to Ariffin Omar’s analysis,
ruler and ruled were turned upside down when dautat, the ruler’s “divine
attribute,” was linked to rakyat, with a new meaning which approached
“power.” A classic proverb had proclaimed the centrality of a raja to the life
of the people; it was now inverted: “If there are not rakyat, there will be no
raja, but if there is no raja, the rakyat can become raja.”56 Ariffin explains
that daulat rakyat (the power of the people) was interpreted by
conservatives to mean that the rulers “should reign with the consensus of
the majority.” Radicals, however, embraced kedautatan rakyat (the people’s
sovereignty) or democracy. This formulation “which prevailed in East
Sumatra would leave the rulers out of the scheme of government” and
threatened to open participation to non-Malays.57 This is where the
consensus on Malay political progress broke down, for it threatened the
legitimacy and position of the bureaucratic elite along with that of the
rulers.
Not surprisingly, crffldsm of “ancient constituted authority”
threatened to wash over from the rulers onto the rest of the ruling class.
54See, for example, Maftis, 14 May 1946; Utusan Metayu, 28 January 1946 (BMA PR 3/7/Vol.
1); Warta Negara, 2 and 7 January 1946 (BMA PR 3/7/Vol. 1).
5’Seruan Rakyat, 23 December 1945; Majtis, 21 February 1946.
56Majtis, 6 February 1946, cited In Mffln, Bangsa Melayu, 175-76. He also argues that the
interests of the bangsa (race) came to take precedence over those of the ruler, 50-53.
57Arlffln, Bangsa Melayu, 176-77.
mEven before the Malayan Union controversy reached a critical stage, letters
appeared in both the English and Malay press attacking entrenched ruling
class interests. “Annoyed” wrote to the Straits Times from Trengganu
complaining that ninety percent of the posts that came open in the state
were filled by Trengganu-born “descendants of either the royal family or
the ‘big men.’ Does this mean that non-Trengganu Malays who have
slaved for over fifteen years in this State are not fit for such posts or is it
because they are not the sons of the soil or are not offspring of the ‘big
men’?”58 A supporter of the MNP in Selangor, writing to Seruan Rakyat
about the need for higher education to achieve self-government, made it
clear that class privilege was no longer acceptable:
And don’t reserve the seats of higher education for the state
aristocracies (orang-orang bangsawan negerti only. Help those
of our community who are poor but worthy to become
educated.. .9
These sentiments came from urban educated Malays, that small but
growing group whose frustration with elite privilege could now be
expressed openly. A far larger group, just as unhappy but for different
reasons, was the rural Malay peasantry. It was widely reported at the time
that rural Malays were disillusioned by the inefficacy of their traditional
leaders during the ethnic violence that followed the occupation (and that
continued well into 1946). Previous studies of this period have therefore
taken into account the very real threat the aristocracy felt from Malay and
Indonesian revolutionary groups and charismatic religious leadership
operating at the village level.60
58$traits Times, 14 January 1946.
59Seruan Rakyat, 23 November 1946.
6Q especially Stockwell, British Policy and Malay ?otitics, chapters 7 and 8.
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In understanding the ability of the aristocracy to deflect
revolutionary threats, however, insufficient attention has been paid to a
struggle between the goals of progress and the resurgence of tradition
which can be found in the suppressed discourse of Malays who favored the
Malayan Union. The eventual unanimity of opposition and subsequent
celebration of its result has obscured the fact that the unity of Malays was
not an inevitability, but a highly contested process. It is, of course, generally
recognized that the MNP initially favored the Malayan Union, but this
stance has been treated as a political misstep quicidy corrected when public
opinion made itself felt or explained away by ignorance of the full extent of
British intentions.61 While there is truth in both of these claims, the
characterization of a pro-Malayan Union stance as a political mistake out of
step with the zeitgeist only endorses the hegemonic view aM doesn’t help
us understan4 how that view came to predominate. It also obscures the
early widespread advocacy of a modern, unified administration, as well as
the fact that pro-Malayan Union (and anti-UMNO) sympathies only
seemed to disappear; they were simply transformed into anti-Federation
sentiment.
It was the logic of progress that led some initially to favor the
Malayan Union. Early Utusan Metayu e itorials explicitly linked
backwardness with the special privileges given the Malays, arguing that
Malays must reject those privileges in order to catch up with the other
races:
The termination of the war prompts the Malays of Malaya to
ponder seriously over their future in this country. The
61, for example, Firdaus Haji Abdullab, Radical Malay Politics: Its Origins and Early
Development (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publicatipns, 1985), 86.
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backwardness of the Malays is attrIbuted to several causes, of
which the most important are disunity, lazmess and lack of
ambition. These weaknesses in the Malays have been
hindrances in establishing their status in their own country...
In the past the Malays have had many privileges from the
Government as they were considered the “sons of the soil,”
but it will be degrading to receive such favors in the lute.
We have seen in the past the futility of the preferences given
to Malays No attempt was made to improve their conditions,
but Instead they deteriorated The wealth acquired by them
was uselessly spent in luxuries.
Let us at least in the future endeavor to improve ourselves,
after the suffethigs of these three and a half years under the
Japanese. There is going to be keen competition in the future,
and we must fight on undefeated We should correct our
ways of thinking and lay the foundations for our future
prosperity, and catch up with the other races in the post-war
world.62
In “this new struggle for progress,” the Malay rulers were called on to lead
their people forward, A few days later, Utusan Metayu welcoed the
“Malay Union,” blaming backwardness on provincial divisions and
declaring Malayan citizenship to be in line with democratic principles.63
This early optimism soon gave way to fear of alien power and the
shock of the rulers’ betrayal. Conservative papers like Majtis and Warta
Negara—mouthpieces of the bureaucratic elite—threatened to cut the
rulers down with progressive ideas, noting that civilized, democratic
nations don’t give rulers absolute power and supporting the democratic
election of sultans.64 The radical papers went much further. Petita Malaya
asked its readers to look at what was happening around Asia, pointing
especially to the revolution in Sumatra, where power was being
62jjj Metayu, 6 October 1945 fBMA COM/61).
63j’gJcfl Melayu, 13 October 1946 (BMA COM/61) and 22 October 1946 (BMA PR 3/5).
64Warta Negara, January 3, 1946 fBMA PR 3/7/vol. 1); Majtis, 18 Januaiy 1946.
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transferred from the rulers to the people, and suggesting that there was no
need for rulers in the modern world.65 Neither di4 that paper, an MNP
mouthpiece edited by Ishak Haji Muhammad, back down immediately
from its support for the Malayan Union, arguing that to oppose it would
mean returning to a system which privileged the few over the many.66
Despite the increasing criticism and isolation which forced the party finally
to back away from the Malayan Union,67 the paper continued to advocate
change. It argued that those who opposed reform possessed no aspirations
for their people or country68 and specifically accused high-ranldng Malays
of opposing Union in order to save their salaries.69
The vigorous populist arguments of the MN? were countered by
conservatives in two ways. The first was to brand the radicals insufficiently
Malay, traitorá to the bangsa MeThyu (Malay race), whose very survival was
threatened by the Malayan Union. The MNP’s self-proclaimed
internationalism, by which it pursued class alliance with the MCP, was
used against it. The Malay Nationalist Party, the Seruan Rakyat accused,
was a tool of the other races fperkaka bangsa lain).70
The conservatives’ second line of defense was the rehabilitation or
recasting of tradition. The Malayan Union was perceived as a threat to
bangsa Melayu politically because it rendered Malays a mere kaum
(community or ethnic group) in their own country. Through democratic
citizenship rights for immigrants, the validity of the Malay political
65Pelita Malaya, 11 April 1946.
66Petita Malaya, 22 March 1946.
671’elita Malaya, I and 3 April 1946.
68Pelita Malaya, 9 Apnt 1946.
69Pelita Malaya, 30 April 1946.
7O$an Rakyat, 11 December 1946 The use of the epithet “traitor” against political
enemies will be discussed further in the next chapter.
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community was denied Malays had traditionally recognized that polity,
their kerajaan, by looking to their rulers. This understanding had not
substantially changed with indirect colonial rule, which was facilitated by
the apotheosis of the Malay rulers. The destruction of these rulers—the
one institution linking Malays to the precolonial past—was therefore
easily understood to mean the destruction of the Malays, just as the rulers’
preservation could easily mean the reassertion of the Malay polity in the
face of Malayan Union The very visible defeat of the rulers at a tune of
great Malay vulnerability transformed them into cultural icons; their
survival or demise became the embodiment of the Malays’ fate in the
modern world.71 This transformation of meaning needed little
manipulation by royal apologists, though editorialists were quick to praise
those rulers who repudiated the treaties All educated or even well-
traveled Malays could see that places which ceased to have a ruler—
Singapore, Penang, Province Wellesley, Melaka—ceased to be Malay
places.72 To the extent, then, that the rulers came to symbolize the Malays,
anti-ruler sentiment was a self-limiting exercise, better understood as
arising from the self-criticism of the 1930s than as having revolutionary
potential. The aristocracy would gain considerable leverage from the
exercise, but it was a political dead end for the radicals. Accused of acting in
the interest of other races and of attacking the embodiment of the Malays,
their rhetoric of progress was twisted into treachery. They had to abandon
the Malayan Union and the class leveling of Malay society it might have
71Majtis, 13 April 1946.
72A letter to Utusan Metayu spectfically linked the loss of royalty in these places to the
loss of Malay privilege. 27 October 1945 (BMA PR 3/5).
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brought. Meanwhile, royal patronage at conservative political events
conferred traditional legitimacy on conservative ppliticians.73
if the central meaning of the royal tradition had transformed itself
with little effort (except perhaps from MacMichael), it still remained to
articulate that meaning politically and to elaborate the ritual. Could this
process have played out as a revival of precolorilal ruling class relations?
Could the rulers have staged a comeback of real power based on their new
postwar meaning? It was unlikely. The context of their transformation,
while not revolutionary, was still determined more by the ethos of
progress than privilege. Tradition now had value insofar as it safeguarded
the interests of the Malays in the modern world. The aristocrats, through
their own involvement with the colonial state and their successful
marshaling of opinion against the Malayan Union, were in a stronger
position than the rulers to mediate between tradition and progress.
Loyalty
The arena of mediation was to be the concept of loyalty and the threat that
the Malay people would withdraw their support from the rulers. The
conservatives had successfully quieted those who would dispense with
traditional authority, but they had not reined in the rulers themselves,
some of whom had not yet grasped the new conventions. It was in this
context that the Malay tradition of unconditional loyalty began to be openly
critidzed as out of date.74 A letter written to Seruan Ralqjat early in 1946
demonstrates a new examination of loyalty in light of colonial history:
73ArIffln Omar points out the importance of this patronage in Baugsa Melayu, 99400.
74Letter from “Regular Reader” to the Straits Times reporting a conversation with “a few
educated Malay friends,” 5 April 1946.
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Malays are loyal to their rulers, but... these signatures will
plant the seeds of Malay resistance against the Sultans, who
did not consult the people. Malays are always loyal [ta’at setíaI
to their rulers, but will not be loyal like in ancient times, like
we have heard in the story of Sultan Mahmud Shah of
Melaka... Sultan Husin Shah signed a treaty surrendering
Temasek [Singapore] to Mr. Raffles because that ruler acted on
his own.75
February 1946 saw an abortive aristocratic movement to overthrow
the Sultan of Johor, based on his violation of the Johor constitution which
forbade him from surrendering the state to a foreign power. This episode
has been analyzed most recently by Ariffin Omar, who discusses the
unprecedented nature of a charge of treason (derhaka) against a ruler.76 In
understanding the value of tradition to the aristocracy, however, it is just
as significant that Onn bin Jaafar stopped the movement in its tracks. More
will be said about Onn in the next chapter. It shall suffice here to note his
genealogy: Encik Long (Abdullah bin Tok Mohamed Tahir) was Menteri to
Temenggung Ibrahim during the opening up of the state to Chinese
planters and until his death in 1863. This post became Menteri Besar
during Abu Bakar’s reign. Lông’s nephew, Datuk Ja’far bin Haji Mohamed
(d. 1919) held the post, as did three of Ja’far’s Sons, including Cnn, who was
raised in the royal household. It is not enough, therefore, to say that Cnn
remained a royalist. Dato Cnn came from a line that assisted in the rather
unique invention that was the Johor sultanate and proved to have a sharp
understanding of its potential value in modern political life.
As the end of the DMA and the date of the new government’s
inauguration approached, the Malay Congress brought together delegations
75$eruan Rakyat, 9 February 1946.
76sjjff Omar, Bangsa Melayu, 53-54.
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from over forty organizations under the leadership of Onn. It successfully
presented a picture of Malay unity, political mobilization, and grassroots
opposition to the Malayan Union, and would later be transformed into the
second postwar national Malay political party, the United Malays National
Organization (UMNO). for months, newspapers reported unprecedented
political activity as tens of thousands demonstrated against the Malayan
Unkn. Despite thi pressure, the colonial government adhered to its April
1 deadline for the installation of Edward Gent as the new governor of the
Malayan Union. The inauguration was to be marked with appropriate
ceremonial, including the attendance, in full ceremonial dress, of the
Malay rulers.
However, Dato Onn and his party were also determined to fight on.
An emergency meeting of the Malay Congress, led by Onn, called for a total
Malay boycott of the Malayan Union—the installation ceremonies as well
as the Governor’s Advisory Council. It was especially important that the
Malay rulers not legitimize the new scheme by attending the installaHon,
although what the British called their “innate politeness” seemed to
guarantee their attendance.77 This problem was discussed in the Malay
press—what would the Malays do if their new-found unity and political
resolve was betrayed by their rulers? Dato Onn visitcd the rulers the day
before the ceremony at the Station Hotel in Kuala Lumpur, where they had
gathered in anticipation of attending. He requested them not to do so, with
the assurance that, “All Malay subjects of all Malay States.. submit their
affection [and] reaffirm their loyalty and allegiance.”78 The protestation of
$fraits Times, 3 April 1946.
78$fraits Times, 4 April 1946.
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loyalty barely concealed the threat, which Cnn also made explicit in the
press: “if the rajas attend... those rajas will be overthrown (dibuang)
immediately by the people.”79
When Onn visited again the next morning, the rulers were dressed
and ready to leave for the ceremony, accompanied by a high British official,
the new chief secretary of the Malayan Union. Inside that room, a struggle
ensued for the allegiance of the rulers. Outside on the street was a tense
crowd of Malays, many wearing a white headband of mourning to
commemorate the death of the Malay birthright represented by the
Malayan Union. Onn convinced the rulers to go one by one to the window
and acknowledge the cheers of the crowd, a moving but also threatening
experience for the rulers, at least one of whom wept. Back inside, they all
signed a letter to the governor explaining that their absence meant no
disrespect, but they could not attend the ceremony.8° As a body they had
capitulated to Onn as representative of the people, and were rewarded in
the following days and weeks with protestations of loyalty in editorials, on
posters, and in public demonstrations.
A New Tradition—Malay Rulers as Icons of the Malay Nation
The culmination of the discourse of loyalty was more than just an
aristocratic victory over royalty. More importantly, It was a transformation
in the position of the rulers which pictured and reflected the emergence of
a Malay nation in several ways.
79Majlis, 2 April1946.
80Allen, Malayan Union, describes this scene on p. 42.
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First, the rulers from all states were present (the only exception
being the Sultan of Johor who was out of the country). Previously, only the
rulers of the Federated Malay States had gathered publicly as a group. These
appearances were made, for example, at the Conference of Rulers or at
Federal Council meetings. The rulers of the unfederated states had
successfully resisted incorporation into a federation, and had so, avoided
such command performances. Yet now they were all seen together, the
effect of which was to wipe out the difference between the federated and
unfederated States in public perception, as it already was in legality.
Second, despite the anomaly of their nearly unanimous presence,
the rulers were, in fact, gathered together to do a very usual thing—to
validate and participate in a British construct, in this case the Malayan
Union. Turning against the British, no matter how politely, effectively
Severed their meaning from the colonial context. They were henceforth in
service to the postcolonial future. In turning against the British as a group,
they offered one of the first concrete manifestations of what that future
would look like—the joining together of Malay states, each retaining its
distinct identity through royal leadership.
Third, the rulers were seen together in Kuala Lumpur, previously
the capital of the federated Malay States, now the putative Malayan Union
capital, but fast becoming a national capital. Before the first Congress
meeting the previous month, there had been talk of meeting in Melaka, a
city of historic importance to Malay political life. But Kuala Lumpur had
been chosen instead for its greater facffities. After the successful Congress
and this dramatic showdown over the installation ceremony, there was no
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more talk of returning to Melaka. The colonial center had been effectively
appropriated as the Malay capital.
Fourth, the Malay rulers acquired a new public posture when they
acknowledged the primacy of the people by changing their plans. The
rulers were forced (through aristocratic mediation) to do the people’s
bidding and were also forced to accept the approval of the people for their
action. One hundred years earlier, Malay rajas had rarely been seen by large
groups of subjects Colonial rule gradually transformed the nature of their
visibility. On 1 April 1946, they took the final step in becoming monarchs
for public consumption.
Finally, Malay royalty presented itself before a group represented as
“the Malay people.” They were cheered by a crowd of Malays—not Malays
in their home state cheering their own ruler, but a crowd of Malays in the
capital city mobilized for political action. In that moment and in the public
debate over the role of the Sultans, the rulers were rendered
interchangeable on the national level. Malay newspapers reported events
all over the peninsula, referring to the rulers in the plural and holding
them all to the same standards. In a related way, “the Malays,” as a national
entity, were taking precedence over Selangor Malay, Perak Malay, etc.
People asked, what do the Malays want, what behavior do the Malays owe
their rulers and vice versa. This process had, of course, started before the
war, in the debate over Malay identity in the 1930s. But prewar changes
took place slowly and unevenly, while the transformation of 1945-46
occurred on a self-consciously national scale, simultaneously, in print.
Ironically, it could be said that Malay royalty itself had been the first
to display pan-Malay proclivities, ignoring as long as possible Anglo-
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Dutch-Siamese borders in favor of Malay-defined spheres of activity like
the old Johor-Riau empire. Indeed, the tradiHonal kerajaan did not depend
on a state at all, but on a ruler. It was colonialism which increasingly
domesticated the rulers, more and more successfully restricting them to
influence within their “own” states. The rulers’ transformation at the
Station Hotel restored something of the floating, place-free quality of Malay
kingship. This newly restored interchangability was a value transferred to
the states themselves. States could fit into a federated nation, any ruler
could now be cheered by Malays from any state, and the rulers could one
day take turns being Paramount Ruler or king. At the Rulers’ Conference
of 1903, Sultan Idris had referred to a Malay proverb which held that “there
cannot be two masters in one vessel: neither can there be four Rulers in
one country.”$’ The new tradition proved Sultan Idris wrong again.
The political struggle over the Malayan Union had transformed the
Malay rulers into symbols of the nation, both constructing and helping
Malays to picture their futdre. But the rulers also became icons of
traditional Malay culture, or rather a new rendering of tradition which
facilitated aristocratic ascendancy in postwar politics! Icons, being invented
symbols, have no intrinsic value beyond that ascribed to them. The rulers
were, in a sense, invented by colonialism, then re-invented by Dato Onn
and the furious public debate over their behavior. In 1946, their continued
existence, role, and meaning were no longer self-evident, even though
their representation of tradition was accepted. The ambivalence shown
toward them was the ambivalence of the Malays toward their invented
tradition, with all its disadvantages in a changing world. The swiftness
Annual Report, Pahang, 1697. CO 437/2.
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with which the ners capitulated in the face of British pressure—after all
the indignities of the occupation—made it impossible for Malays to ignore
the dual meaning their rulers had come to embody—British creatures and
symbols of Malay weakness. In short, the rulers had become problematic.
The aristocracy provided a traditional resolution, with modern political
advantage. The iconic monatchies were retained, now to guarantee that
Tanab Metayu would remain a Malay land. But real power was passed to
those who would bring the Malays progress In Malay history, when a hero
was called for, someone like Hang Tuah, an aristocrat, had won the battle
for his sultan. So did the aristocracy save the rulers in 1946.
This chapter has interpreted the Malayan Union crisis as an opportunity
for the resurgence of aristocratic power at the expense of both Malay rulers
and Malay radicals. The general outpouring of criticism against the rulers
threatened to engulf the aristocrats as well, thus activating the latent
division in ruling class interests whichhad been developing during
prewar colonial rule. In the dangerous political climate of 1945 and 1946,
aristocratic politicians asserted their claim to modern leadership by
distinguishing themselves from the erring rulers and by taking control of
the evolving meaning of Malay tradition. The conservative press presided
over the revelation that the Malay rulers were creatures of the British
rather than protectors of Malay society, thus deposing both those
“protectors” in favor of the conservative political leaders. Mass
mobilization and a relentless editorial drive in the conservative press also
defeated the minority view that the Malayan Union, by sweeping away the
old leadership, might actually benefit the Malays. Finally, having secured
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the position of the rulers at the head of society, the aristocrats, led most
ably by Onn bin Jaafar, then secured the obedience of the rulers to UMNO’s
policy by updating the Malay tradition of loyalty. This rehabilitation of
tradition left the Malay sultans as iconic rulers whose survival was crucial
to the fate of the modern Malay nation and rendered UMNO, their
protectors, as the embodiment of progress. In a subtle resolution of the old
contradiction between preáervatioa and progress, aristocratic power was
preserved. UMNO’s hegemony, however, was still not secure. The end of
UIvfl’JO’s mass mobilization, which was coincident with the beginning of
closed-door negotiations with the British, left UMNO vulnerable to the
continuing activity of the Malay nationalists. In the next chapter, I turn to
the construction of the new political discourse and aristocratic efforts to
master the language of nationalism.
Chapter 6
POLITICS AND NATIONALISM
The struggle for aristocratic ascendancy within the ruling class was
paralleled by the traditional elite’s struggle to dominate the emerging
political discourse of the wider society through its political party, the
United Malays National Organization (UMNO). In this endeavor, the
conservatives faced a radical nationalist movement which specifically
targeted traditional leadership and colonial rule as twin evils endangering
Malay society. Emboldened and nurtured by the Japanese occupation, and
encouraged by the Indonesian struggle against the Dutch, Malay
nationalists took advantage of the weakness of the restored colonial state to
disseminate their views, organize, and recruit for membership in the
immediate postwar period. As discussed in chapter 4, BMA policy afforded
a window of opportunity for this activity and subsequent policy was to
encourage what the British considered legitimate nationalism among the
Malays. Once UMNO had emerged as the spokesman of that acceptable
nationalism, suppression of radical formulations would proceed apace.
Malay radicalism, along with Chinese and Indian, was defeated in the
wholesale suppression of progressive politics which commenced in mid-
1948 with the counterinsurgency movement known as “the Emergency”
(1948-1960).
Contemporary and current left-wing critics of UMNO’s dominance
in Malay politics have pointed to British intervention as an important
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factor in U!6NO’s victory.’ While this approach recognizes UMNO’s
weakness in the years 194648, it fails to acknowledge an important process
of which British complicity was only a part. What is overlooked is the
significant gap between UMNO as established—champion of the Malays in
the fight against the Malayan Union—and UMNO’s development of a
credible nationalist persona. In the two years of its existence before the
Emergency eliminated left-wing parties, conservative politicians learned to
appropriate the powerful tools of nationalist symbolism and practice that
their radical competition often pioneered. In this chapter, therefore, I will
not attempt to assess the relative strength of opposing political forces, nor
to show that a different outcome was possible or probable had the British
not protected UMNO and suppressed the left.2 Instead, I will show how
conservative politicians constructed an ideological hegemony, casting
UMNO as the mainstream party of Malay nationalism, an ideology which
aided in UMNO’s long-term victory over progressive forces.
The traditional elite had both advantages and disadvantages in this
endeavor. In its favor was the power of tradition, its success in gaining
control over the meaning of the Malay rulers, and the growing complicity
of British officials in its project. Working against it was the momentum of
change and movement gripping Malay society. More specifically, a Malay
political public was emerging precisely in reaction to the colonial milieu
See, for example, Ahmad Boestamam, Datuk Onn Yang Saya Kenat (Kuala Lumpur:
Adabi, 1979) and S. Husin All, The Malays: Their PrOblems and Future (Kuala Luñur
Heinemann AsIa, 1981).
2Thls argument is criticized in Roger Kershaw, “Difficult Synthesis: Recent Trends in
Malay Political Sociology and History,” Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 16, 1
(1988) 156, n 19 Here Kerithaw questions S Husin Ak’s view that British action kept a
“natural historical development” from fruition Kershaw argues that “a few years of
Bnbsh suppression should not have held up [Malay left wing parties’] progress once
democratic elections were introduced.”
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which was the basis of elite power. The shape of that emerging political
public was a national public, that is, one which was bound, sooner or later,
to embrace anti-colonialism and demand access to political power in a
modern nation. In this dynamic atmosphere, mastery over the language
and symbolism of nationalism was necessary for the elite to maintain its
relevance.
In the following section, I discuss how prewar Malay public
discourse was transformed mto a political discourse by 1945 I then
examine four important ways in which political nationalism was practiced
from 1945 to 1948 and how a conservative UMNO appropriated those
forms to its own political practice.
The Development of a National Political Public
Throughout the prewar period, Malay public discourse was constructing
the basis of a Malay national public. Newspapers like Saudara and Warta
Malaya, though published in the Straits Settlements (Penang and
Singapore, respectively) were sold and read all over the peninsula, as
shown in their correspondence columns.3 A central concern of journalists
was the definition of the Malay community. The Arab-Malay Muslims
who published At-Imam had referred to all Muslims of the peninsula as
“our people.”4 By the 1930s, in opposition to years of Arab-Malay and
Indian-Malay (Jawi Peranakan) dominance, Malay public discourse began
to refine that definition of community, moving from a religiously-based
3ZuJkipii bin Mahmud, Warta Malaya: Penyambung Lidah Bangsa Melayu 1930-1941
(Bangz, Selangor Jabatan Sejarah, Uruversiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1979), 107-8
4William R Roff, The Ongrns of Malay Natzonaltsm (Kuala Lumpur Penerbitan
Universifi Malaya, 1980), 56.
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conception of the l1mat çwhich made no distinction between Malays and
other Muslims) to a secular and ethnic conception of genuine Malays
(Melayu jati). Yet even as the community was narrowing in this regard,
there were, by the late 1930s, several attempts to broaden its definition
beyond state-based limitations. Two pan-Malaya conferences were held, in
1939 and 1940, to bring together the similarly-oriented state associations for
common purpose. But despite much time spend debating the definition of
“Malay” and discussing the need for “national” endeavor, at neither
meeting could the associations agree to form a unified national body.5 The
associations’ mainly aristocratic memberships would not risk alienating
their British and royal benefactors.
It is somewhat fitting, in retrospect, that this dead-end occurred on
the eve of the Japanese occupation. For all that Malay public discourse had
done to create a national public, it seemed nationalism could go no further
without politics. By disrupting the colonial, traditionalist milieu and
substituting Japanese goals and practices, the occupation accomplished two
things: it gave legitimacy to the national conception of Malay society and
introduced new forms of social organization and action in order to further
that conception. Examples of these will be touched on below in relation to
the new political practices of UMNO and the nationalist groups. But first
the phenomenon of “politics” itself requires attention.
It is strildng not only that Malays engaged in politics after the
colonial restoration, but that their newspapers constantly reminded them
of the significance of what they were doing. According to Seruan Rakyat,
5INd., 24247. Cheah Boon Kheng reproduces the minutes of the second meeLing In Tokoh
Tokoh Tempatan dan Dokumen-Dokurnen dalam Sejarah Malaysia (Pulau Pinang:
Universiti Sains MalaysIa, 1982).
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Malays were “quiet, patient, and gracious. they have never gone on strike,
never even marched, let alone revolted.” But now they “know how to
oppose and how to march.”6 Majtis commented on the change in Malays’
attitude, that they “no longer dread politics but are taking a vigorOus part
in them,” and attributed it to the Malayan Union proposals and the
successful pan-Malay congress of March 1946. It was clear, according to
Warta Negara, that the “tidak apa” (never mind) attitude was gone.8 There
even appeared on the market a Kamus Potitik(Political Dictionary) of
sixty-eight pages, costing one dollar.9
The political taboo had been broken, and in radical publications the
change in attitude was analyzed in just those terms:
Before the war, it was difficult for us to start a politicat
movement. At that time, politics was like a ghost in the view
of the public At that time, politics was forbidden (haram]—
there was no use trying to start a political movement then,
just mentioning the word “politics” was forbidden. But now
after the war, not only has the ghost vanished, but politics is
permitted Ihalat] and demanded as well by the public and also
by the authorities. Therefore, what are we waiting for or are
we still afraid?10
An interesting note of uncertainty is present in that question. For the most
part, however, the political activity of the Malays was encouraged and
celebrated in phrases which often employed the metaphor of awakening:
“Malay masses: Be aware! Wake up!”1
6Seruan Rakyat, 20 December 1945.
7Majtis, 23 March 1946.
8Warta Negara, 20 April 1946 (BMA PR 3/6/Pt. IV).
9riu 11703/47.
IO$ij Rakyat, 2 February 1946. A longer analysis along the same lines can be found in
Kenchana, No. 3, March 1947, under the HUe “Melayu Berjuang” (Malays Struggle).
111’elita Malaya, 4 April 1946.
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As with the rhetoric of progress discussed in the previous chapter,
this unanimous celebration of Malay political activity actually concealed
different attitudes and intentions. Politics itself was not simply the
affirmation and assertion of the Malays as a people, but a new way of
ordering society which represented danger to some and opportunity to
others. In order to understand the orientation of conservatives and radicals
to this new activity, it helps to recognize three important characteristics of
the new politics.
First, everyone in Malay society was, at least theoretically, a political
participant. Where prewar politics existed in a circumscribed ruling class
arena, postwar politics was mass politics. It was no longer restricted by class:
It is not just the state aristocracies who may participate in
Politics like before. Farmers can participate provided they are
worthy.12
Nor was ft restricted by age or gender, as newspapers commonly pointed
out the presence at demonstrations of Malay men, women, and children.
In fact, the participation of women was the exemplar of the new politics.
While making no claims about the effect of political participation on the
status of women per se,13 it is nonetheless clear that their entrance into
public life was considered highly sigflificant, both by Malays and by British
observers gauging the extent of opposition to the Malayan Union.14 In
to Seruan Rakyat, 11 November 1945.
13Manderson argues that “despite the participation of women m politics, the role of women
did not change in essence but rather drew its inspiration and its mode of operation from
tradition.” Women, Politics, and Change: The Kaum Thu UMNO, Malaysia, 1945-1972
(Kuala Lumpur Oxford University Press, 1980),;
4CaptaIn L D Gammans, the Conservative Member of Parliament whose visit was the
occasion of massive demonstrations, was particularly impressed by the women’s rallies,
especially the one led by the consort of the Sultan of Perak Manderson comments “That
woman led the march does not Indicate that they were Initiators—it was obviously a
successful tactical decision That they marched separately reflected the general segregation
of women on public occasions “Ibid, 49, n 51 A Mujtts editorial (4 June 1946) commented on
242
Malay papers, the participation of women—at demonstrations and in
forming associations—was encouraged and celebrated as a specific
indication of Malay progress.15 Women’s political activity was exemplary
in one other sense. While the British thought they were witnessing novel
behavior precipitated entirely by the Malayan Union proposals, Malay
women’s entrance into public life had actually begun during the
occupation. Labor service, welfare associations, economic production,
education, rallies, and public lectures were among the activities
encouraged and required by the Japanese regime.’6 As with political
speech, associational barriers fell which could not easily be re-erected. The
new forms of activity could not be unlearned, but would be deployed and
mobilized by political leadership.
Second, the primary purpose of politics as articulated in both the
radical and conservative press was to safeguard Malay rights which were
being threatened by the Chinese (politically and economically) and by the
British constitutional proposals.’7 It was implicitly understood, and
explicitly stated by radicals, that it was the failure of the ruling classes that
made politics both possible and necessary:
Now the masses have embraced politics in order to defend
their rights and keep their race from sinking to oblivion. But
thIs march and on Gammans’ surprise at seeing five thousand Malay women standing up for
their rights. The Singapore English daily Straits Times often commented on the new
participation of Malay women in public life. See “Malay Women Want Active Part,” 25
March 1946 and “Malay Women in the New Malaya,” 5 December 1946
15Utusan Melayu, 23 January 1946 (BMA PR 3/7/Vol 1) News articles and editonal
comment on women’s political activity were ubiquitous in the dailies See, for example,
Majlis, 26 February, 6 March, 13 March, and 12 June 1946; and Warta Negara, 12 February
and 16 March 1946, Ionger analyses and pictures of women meeting and protesting can be seen
in the Singapore monthly Kenchana, May, September, November, and December 1947, and
on the cover of the February 194$ Issue
16Manderson, Women, Politics, and Change, 5 1-52
17Letter to Seruan Rakyat, 19 December 1946.
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the ruling classes are still fragmented and individualisUc
which continues to invite British intervention in internal
affairs.18
It was with this understanding that the aristocrats had at first distanced
themselves from the rulers, but all Malays understood who “the ruling
classes” comprised. The aristocrats had lost some of the advantage inherent
to their position and would have to try to shape politics in their own
image in order to regain it.
Third, the new political consciousness was a national consciousness,
though it took conservative politicians some time to shift their bearings
from the regional fkenegerian) to the national fkebangsaan). The Malay
Nationalist Party (Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya) was the first Malay
organization to use the political term “party” in its name. The combination
of Partal and Kebangsaan proclaimed a new era in which politics was
embraced as the medium of nationalism. MNP rhetoric also made the new
relationship quite clear:
The Malay Nationalist Party is a National Movement and so
every Malay has the right to come forward... with his views
and findings for the upliftment of his Nation.19
UMNO’s own name (Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu) is
instructive in more than one way, pointing at once to a reluctance to
embrace the new forms. First is the eschewing of “party” for the non
political “organization” (pertubuhan) Second, neither would the name as
originally conceived have included “national.” Onn bin Jaafar suggested
that United Malays Organization, shortened to UMO, would evoke the
18suara Sa&erkas, April 1946.
9Voice of the People, 16 November 1945 Emphasis in original This publication was the bi
monthly English version of the MNP’s official organ, Suara Rakyaf.
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sound (and presumably the prestige) of the United Nations Organization,
then commonly referred to in the press as the UNO.20 That Onn sought
evocations in English rather than Malay is not merely anomalous.21 It
points to the distance between the goals and mindset of the new
organization and those of prewar Malay nationalism, which was
intimately linked with the propagation of the Malay language. Further, the
analogy of the United Nations, a federation of mutually exclusive
sovereign entities, dearly articulated the aristocratic desire for the prewar
status quo rather than that of a forward-looking nationalist movement.
Nevertheless, Za’aba, doyen of Malay letters, managed to insert “national”
into the name (though the United Nations still exerted a powerful pull on
the organizational imagination, providing such structural models as the
General Assembly).22 The combination of UMNO’s de facto appropriation
of politics from the rulers and its hasty adoption of the national sobriquet
seconded the MNP’s political nationalism and brought it tentatively into
the political mainstream.
In sum, the prewar development of a national Malay public, which
articulated a critical discourse about Malay society and the state, had
probably advanced as far as it could without embracing the medium of
politics to further its ends. With the Japanese occupation, the rulers’
monopoly on politics was broken, leading in the postwar period to a
remarkable transformation in Malay attitudes. Mass politics, predicated on
20A. Samad Ahmad, Sejambak Kenangan: Sebuah Autobiographi (Kuata Lumpur: Dewan
Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1981), 216.
21Accordlng to Samad, It was in September 1947 that Onn pronounced “Amno” for UMNO
and it stuck, fixing the English, rather than Malay, name in the public mind. Ibid., 245.
See the speech by the delegate from the Kesatuan Malayu Singapura in Mohammad
Yunus Hamidi, $ejarah Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjung (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara,
1961), 38-39.
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the failure of traditional Malay leadership, was now a legitimate activity
and linked firmly to nationalism. I will now turn to the new forms of
political nationalism and their use by contending political forces.
Nationalism and the Practice of Politics
The critical discourse developed by prewar Malay publishing and
associational life was unrelated to the production and propagation of
traditionalistic Malay culture and aristocratic privilege. From the
beginning, newspapers were published by people who were trying to
change the status quo, even if their vision was not radically anti-colonial.
The traditional elite related to those they ruled in either a traditional or
colonial/bureaucratic discourse, and usually needed no such novel
approach as print. This began to change with the growth of a literate public,
and by the 1930s, a discourse of backwardness and progress had evolved
which engaged the forward-looking of the bureaucratic elite, as well as
Islamic and secular critics of colonialism.
After the war, when constitutional crisis and ethnic and political
violence produced an atmosphere of urgency and political awakening, the
outright denunciation of colonialism sanctioned during the occupation
became a norm of political expression against which the colonial
restoration moved cautiously at first. This greater range of allowed opinion
and the encouragement for everyone to practice politics drastically
enlarged the arena of public discourse. But all these new participants, most
of them illiterate, could not participate in a critical discourse through the
“public use of their reason.” Modern Malay political life was born in the
era of mass democracy, in which the manipulation of “public opinion”
246
replaced the “critical public” that had conducted a discourse among literate
individuals and with the state.23 In the colonial territories, as in the
metropole, democracy and self-determination were catchwords, often no
more than catchwords, it is true; but they certainly lent unquestioned
legitimacy to any appeal to public opinion.
It was in this context that the colonial state sought to privilege a
“Malayan” public which it could groom for eventual self-government. The
Malay elite countered with the reassertion of a Malay public which was
suddenly called upon not only to be political, but to demonstrate unified
political behavior and opinion. In contrast to the slow construction and
refinement of a Malay public in the first half of the century, the immediate
postwar period saw the startling quick construction and manipulation of
“public opinion,” first mobilized in opposition to the Malayan Union and
then in a struggle to define the nationalist mainstream. The way public
opinion was constructed can be seen in the different ways Malays
participated in politics and in which avenues were encouraged and which
cut off. This section will examine four such participatory modes,
commenting along the way on the extent to which each contributed to a
political nationalism and also on how they reflected the ongoing
conservative-radical contest for control over that nationalism.
Propaganda and the Press
World War H had a profound effect on the way political elites
communicated with their populations throughout the world. This was no
less true in Japanese-occupied Southeast Asia, where both old elites and
23S Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere An Inquiry into
a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 236-50.
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rising nationalists learned about participatory (mass) politics and the art of
propaganda through print and oral media.24 In Malaya, propaganda in
service to the Japanese war effort and directed against the British colonial
mentality was incessant in public life—poster and essay competitions on
“The Birth of the New Malaya” and “The Co-Prosperity Sphere,” slogans,
songs, and films hammered home the message “Asia for the Asians.”25 As
in Indonesia, Malay nationalists were employed in propaganda
departments and at newspapers, which were used for essentially the same
purpose. Among the prominent Malay political and literary figures so
employed were Ahmad Boestamam at Berita Perak and the Ipoh
propaganda department, A. Samad Ahmad at Perubuhan Baharu (the
ocupation name for Majtis) and as a radio announcer, and Ishak bin Haji
Muhammad at Berita Malai and Semangat Asia.26
The British had also been learning to use propaganda during the war
and they applied the lessons learned to their reoccupation of Malaya,
where they competed most immediately (and unsuccessfully) with rival
245, for example, Anthony Reid, The Blood of the People: Reiolution and the End of
Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979), 134-
36, on the propaganda value for Sumafran nationalists of Japan’s promise of “independence
In the future”; and Benedict Anderson, “Japan: ‘The Light of Asia,” in Southeast Asia in
World War Ii Four Essays, ed Josef Silverstein (New Haven Yale University Southeast
Asia Studies, 1966), 21, on “the dramatization of politics, the creation of massive rituals of
state, the propagation of ‘Ideological’ formulas of vague but patriotic content” m Java
25BMA/ADM 9/1; Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and Social
Conflict During and After the Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 1942—1946 (Singapore:
Singapore University Press, 1983), 39, Chin Kee Onn, Malaya Upside Down (1946 Reprint,
Singapore: Federal PublicatIons, 1976), 139.
26William R Roff, introduction to Carving rhe Path to the Summit, by Ahmad Boestamam,
trans. William R. Roff (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1979), xv; Samad Ahmad,
Sejambak Kenangan, 168-70, Abdul Latiff Abdul Bakar, Ishak Hap Muhammad (Kuala
Lumpur: UniverslU Malaya Press, 1977), 27-30.
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propaganda of the Malayan Communist Party.27 By 1945, propaganda—
inundating a population with political messages in various media in an
effort to construct a political consensus—had become not a singular
method, but a universal medium of political expression, utilized by every
political group to construct and mobilize public opinion For example,
Indian nationalists in Singapore circulated pamphlets, leaflets, and
photographs of the Japanese-sponsored Indian National Army’s war
memorial, considered subversive material by the British authorities.28 The
MCP employed trained orators in Penang.29 Indonesians imported
Republican propaganda from Sumatra whith was circulated by branches of
the Pembantu Indonesia Merdeka (Aid Free Indonesia) all over Malaya.
Indonesian propaganda was especially directed at schools, and in some
areas Malay schoolchildren were heard singing the Indonesian anthem on
their way to the classroom.30
Despite this prevalence of propaganda and new thinking in the
Colonial Office about government’s communication with colonial peoples,
there was little substantive publicity about the Malayan Union among the
various communities of Malaya before the release of the Government’s
White Paper on 22 January 1946.31 Despite Mountbatten’s repeated requests
for such publicity,32 the Colonial Office cautiously declined, hoping to
275
“Guidance on the duties of a Public Relations Officer in the Colonies, for the
Information of British West Indian Governments,” CO 875/5/15, and G L Edwett, “Colonial
Propaganda 11—Aims and Policy,” CO 875/11/1,
28R No.61 (1945). WO 203/2076.
29ij N. 60(1945). WO 203/2076.
30BMA ADM 9/16, P1J No 6(1946), No 7(1946), No 11(1946), No 16(1946), and
Supplement to No.10 (Indonesian Influences in Malaya, 1947),
31James de V. Allen, The Malayan Union (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian
StudIes, 1967), 14
32Mountbatten argued that the Chinese resistance fighters, whose cooperation he was
enlisting in the reoccupation, could well consider the British to be in their debt and ask for
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safeguard the secret treaty negotiations with the Sultans. An important
attitude was implicit in this approach. Although the Malayan Union
would abandon the prewar “pro-Malay” policy vis-à-vis the Chinese, the
British were inclined to remain “pro-aristocrat” when dealing with the
Malays. Unlike the other communities, in which publicity was expected to
play a role in shaping political attitudes, Malays were assumed to remain
basically apolitical, despite war and occupation. There was never a full-
scale Malayan Union publicity campaign aimed at the Malay population.
Instead, surprised by the level of opposition being organized by the Malay
community, British officials tried to turn opinion in their favor through
selective appeals to those who had worked with them before the war. One
such appeal Was a Malay Newsletter, dated february 10, 1946, over the
signature of Chief Civil Affairs Officer H.R. Hone. The two-page “personal
letter” was specifically designed to address Malay opposition to the January
White Paper and was distributed to about 4,000 “leading Malays.”33 It is
clear from the newsletter that the British hoped the Malay leaders would
continue acting as intermediaries with the Malay masses:
I know that you will continue to assist me by seeing that as far
as possible your people are told the truth and kept informed
of what is being done for them... Later on we hope radio sets
will be available so that people can hear the daily news in
Malay. Until then I know I can count on your co-operation in
explaining matters to the people.34
an equality of status that Chinese had not enjoyed in prewar Malaya, exactly what the
Colonial Office was planning to grant. To release details of the postwar policy after the
Chinese started making their demands, he argued, would be to appear to be granting
concessions. To publicize the plans early would give the Chinese a “concrete” reason to fight
for the British return. See Cheah, Red Star, 154-56.
33BMA PR 1/8.
“Malay Newsletter No. 2.” BMA ADM 8/64.
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The newsletter addressed the ill will and fear British policy had evoked by
reminding the recipients of their “experience of British fair dealings in the
past” and by appealing to the principles of modernity and democracy:
no longer will there be different laws and different taxes in
each State but slowly and by degrees the laws of Malaya will be
the same throughout the country; all the States being united
into a Malayan Union. There will be one central government
consisting of a Governor with an Executive and a Legislative
Council. This is necessary to give the country strength
through unity and is in accordance with the development of
all countries in the modern world.
In each State, however, there will continue to be a local
State Council which will have certain administrative and
legislative powers delegated to it by the Central Authority for
purposes of local Government. This is necessary in order that
the people may take a full share in their administration and it
is also in accordance with sound democratic principles.35
The overall message of the newsletter was that the Malayan Union held
nothing but advantages for the Malay community. There was some dissent
from within the Civil Affairs staff over the wisdom of this approach. One,
Civil Affairs Officer, reporting on requested feedback to the newsletter, said
that he and his local informants found it too “rose-tinted.” He felt it would
be wiser to admit the loss of privileges, but to call it a sacrifice for progress,
a chaflenge to Malays to “exert themselves.” Instead of simply extolling the
benefits of the British presence, he would have pointed out that British
protection couldn’t last forever, that “neither world opinion, British policy
nor the temper of the peoples of Asia will permit it.” Ir this view, “the
Malays will have to stand on their own feet in a hard world eventually”; it
351b1d.
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would be better to start learning now, while the British were present to
ensure “fair play.”36
The Malayan Union Newsletter was seriously out of synch with
Malay public discourse, right down to the assumptions it made about
Malay leadership. H the British were at first complacent about the
relationship of the Malay masses to the traditional elite, the conservative
politicians were not. When UMNO was established in June 1946, two
departments were set up immediately to fight the Malayan Union.37 One
of them was a propaganda department, aimed as much at unifying Malay
opinion against the Union as at making representations on the
international stage.38 But UMNO’s member associations engaged in
propaganda much before this, mobilizing peasants across the country to
rally, march, and wear mourning to mark the Union’s inauguration.39
UMNO’s political opponents were just as active and more tenacious.
In December 1945, the MNP began sending speakers on propaganda
missions around the country.4° In July 1946, there were reported to be
MNP speakers in every Malay state calling for independence for Malaya in
association with free Indonesia.41 In 1947, the British particularly noted
MNP propaganda activity in the schools. This was also true of the MNP’s
Letter from J. Gullick, C.A,O., Seremban and Jelebu, to S.C.A.O., Seremban, 9 March 1946.
BMA ADM 8/64.
37lshak bin Tadin, “Dato Onn and Malay Nationalism 1946-51,” Journal of Southeast Asian
History 1 (March 1960), 65-66.
38For the latter, note that demonstrators held banners with messages in both English and
Malay.
39Persetiaan Melayu of Kelantan, for example, had a propaganda section by February 1946.
British Intelligence reports attributed peasant mobitizabon and political action to
propaganda, and opined peevishly that the uneducated had no idea why they were
wearing mourning. BMA ADM 9/16; PU No.1 (1946).
WIR No.62 (1945). WO 203/2076.
41pjj No.7(1946).
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more thifitant affiliate, API fAngkatan Pernuda Insaf, Generation of Aware
Youth, to be discussed further below). A large number of API members
were Malay schoolteachers who were spreading propaganda in villages and
rural schools.42 In urban areas, political messages and desired outcomes
were often dramatized as entertainment, The Sri Nooran Opera Company
staged the play “Berjuang” (Struggle) at a Kuala Lumpur amusement park
to raise money for API. The play, directed by Ahmad Boestamam, depicted
battles between Dutch and Indonesian soldiers. Another play staged in
Selangor, “Chinta Sajati” (True Love), showed united Malay, Indian, and
Chinese youth working for an end to British rule in Malaya.43 British
intelligence observed in 1947 that Malay nationalist propaganda was
repetitive, incessant, and successful.44
The eiichrnert of political discourse through new modes of
expression did not, however, displace newspapers as the most powerful
avenue of communication among the literate and even with the mass of
Malay society. This was partially because newspapers had a singular ability
to bring authoritative news and opinion-making commentary from the
centers of political activity to isolated rural areas. The colonial government
itself helped overcome delays in communication and transportation by
distributing vernacular newspapers to post offices around the country in
the early days of the reoccupation.45 Later, to help compensate for the
wartime depletion of textbooks, “newspapers were prcwided in many
42P1J No.2 (1947), No. 13 (1947).
43P1J No. 16 (1946), No. 2 (1947).
44P1J No.8(1947). It was often noted, however, that communist propaganda, even when
printed in Jawi (modified Arabic script), was quite unsuccessful with Malaya. Co
273/675/50822/56/2; PU No.3(1946), No.21(1947).
45The aim was to provide one newspaper for every five hundred people The papers
distributed were Majtis, Malaya Tribune, Mm Sheng Pau, and Tamil Nesan. BMA PR 2/2.
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schools,” and according to the 1946 Annual Report on Education, “were
particularly in demand by parents who have always been free to make use
of school libraries.”46 As in the schools before textbooks were replenished,
so in rural villages, there was no other reading material of an educational
or entertaining nature besides the papers. When one newspaper would
reach a village tea stall or coffee shop, it was perused by all who could read
and was read aloud to those who could not. Because the nature of the
times made national politics the concern of all Malays, newspaper articles
became topics of discussion for days or weeks.47
Although no one newspaper achieved truly national circulation,
each of the three major dailies was read beyond its city of publication.
Utusan Melayu, published in Singapore, was sent with the English Straits
Times to Kuala Lumpur, where it enjoyed a circulation rivaling that of
Majtis.48 Majlis itself, though past the peak of its influence of the 1930s,
had the advantage of being the Malay newspaper chosen for post office
distribution and, as the unofficial organ of UMNO through the late 1940s,
was probably the paper which most often found its way into school
libraries. Warta Negara, from Penang, had access to the large population of
the neighboring Malay state of Kedah. Importantly, all three, as well as the
smaller dailies and organs of the MNP1 reported events from all over the
peninsula, creating a national community for news consumption. When
the British emissary Sir Harold MacMichael arrived to conclude new
46MU 3465/47. The 1946 estimates for the Education Department also included $1,000 to
purchase Malay newspapers and periodicals for the Sultan Idzis Training College, then the
only secondary Malay-medium school in British Malaya. BMA PIN 406/52.
47lnterview with A. Samad lsmall (October 23, 1989), who was an editor of Utusun Melayu
at the time I am also grateful to Firdaus Hap Abdullah, a scholar of the period, who
shared his personal reminiscences on this topic
48intervlew with A. Samad Ismall.
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treaties with the Malay sultans, Utusan Melayu wrote that “the Malays will
be asked by Sir Harold to give their opinion,” inviting that national
community to become political.49 And as discussed in the previous
chapter, the newspapers played a crucial role in reconceptualizing the
Malay rulers in a pan-Malay setting. Clearly, newspaper journalism
continued its prewar role of building a national identity. And the
proliferation of radical papers began to articulate a political discourse
unrestricted by traditionalism.
Nevertheless, Malay newspaper discourse in the late 1940s held an
inherent advantage for conservatives seeking to preserve a privileged
place in the new national politics. This was because of the way in which a
still largely illiterate and residually oral society related to the written word,
Amin Sweeney’s study on orality and literacy in the Malay world suggests
important ways to understand how newspaper editorials on political
matters were apprehended by the Malay public in the 1940s. Sweeney
argues that societies are not simply oral or literate, but exhibit “a whole
range of tendencies,” and that “not everything that appears in print reflects
interiorization of print-based thought.”5° He points as well to the
importance of literary consumption along with composition. Scholars
focusing on the changes which occur when literature can be written and
read—freedom from memorization, formula, and established themes—
have assumed that the new reading public demands new themes. Sweeney
shows how the Malay case belies that assumption by demonstrating the
49utusan Melayu, 16 October 1945, cited In Ishak, “Dato Onn,” p. 58.
50Amin Sweeney, A Full Hearing. Oratity and Literacy in the Malay Wortd (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1987), 144.
255
continuing oral orientation of much modern written composition and its
correspondingly aural (as opposed to visual) consumption:
In the West, the evolution from the oral/aural cultures of the
ancient world to the visualist, type-centered, and electronic
cultures of modernity spread out over many centuries. In
many Third World countries a similar development has been
compressed into little more than a hundred years. In the
Malay world, the study of the way new media interact with
the old is particularly complex, and the fairly recent
introduction of typographic and electronic technologies has
caused radical reorganizations of verbalization and thought.
Even so, hardly surprisingly, there remains a strong oral
orientation An understandmg of the extent and significance
of this orality makes it possible to explain much in modern
Malaysian and Indonesian society that may appear strange
and exotic or simply dull to the Western observer, not merely
in the realm of “literature4” but also in other areas of
communications such as news broadcasts, political speeches,
propaganda, television dramas, university lectures, and their
impact upon their audiences.51
Thus even written literature—in this case, newspaper editorials—may be
composed with an oral orientation and consumed in such a fashion as
well. Court-produced manuscripts were consumed aurally in the Malay
world as early as the seventh century AD, a situation in which “literacy
was not a prerequisite for experiencing the written word.”52 In the 1940s,
we know that many, if not most, Malays listened to rather than read the
newspapers. The connection between these two experiences of written
literature can be seen in the function and style of the works, both of which
have political ramifications.
Court literature (hikayat) had a prescriptive function, aiming
through genealogy to legitimize a ruling family and through narrative to
IbId., 14.
52Th1d., 73.
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reinforce dominant ideas governing relations between ruling and subject
classes. According to Sweeney, the way this literature was consumed
reinforced the prescriptive mode, as “the corn unal (aural) consumption
of oral and written composition tended to limit its content to what was
acceptable to the community as a whole and/or to those in a position of
power!’53 The style of hikayaK-writing was followed by Malay newspapers
up until about 1907, when English punctuation and phraseology began to
appear The emergence of the editorial as a regular and prominent feature
in Malay newspapers, in about 1930, coincided with marked English-
language influence on sentence structure and increased clarity of
expression54 But the prescriptive function of written composition was
maintained, in many cases in the short stories which appeared in all Malay
newspapers warning about the Chinese and other, internal, threats to
Malay society.55 By the late 1940s, with politics a newly sanctioned activity
and mobilization essential, editorialists become masters of exhortation,
prescribing to Malays how they should be political. Majtis editorials in the
latter half of 1946, for example, called on Malays many times to donate
money to UMNO and support Malay businesses, reminded them to boycott
Malayan Union advisory councils, admonished parents to keep their
children in school, and asked for donations for the poor. Aside from these
special appeals were the everyday calls to support Ulvfl’lO’s policy on the
Malayan Union, occasionally accompanied by Onn’s draconian warning
531b1d., 5-6.
54Mohd, Taib bin Osman, The Language of the Editorials in Malay Vernacular Newspapers
Uy to 1941 (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1966), 30-39.
5’ZulkIpIi, Warta Malaya, 101.
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that “any Malay person who participates in the Malayan Union will not be
adcnowledged as a Malay.”56
The style of newspaper editorials also reveals certain continuities
with older, aurally consumed writings, especially in length, repetition, and
formula. Editorials were usually laid out on the page in a fashion similar
to that of the English papers, that is, in a column running the length of the
page, usually on page two. Unlike the Straits Times, however, which ran
seven columns on a page, Malay papers often ran only two, so that one
column consumed half a page. Then, too, editorials quite often ran into the
second column and editorial topics were sometimes spread out over two or
three days. Sweeney tells us that in manuscript culture, “the length of
telling rather than the content of what is told... underlines the relative
importance of an event or character” and that it is only the transition to
visual consumption that shrinks the copiousness of traditional
composition.57 Decorous repetition of one or two main points can well be
imagined to have been successful in tea stall readings of editorials.58
*
Repetition of one topic over several days’ editorials also had a practical
function. Perhaps only one out of a week’s run of a newspapers might
reach a particular village. An important message would need to be
repeated to be sure it was properly disseminated.
Majtis, 7 August 1946.
57Sweeney, A Full Hawing, 239.
58A recent work presents the Majlis editorials of October 1945-January 1948 (the BMA and
Malayan Union periods) to modem Malay readers. It is highly indicative of the changing
style of written Malay that the editorials are summarized, rather than reproduced in their
original words and length. The main gist of each editorial is usually captured in one or two
short paragraphs. Zakiah Hanum, Tercabarnya Maruab Bangsa: Satu Himpunan
Pemikiran Wartawan Akhbar Majtis 19454948 (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Lajmeidakh,
1987).
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Sweeney further reminds us that theilliterate and residually oral
tend to think in formulas, using large schematic “chunks” of received
knowledge over and over where the literate person engages in analytical
thought. He has observed in this regard that the governments of Malaysia
and Indonesia have exploited this tendency “by deliberately creating
formulas, in the form of slogans, mottoes, and catchphrases for adoption by
the masses. It might be said that the slogan has become the new proverb.”59
In fact, it was during the anti-Malayan Union campaign that proverbs
themselves first became slogans. The most famous was Matayu takkan
hitang di dunia (Malays will not vanish from the earth), updated from the
battlecry of Melaka-era warrior Hang Tuah into a modern political slogan.
This sloganizing of Hang Tuah utilized tradition as an emotive
reinforcement for UMNO’s anti-Malayan Union policy. Other formulary
features of expression also confirmed received wisdom and worked against
the development of new political thinking. The typing and stereotyping
common to schematic formulation were apparent in the frequent
references to “Si Ah Chong” (standing in for the Chinese) and “Si
Ramasamy” (for the Indians) in Maflis. Such stereotyping, always
appearing in negative contexts, helped make the MNP’s sporadic efforts at
inter-ethnic alliance a priori suspect endeavors.
I am suggesting here that the didactic or prescriptive function of
newspapers, the persistence of formulary features of expression, and the
way aural consumption evoked the prescriptive mode of traditional
manuscript culture translated into an advantage for political conservatism.
The experience of listening to newspaper editorials—especially hearing
59Sweeney, A full Hearing, 14142, 98.
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about Dato X or Raja Y60—held an inherent bias towards conventional and
conservative political messages. Further, since the bureaucratic elite had
successfully transformed itself into something purporting to represent
progressive traditionalism, its political messages, transmitted in
newspapers that were supported, not suppressed, by the colonial
government, had much more credibility than those of younger, mostly
non-aristocratic nationalists, who could easily be dismissed as
collaborationist (vis-à-vis the Japanese) or communist.
One last note on literacy and the consumption of newspapers
concerns the use of jawi (modified Arabic script) and rumi (romanized
script). In the Netherlands East Indies, the universality of Malay as an
administrative language led to the predominance of the romardzed
version. The situation on the peninsula was quite different. In the English
language-administered Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States,
Malay was quite marginal and its romanization was of no official concern
to the British. In the Unfederated States, Malay was the language of state
and it was here as well that the elite had the power to preserve traditional
forms, like the use of jawi. In neither case were the British hostile to the
retention of jawi, concerned as they were with preservation, though they
did introduce rumi, which then became an option for Malays. Education
also played a role in preserving jawi, as the colonial government’s
indifferent attitude toward secular Malay education before the war had left
a large realm for religious education, which centered around Arabic and
Malay in the jawi script. In the 1930s and 1940s, then, most literate Malays
were literate in jawi only, and the use of rumi was even controversial.
60Arlstocraffc and royal titles.
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Language organizations and newspapers in the 1930s largely favored the
retention of jawi for purposes of purity and quality of language (essentially
preferring to borrow from Arabic rather than English), and proponents of
rumi were sometimes called “traitors” to the Malay race.61
By the late 1940s, however, the tide was beginning to turn. As
Sweeney points out, there was “a limit beyond which Jawi could not keep
pace with the development of modern Malay.’62 There was, too, a general
momentum favoring progress, which proponents of rumi successfully
tapped.63 By 1947, Majatlah Guru, the influential magazine of the Malay
teachers association, which was itself published in jawi, ran an article
entitled, “Jawi Script and Rumi Script are the Malays’ Scripts.”64 Finally,
the writers’ organization Angkatan Sasterawan ‘50 (1950 Literary
Generation) pronounced a few years later in favor of rumi, assuring
Malays that choosing the romanized script for its many advantages did not
mean abandoning Islam.65 Nevertheless, rumi readership in the late 1940s
was very small and publication in jawi was still the way to reach the
greatest number of readers. It is striking then that conservative
61ZuIkipIi, Warta Malaya, 99.
62Sweeney, A Full Hearing, 86.
63A letter from a reader In Penang to Seruan Rakyat, a rum! paper, extolled the progress
made by Turkey under the influence of Kamal Ataturk, who switched to a romanized script.
Indonesia was cited as well, as a place where everyone—Europeans, Chinese, Arabs, and
Indians—could read Malay newspapers and magazines. To those Malays who wondered if
they really wanted the other races to read and know their thoughts, the letter writer
answered, “They must! tMeatil] Misunderstanding always leads to social discord.” Seruan
Rakyat, 8 November 1945. A Sumatran reader of Kenchana, a rum! monthly published in
Singapore, praised the journal’s script, saying that it helped Indonesians and the Malay
world In general to follow the struggle of Malays to achieve independence. Kenchana, no.5
(May 1947).
b4Mgjaltah Guru, no. 3 (June 1947).
65”Memorandum Mengenai Tulisan Rumi untuk Bahasa Melayu” (March 1954) in
Memoranda Kumpulan Tulisan Angkatan Sasterawan 50 Dengan lAmpiran Rumusan Kongres
Bahasa dan Persuratan Metayu Ketiga (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1962), 14-
30.
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publications consistently utilized jaui, while progressive newspapers and
journals were often printed in rumi. The bureaucratic elite which formed
the core membership of UMNO were the Malays most likely to know
English, and party documents show them to have been comfortable in both
jawi and rumL66 Yet the publications associated with the conservative
party showed political acuity in making themselves accessible to the
greatest number of Malay readers. The more progressive periodicals which
published in rumi, Sëruan Rakyat and Kenchana, for example, lImited
their readership among peninsular Malays while seeking, in the case of the
latter, to bridge a Malay and Sumatran audience.
A Modern Hero: Oiin bin Jaafar as national leader
The bureaucratic elite and its contribution to the progress of the Malays in
the modern world had been a subject of public discourse before the war. It
was articulated as a problem of leadership and was discussed by the elite
itself in the context of the Malay associations established in the late 1930s.
According to the President of the Selangor Malay Association, “We all lack
leaders who can lead us to national salvation. It is with the view to seeking
leaders for the future that this Association is founded today.”67 In a
manner consistent with the goals and experience of this elite, higher
education in English was seen as the medium through which such
leadership would emerge. After the war, the terms of this discourse in the
conservative press had not changed much, though now the problem was
Party documents were typed In rumi. Letters from private Individuals to UMNO officials
were written in English, rum:, and jaw: Minutes on the correspondence were written in rumt
and English. See examples in UMNO SC 12/1946 and 74/1946.
67Tengku Ismall, Inaugural speech of Selangor Malay Association, Majtis, 23 November
1938, cited in Radin Soenamo, “Malay Nationalism 19(10-1945” lournal of Southeast Asian
History 1, 1 (1960): 25.
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more urgent. The lack of “true leaders” was blamed for the Malays’
restricted access to the prosperity of the country.68 Editorials called for the
well-educated, especially government servants, not to shrink from duty to
their country and not to be afraid to get involved in politics, arguing that if
they did not the future of the Malays would be grim.69 Those who were
highly placed in society came in for particular censure. Mohammad Yunus
Hamidi, editor of Majtis and secretary of the Selangor Malay Association,
was quoted in Seruan Rakyat attributing the backwardness of the Malays to
the “unworthiness” of their leaders, from penghutus to sultans.7° As the
conservative prewar associations re-established themselves, however, and
the anti-Malayan Union campaign progressed, there were positive
examples to extol and specific courses of action to recommend, Malays
were urged to unite behind the Malay Congress, soon to become UMNO,
and those who risked “their ranks, their posts and even their lives” to
oppose the colonial power were praised as worthy national leaders.71
Dato Onn bin Jaafar was quickly singled out for particular mention.
From the time he established his Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjung Johor
(Peninsular Malay Movement of Johor) in January 1946, Onn was hailed as
a leader of extraordinary promise:
[The Movement’s] promoter is the national leader long
awaited by the public... He is the leader the nation hoped has
for.72
Onn had earlier made a name for himself defusing Ma’ay-Chinese
tensions in the Batu Pahat region of Johor where he was District Officer in
68Letter to Seruan Rakyat, 8 January 1946.
69j1is, 6 April 1946.
7OS Rakyat, 18 December 1945.
7lM4is, 3 May and 30 May 1946.
72$t&i,i Rakyat, 10 January 1946.
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1945. In that situation he had managed to rein in, while acknowledging the
influence of, a local religious cult leader who was preparing to launch an
armed attack on a Chinese town.73 In announcing his new movement,
Onn showed similar attention to new forces arising in Malay society, while
still bowing in the direction of traditional authority:
With the permission of the Malay chiefs in the state of Johor,
I have formed a new movement which will include within it
the entire Malay public in order to guard the rights, mterests,
and safety of the Malays. This movement was started in the
villages; it is managed by village people in the interests of
village people themselves.74
The “rise” of Dato Onn as the leader of the anti-Maiayan Union
campaign and as founder and first president of UMNO is dealt with in
virtually every account of this period; I will not repeat the details hereY5
What needs to be extracted from these narratives are the two ways Onn’s
leadership helped shape national political practice. The first was his pivotal
role in the re-invention of the rulers, discussed in the previous chapter.
Onn was perhaps uniquely qualified to effect this transformation, given his
prewar experience as both intimate and opponent of Sultan Ibrahim of
Johor. Onn’s second influence, of interest here, was his creation, by
example, of a new kind of leadership. Onn was the first national leader; he
transcended state boundaries, construded political opinion, and connected
with Malays throughout the peninsula. He did this largely on the strength
73cheah, Red Star, 225-230.
74Seruan Rakyat, 10 January 1946.
75The Engtlsh accounts include Allen, Matayan Union, and A,J. Stockwell, British Poticy
and Malay Politics During the Malayan Union Experiment, 1945-46 (Kuala Lumpur:
Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Monograph No. 8, 1979). In Malay, accounts
written by participants include Ibrahim Mahmood, Sejarah ?erjuangan Bangsa Metayu
(Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1981) and Mohammad Yunus Hamidi, Sejarah Pergerakan
Politik Melayu Semenanjung.
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of oration and his willingness to manipulate the mechanisms of mass
politics.
Although the !vINP had speakers touring the states from December
1945, it was the oration of Dato Onn which sent a spark throughout the
country, even before he left Johor. The power of this new type of
leadership is reflected strongly in the recollection of Onn’s political
opponent, Abmad Boestamam, who saw Onn’s picture and news about
him constantly in the conservative press:
According to those papers, he held public political meetings,
presented the political organization which he headed,
explained its aims and objectives, called the Malay
community together, and much more.
Datuk Onn could speak for hours and hours, and his speeches
were very spirited, according to reports. He was very good at
lifting the spirits of those listening to him talk. The public
would be spellbound where they sat listening to his speech,
not wanting to leave from beginning to end.
The name of Datuk Onn, it was further reported, was like a
magnet to the public. When it was announced that he would
speak at a public meeting, it was certain that people would
throng to hear him. Thousands of them, Because of this, he
was said rarely to have spoken in front of a crowd numbering
less than a thousand people...
Datuk Onn’s speeches, which never lasted less than one hour,
always drew thunderous applause from the audience.76
Based on these reports, Boestamam wanted to hear Onn speak, but Johor
was far from Perak and he had his own responsibilities, as an MNP officer.
He finally heard Onn speak at the Malay Congress in early March, to which
the MNP sent a delegation. Boestamam’s assessment makes it dear that
Onn did not disappoint:
Datuk Onn, 1041.
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He was not a lecturer... who put his audience to sleep...
Neither was he simply one who ignited the spirit, an agitator
who made the blood boil without presenting any new
information. On the contrary, lecturer and agitator were both
united within him as an orator. That was what was
extraordinary about him.77
As Boestamam describes it, It was Onn’s knowledge as much as his
charisma which contributed to the powerful consensus he was able to build
in those few days, knowledge which he clearly obtained working and
socializing at the top of colonial society:
He could talk for a long time without boring Ms listeners.
And that is what he did throughout the assembly, whenever
he had the opportunity. He talked very knowledgeably, giving
facts and evidence.
If a oubt arose among the representatives regarding the
political situation at that time, the system of government
under colonialism, or other such matters, he stepped forward
with an explanation. And about those things he indeed knew
everything.
In short, let me say that from the time the assembly began he
was already regarded as a Malay hero. As the assembly
progressed, hi stature rose further. As a result, the congress,
or at least a large number of the representatives, quickly fell
under his influence and were henceforth controlled by him.78
Two things are notable about the leadership style evolving here.
First is the consensus Onn was able to create on the strength of his
character and, increasingly, on the simple fact of his leadership. His
unanimous election to the presidency of the Congress, and later UMNO,
set a precedent in modern Malay politics for the degree of consensus a
lea4er could demand. His ability to enforce consensus enabled Onn to
shape UMNO, in the following years, into a direct membership party over
77lbid., 18.
78JbId., 18-19.
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the opposition of several member organizations which strove to retain
their distinctive voicesY9 Once completed, this change in turn structurally
strengthened the party executive. Onn eventually pushed too far in trying
to make UMNO accept non-Malay members, a conflict which ended Ms
association with the party (and his political influence) in 1951. But his style
of consensus-building survived his fall, leaving power and decision-
making in UMNO highiy centralized. Onn’s successor, Tunku Abdul
Rahman, the first Malaysian prime minister (1957-1970), exercised power
with no interference from UMNO’s General Assembly, which was required
to give a vote of confidence to all the executive’s past and future actions.80
This style of leadership has been exhibited by all subsequent UMNO
executives. The current prime minister, though the first non-aristocratic
Malay to lead UMNO and the country, has carried the centralization of
power to new heights by weakening all rival institutions of government—
legislative, judicial, and monarchical.
The second innovation Cnn pioneered was updating the way
aristocratic leadership interacted with the rakyat, making bureaucrats into
politicians. This he did by going on speaking tours throughout the country
beginning in June 1946. Cnn attended receptions along the way, “stressing
his now well known and publicised views.”81 Majtis both reported Onn’s
tours and editorialized about how such visits gave Onn an opportunity to
UMNO began life as an umbrella organization to which about thirty-seven local
organizations belonged. In 1947 the local organizations amalgamated so there would be only
one UMNO affiliate in each state, but they were still autonomous, it was not until 1949 that
UMNO became a direct membership political party with subordinate state branches.
Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics, 118-21.
80John Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of the United Malays National
Organization and Party Islam (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1980), 173.
81P1J No.5 (1946).
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speak with the people and awaken their spirit of struggle. It was also an
opportunity, Majlis continued, for Onn to pass on important information
about national politics.82 When Maftis predicted that many more such
invitations would come Onn’s way, the newspaper was in essence asking
Malay associations to invite Onn to visit. The associations took the hint. In
1947, Onn had more invitations than he could handle, and other senior
UMNO officials had to go to local ceremonies in his stead.83 On the state
level, politically-minded aristocrats began to make propaganda tours in
emulation of the popular UMNO president.84 This new style of ruler-ruled
interaction was not, however, embraced by all aristocratic leaders. And
those who did so understood that they were trying to master the new
medium in direct competition with the MN]?. UMNO officials paid careful
attention to the impact of propaganda tours by Dr. Burhanuddin, Ahmad
Boestamam, Ishak Haji Mohammad, and other nationalist leaders.85
As time went on, Onn’s tours became important more as visual
representations of the new Malay leadership and less as opportunities for
oratory. The schedule for the last two weeks of April 1947 included eleven
major towns and the villages in between, but the number of speeches was
diminishing. In the last third of the tour, “there will be only one or two big
gathering[s] where a speech is expected. The rest is in the nature of personal
visits and picnics only to give the people a chance to see their leader.”
Urging Onn to make the tour, Acting Secretary-General, UMNO, Zainal
Abidin bin Haji Abas wrote:
S2jyfgjjf 23 October 1946.
UMNO SC 10/46 (Outstation Visits).
84For example, Raja Bendahara of Perak went to the Pant area in April 1947, urging
Malays there not to get mixed up In the MNP. P13 No.5 (1947).
UMNO SC 10/46.
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The important thing is that the people want to see you—not
necessarily to hear you. They have read all you have said but
they have not seen you.86
This emphasis on the visual can also be seen in the large numbers of
photographs of Onn sold in Johor87 It suggests that the newly politicized
traditional leadership had appropriated a function the rulers had
performed under colonialism. It was now politicians—especially the
popular Onn—who toured the country, symbolically connecting ruler with
ruled and simultaneously mapping out the realm—now Tanah Melayu,
not the individual Malay states
How did this transcendence of the Malay state (negeri) come about?
It is commonly held that Malay peasants had to overcome state-based
loyalties (with some difficulty) in the late colonial period in order to
progress to nationalism. Perhaps this has been overstated, if state-based
loyalties were so strong, Onn bin Jaafar, previously identified only with
Johor and Singapore, would not have been so easily accepted as a national
leader. The puzzle may be lessened if we recall the colonial inspiration
behind the traditionalistic “ideal” Malay state of the twentieth century and
disentangle state identity from the question of leadership.
It was the bureaucratic class which owed its continued stature and
influence to the Malay state and this class, rather than the newly literate or
the peasants, who were likely to identify and organize at the state level.
This supposition is, in fact, borne out by the pattern of political
organization of the 1930s and 1940s. Aristocrats established state-based
Malay organizations in the 1930s and reestablished them as openly political
8ftIMNO SC 10/46.
87pij No. 3 (1947).
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organizations in the same format in 1946. The only way this class could
conceive of a national organization at first was as an umbrella group like
UMNO, which combined but did not dissolve its constituent member
organizations. In contrast, both before and after World War U, non-
aristocrat-led organizations like the KMM and the MNP were formed at
the national, pan-Malay level. Only then were state branches formed, Even
earlier, from the days of At-Imam, reformist ideas were articulated in a
geographically inclusive, pan-Malay format.
A reexamination of the loyalty owed to Malay leadership similarly
downgrades the importance of the negeri. Loyalty was ideally owed to the
ruler, and kerafaan referred to the condition of having a ruler, not to a
government or a place. An effective ruler could create in a state the
circumstances conducive to good living. This is how Abu Bakar of Johor
was remembered: despite his usurpation of the sultanate, for which fellow
monarchs despised him, the inhabitants of Johor remembered with pride
that he created an independent Islamic State in which Europeans were held
to an advisory role.88 There is no other way to explain why a recent
Javanese immigrant, for example, would be loyal to Johor. The colonial
“restoration” of ideal Malay states and the enhanced visibility of rulers in
their states may have served to strengthen the link between loyalty to ruler
and identification with place.89 But the visible decline in status and efficacy
which the rulers suffered during the occupation may then have uncoupled
this pairing of loyalty and identification. After the debacle of the
88Kenelm O.L Burridge, “Racial Relations in Johore,” Australian Journal of Politics and
History 2,2 (1957) 159
89The most parochial and least well-traveled Malay subjects would have had no
knowledge of the increasing uniformity of British Malaya and might easily have assumed
the uniqueness of their ruler and state.
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MacMichael treaties and thanke to the intervention of Pato C)nri, one
could still be loyal to one’s ruler, but choose to identify with a more
effective and progressive polity and leadership than that represented by the
ruler in his state In the prevailing nationalist climate of postwar Asia,
there is no reason at all why a Johor leader, purporting to represent “the
Malays/’ should not become wildly popular. And insofar as Onn stayed
close to the rulers, whether in tension or in support, he successfully re
articulated a Malay leadership with historical resonance Though both
conservatives and radicals spoke of restoring the glory of the Malay past,
Onn succeeded in living it, a modern-day rendWon of Hang Tuah and
Hang Jebat rolled into one 90 Despite the novelty of mass politics, Onn was,
as Boestamam understood, a Malay hero.
Symbols of Nation
Prewar colonial articulations of place and authority had been premised on
the restoration of tradition. Symbols of colonial Malaya were therefore
designed to evoke a glorious past, even when they actually introduced
entirely new elements, such as the “Moorish” design of the Sultan of
Selangor’s palace and the Federal Secretariat buildings. By the late 1930s
even the addition of British iconography—such as statues of British
heroes—had long become a familiar part of the representation of British
Malaya. These last were to be found, however, in greatest number in the
Warriors from the Melaka era, Hang Tuah and Hang Jebat have become icons of blind
loyalty and murderous rebellion, respectively. In the postwar and independence era, the
traditional valorization of Tuah has sometimes been replaced by the elevation of Jebat to
the status of “national hero,” a man before his time See Kassam Ahmad, Characterizatton
in Hikayat Hang Tuah (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1966). For a
condemnation of the continuing valorization of all feudal heroes in contemporary Malaysia,
see Shaharuddin bin Maaruf, Concept of a Hero in Malay Society (Singapore and Kuala
Lumpur; Eastern Universities Press, 1984).
271
Straits Settlements and fewest in the Unfederated Malay States. The
fractured nature of colonial administration, reflecting the priorities of
indirect rule and traditionalism, militated against representations of
British Malaya per se, and thus against “Tanah Melayu” as a whole.
After this period of relative stability, the Japanese occupation
introduced a time when symbols of power and identity were much more
fluid and contested. first the Japanese, in “an attempt to erase the last
vestiges of British power in Malaya, [removed] the British Imperial coat-of-
arms and other foreign heraldic ensigns from the frontages of public
buildings and... British statues (notably that of Raffles in Singapore) from
prominent public places.”91 In addition to the symbols of Japanese culture
and power—Nippon-go, bowing, and so forth—which replaced those of
the British, new possibilities were introduced for representing Malaya as a
nation. One outlet for such representation was found in the many contests
held by the occupation government, which invited people to use new
forms—posters, essays, slogans, oratory—in order to articulate the “New
Malaya.” In such one contest held to create a memorial stamp, the winning
design showed a farmer superimposed against a map of the Malay
peninsula.92
The interest in representation of the nation did not cease with the
restoration of British colonial power. It was, in fact, reflected in the struggle
between the returning British and the newly politicized communities of
Malaya. In this aspect of political life, Malay nationalists were, not
surprisingly, more innovative than conservative elite politicians.
91chIn, Malaya Upside Down0 139.
CO 273/669/50744/7.
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Nationalists had, first of all, been thinking in pan-Malay terms for some
time and had gained valuable experience producing nationalist rhetoric
and imagery during the occupation. The conservatives, as reflected in the
name UMNO, were slower to embrace a nationalism which, in the
prevailing international climate, implied both social revolution and anti-
colonialism.
The conservatives’ relative disinterest in symbolizing the nation can
be seen in the matter of the national flag. The acted quickly after its
fouliding to define a national flag which linked Malaya to a glorious past
and also to the Indonesian republic. In proposing a national flag, Ahrnad
BoestaiTtam acknoxdvledged that every state in Malaya already ha4 a flag, but
he attributed those flags’ identities and hence their differing designs to
their belonging to the individual rulers.93 He looked askance at anyone
actually identifying anymore with those flags, smearing them with the tar
of “provincialism” and royal absolutism. To replace all those state flags
with a national flag, he argued, was both desirable for the unity of the
Malaya and easy to accomplish. A new flag did not need to be invented,
because the Malays already had a one dating from “before the year 1511,
when the Malays were still a free nation.” This flag was the Merah-Putih
(Red and White), which was also the flag of the Republic of Indonesia.94
Boestamam’s logic for adopting the Indonesian flag ran as follows: Malaya
“was not a country by herself” but “part of the Malay Archipelago along
with Java, Sumatra and many other small islands [which now] call
themselves Indonesia.” The Merah-Putih had flown over Majapahit
93Th1s paragraph is based on “Our National Flag,” in Voice of the People, 16 November
1945. Vie article also ran, in Malay, in Seruan Rakyat, 29 November 1945.
94The top half of the Merah-Putih is red, the bottom white.
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(fourteenth century Java) and wa carried by the “Revolutionist”
Diponegoro in the nineteenth century. Due to the political awakening of
the Indonesian people, the Merah-Putih had now become the national flag
of Indonesia. Boestamam backed up the greater Indonesia idea with a local
connection as well: “According to some Historians the Red and White Elag
was also the flag of Hang Tuah that great Malay hero of the Malaccan
Empire and his followers.”
Hang Tuah did indeed prove to be a much more popular
justification for adopting the Merah-Putih, even among those who agreed
with Boestamam that, historically, culturally, linguistically, and
religiously, Indonesia and Malaya were one and had been artificially
aeparated by the Dutch and the British empires.95 Others who favored “the
original white and red flag hoisted by Hang Tuah in Malacca” made no
reference at all to Indonesia.96 It quickly became accepted that the Merah
Puffh was the national flag of the Malays. Just as quickly, though, letters to
newspapers showed that Malays wanted some differentiation on their flag,
most commonly calling for a kris (dagger) or green crescent, the symbol of
Islam, to distinguish the Malays of the peninsula.97
Eventually, the question of the flag would provide an excuse for the
MNP to leave UMNO.98 At the June 1946 meeting in Ipoh (UMNO’s
second general assembly), delegates decided between four flag designs: one
had horizontal stripes of green, white, and black, representing fertility,
95Letter to Sentan Rakyat, 1 Pecember 1945,
Lefter from a Kuala Lumpur reader to Utusan Melayu, 20 October 1945 (BMA PR 3/5).
97Letter to Seruan Rakyat, 1 December 1945; letters to Utusan Matayu, 23 November and 26
November 1945. The editor pointed out, however, that Islam, as a religion, did not connote
nationality and that all Malays were not Muslim (BMA PR 3/7/Vol. 1).
981t Is clear that this issue provided a pretext for leaving what was becoming a very
uncomfortable alliance
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purity, and tin (proposed by Onn’s Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjung
Johor); the Merah-Putih (proposed by the MNP’s Ishak Haji Muhammad,
who argued that it was the Malays’ historical legacy); the Merah-Putih with
a green kris in the center, representing the Malays and Islam (proposed by
the Persatuan Melayu Daerah Sabak Bernam);and the Merah-Putih with a
green kris in a yellow circle, yellow representing the Malay rulers
(proposed by the Ikatan Setia Kampung Melayu of Kuala Lumpur).
According to a parHdpant A. Samad Abmad, the real contest was between
the first and the fourth, with the MNP’s choice having little chance of
acceptance. The fourth flag was chosen, and the MNP walked out.99
Two interesting things have been Utile noted about this episode. The
first is the striking similarity in most of the choices, the extent to which
nationalists had, over the preceding six months, defined the discourse on
the representation of Malaya. The Merah-Putih, with or without a kris, was
a powerful reminder of revolutionary Indonesia which Onn’s group had
specifically avoided. Its popularity as the basis of the Malay flag was a
victory of sorts that the nationalists discarded by choosing to withdraw
from UMNO on this pretext. The MNP allowed UMNO to appropriate, and
domesticate, the Merah-Puffh by treating the flag vote as a defeat.
The second point is also connected to UMNO’s appropriation of the
Merah-Putih. Boestamam and the letter writers cited above were
discussing a “national” flag. What was voted on in June 1946 was the
“UMNO flag,” soon to be featured at party flag-raisings all over the
country.10° Although there was certainly some blurring between national
99Samad Ahmad, Sejambak Kenangan, 23740.
100Oij’s outstation vlsts usually included a flag-raising. UMNO SC 10/46.
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and party symbols on the part of the MN? as well, the adoption of a party
flag had a distinct effect. Foregrounding the organization, rather than the
nation, alloweä conservative politicians to avoid for the moment thorny
questions of agenda. If nationalism, and by extension a national flag, had
been highlighted, UMNO would have had to answer to a standard then
being set by nationalist movements in India, Indonesia, Burma, Vietnam,
and China—the struggle for independence Instead, UMNO in effect
subordinated the nation and its aspirations to its own vision by attaching
the national symbol to the party. It was also the first manifestation of the
idea that UMNO was identical with the Malay nation. The following year,
when UMNO was working hard to counter MN? popularity, Onn would
say that the UMNO flag represented Malay unity.10’
The MNP continued to link Malaya to Indonesia through symbols
even after the flag was “lost” to UMNO. The most important way this was
done was through the celebration of Indonesian independence on the
seventeenth of each month.102 Although the anniversaries have been
construed as “any conceivable excuse to hold a mass rally”03 and
attendance fluctuated greatly, they in fact kept the example of Indonesia
constantly before the public, an implicit reproach to the pro-British, pro-
ruler conservatism of the UMNO movement. The one-year anniversary in
August 1946 was celebrated in “nearly all towns”; MNP speeches called for
Malay unity to fight for freedom and warned that the Sultans could not be
trusted.104 The MN? had other ways of keeping Indonesia before the
101P1J No. 10(1947).
102lndoneslan Independence was declared on 17 August 1945.
°3F1rdaus Haji Abdullah, Radical Malay Politics Its Origins and Early Development
(Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk PublicatIons, 1985), 92.
04PIJ No.9(1946). See also BMA ADM 9/16; PlJ No. 13(1946) and No. 14 (1947).
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public. While UMNO held an “UMNO song competition,” the MNP
simply sang “Indonesia Raya,” the Republic’s anthem, at official
occasions.105 In the final act of a performance of Malay opera in Kuala
Kangsar (Perak), actors dressed as Javanese, Balinese, Surnatran, and other
Indonesians were joined on stage by an actor and actress representing
Malaya, the opera featured Indonesian songs and urged Malays to join the
Republic.106 At a play sponsored by API (MNP’s militant youth wing) in
Singapore, the curtain was painted with a map of ] alaya, Java, Sumatra,
Bali, Sulawesi, and Borneo, with the words “Indonesia Merdeka” (Free
Indonesia) superimposed.107 The prestige of the Indonesian revolution put
UMNO under considerable pressure and Majtis did begin to acknowledge
the monthly anniversaries, but a proposal at UMNO’s March 1947 general
assembly to celebrate Indonesian independence day every year received no
Support.108
In early 1947, an event took place that seemed to prompt UMNO to
articulate a response to the MNP’s Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia)
vision of the Malay nation. In February of that year, the birthday of the
Prophet coincided with the MNP’s monthly observance of Indonesian
independence. These events were ceiebrated in Kuala Lumpur with a
procession by the !vilTP, API, and a Malay labor organization, after which
the Sultan of Selangor spoke on the Prophet and Islam.’09 From this point
on, UMNO began using the rulers much more actively to symbolize a
105I]fl.jO SC 94/46; P1J No.5 (1946).
106P1J No. 7(1947).
107PU No. 9 (1947).
108The proposal was made by the Persatuan Melayu Selangor “in order to strengthen and
[Intensify] feelings of nationalism among all Malays in Tanah Melayu.” UMNO F 7/47.
1O9PU No.2 (1947).
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politically and religiously conservative vision of the nation. In March, the
ruler of Perlis paid tribute to the Malay Association of that state, asking
Malaya to join the association which was affiliated with UMNO and
recognized by the rajas.11° In April, UMNO held a ceremony in Selangor at
which a new labor section was announced and the Sultan recognized
UMNO as “the Malay political body.”11 Within the next two months, the
Sultan of Kelantan raised the UMNO flag before a crowd of 5000, and the
Regent of Johor called on Malays to unite at a flag-raising in Mersing at
which Onn spoke darkly of upheavals in India and Indonesia.’12 In June,
UMNO concentrated on building up its youth movemert in Johor
(established in opposition to API and headed by Onn’s son Hussein), which
was to be centered on loyalty to the Sultan,’13
Thus UMNO at times appropriated symbols of the nation—as with
the flag—and disarmed them of revolutionary potential. At other times it
imply emulated nationalist innovations and infused them with
traditionalism. In neither case did the conservative formulations
overwhelm the opposition, but they were important steps in mastering the
language of nationalism and allowed UMNO more and more confidently
to assume a nationalist posture.
“°PIJ No.4 (1947).
111P1J No. 6 (1947).
112PU No 8 (1947) and P1J No 10(1947)
113P1J No 10(1947) Sultan Ibrahim returned to Johor from London for the September 1947
UMNO general assembly, at which Hussein Onn led a parade of his youth organization,
which swore allegiance to Islam, the Sultan, and UMNO Stockwell, Bnhsh Policy and
Malay Politics, 99, n. 58.
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Gathering in Defense of Bangsa Metayu: Demonstrations and Dritling
The single most important political act Malay’s were asked to perform in
the first eight months of the reoccipaffon was to participate in public
demonstrations against the Malayan Union. In fact, political meetings and
mass rallies by all the communities signaled to the British the vast changes
which had occurred in public life since 1941. When a communist rally
drew more than 15,000 people in Singapore in November 1945, intelligence
reports remarked that it was the first of its kind held in M:alaya.114 Political
meetings presented opportunities to engage in political imagery, as at the
MNP’s inaugural congress, which obsezed a three minute silence for the
Indonesian war dead, and to work out political programs and tactics.5
Participants in mass raffles heard speeches, sang anthems, and learned
slogans which often encapsulated all their knowledge about the political
events in which they took part.116
Government reaction to this new and pervasive form of political
activity, much like its relations with the press, was governed by
pragmatism, attempts to aid groups considered friendly, and harassment
and eventual suppression of radical gatherings. There was a certain
amount of inconsistency during the BMA period. Boestamam recalls easily
obtaining permission to hold a mass meeting at Jubilee Park in Ipoh to
commemorate six months of independent Indonesia.117 A month earlier, a
Pan-Malayan Congress of Indonesians was “canceled” by the BMA; the
114W0 203/2130.
115See “Malaya Political Climate” No. 6, WO 203/5660, and Firdaus, Radical Malay
?otttics, 79, for details of the congress and the eight resolutions passed.
1165ee P1J No 1 (1946), No 5 (1946), and No 11(1947) for examples of the uses of Malaya
Hak Metayu (Malaya for the Malays).
‘17Boestamam, carving the Path, 34.
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meeting was held despite the ban, and several participants were stopped
and searched on their journey home.118 In one case, a public rally became a
private meeting when the first option was disallowed by the
government,119 but organizers didn’t always heed official
pronouncements. In March, permission was requested for an MNP
congress, and British intelligence noted dryly that preparations were
proceeding unworriedly even before permission was obtained.120
Government attitudes toward anti-Malayan Union demonstrations
were markedly different before and after the inauguration of the civil
government. While the Pan-Malaya Malay Congress in early March was
allowed, permission for a procession through the streets of Kuala Lumpur
was denied. Within a month of his installation as Governor, however,
Edward Gent had concluded that the Malays should be conciliated,121 and
the local British government was thereafter allied with the Malays in
convincing the Colonial Office to change course. In late May, two British
parliamentarians were greeted warmly by Onn’s movement with friendly
mass demonstrations. The Labour member, Rees-Williams, later
cheerfully acknowledged how the local administration worked against his
own government’s policy:
The Europeans were on the side of the Malays almost to a
man. This had a curious result. British flags flew everywhere,
the very dais from which vitriolic speeches against the British
Government were made was draped with the Union Jack and
1188MA ADM 9/16.
120Th1d.
121S Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics, 87-89.
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the British Army helped to marshal the crowds and to
provide transport for the demonstrators.122
The Conservative Ml’, Captain L.D. Gammans, actually spend more time’
than Rees-Wifl;am traveling the country with Onn and meeting Malays
His progress was especially facilitated by Gent’s government1 which
allowed half-day holidays for schoolchildren and government employees
to attend rallies and provided a special plane for the Sultans of Kelantan
and Trengganu to fly to the west coast.123
Onn reciprocated the government’s good will, approving Malay
participation in the official Victory Day celebrations in June 1946, even
though the Malayan Union was not yet defeated124 And government
officials were invited to public events in connection with UMNO’s
meetings, beginning with a formal evening meal on the last day of the
March Congress.’25 Officials were also present at nationalist meetings, but
m a surveillance capacity rather than as honored guests At one MNP
meeting, the speaker openly asked the participants not to fear the note-
taking police in their midst.’26
Even before the government lent political and logistical assistance,
mobilization for demonstrations was impressive. Just as important was the
consistent coverage given these political events in Malay papers
throughout the peninsula: 3000 farmers rallying at Tanjong Karong
(Selangor), reported by Majtis, Seruan Rak/at, and Utusan Melayu;’27
122D.R. Rees-Williams, foreword to E.E. Dodd, The New Malaya (London: Fabian
Publications, 1946), 4. Emphasis added.
123MU 1212/46.
124Jj1is, 8 June 1946.
125Mohammad Yunus Hamidi, Sejarafi Pergerakan Potitik, 106-8.
126pjj No.4 (1947).
127Jjtis, 13 December 1945; Seruan Rakyat, 15 December 1945; Utusan Metayu, 18
December 1945 (BMA PR 3/7/Vol. 1).
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10,000 Kelantan Malays protesting against MacMichael, reported in the
Kuala Lumpur papers;128 3000 in Perils;129 2000 in Alor Star (Kedah;’3°
1000 at the Abu Bakar Mosque (the anti-Sultan Ibraldm meeting in
Johor);131 3500 in Rembau (Negeri Sembilan) with petitions for the
government;’32 2000 outside the palace at Kuala Kangsar (Perak) to express
loyalty to the ruler.133
The demonstrations, and the coverage, reached a peak with the visit
of Gammans and Rees-Williams, who were met by thousands of Malays at
every stop, proving to the British Government in London that “Malaya
has undoubtedly become acutely politically conscious overnight.”134 Only
days after the visit ended, Gent made known to the rulers Britain’s
willingness to deal, and, ironically, that success stopped political
momentum in its tracks. for the political process now returned to closed
room dealings between the British and the Malay ruling class; suddenly
mass politics became awkward and inconvenient for those trying to put the
Anglo-Malay relationship back together.135 The long months of
negotiation stretched from June to November, after which draft
constitutional proposals were published in December 1946. The British
then insisted on consultation with the other communities, amendments
128M3j11s 12 December 45; Seruan Rakyat, 20 December 1945.
l29gjj Rakyat, 3 January 1946 (BMA PR 3/7/Vol 1)
130Warta Negaru, 2 February 1946 (BMA PR 3/6/Pt II)
I3l,4qjjs, 4 February 1946.
132Ma11is, 7 February 1946.
133Majtis, 10 Apr11 1946.
1Gammans’ press statement In Kuala Lumpur, 25 May 1946. Cited in Stockwell, British
Policy and Malay Politics, 89, n. 12.
135UMN0 preconditions for negotiation barred any Malay representatives except those of
UMNO and the rulers. Ishak, “Dato Onn,” 65. Certain of the rulers went a step further.
After the British signaled willingness to guarantee the rulers’ positions, some of them fried
to discard mass politics and shake off UMNO’s control Stockwell, British Policy and
Malay Politics, 99.
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were considered by the original working committee, and the revised
constitutional proposals were published in July 1947. The federation
Agreement would not be signed by the rulers (superseding the MacMichael
treaties) until January 1948 and the Federation inaugurated oni
February.’36
From the moment negotiations began, conservative Malay
politics—the political movement centered solely on the issue of Malayan
Union—was in a “state of suspense,” waiting for results from London.137
Yet it was not so easy for Onn and the other leaders of UMNO to dampen
the anti-British feelings that had been stirred up by the political campaign.
According to Stockwell, “when Malay leaders softened their attitude in
order to negotiate with the British, they endangered their standing within
their own community, and the stability of the Malay united front grew
more precarious as the constitutional talks proceeded.”38 Malay
nationalist politics—fractured though it was in ideology—stepped in to fill
the vacuum. In August 1946, British intelligence noted that
Little has been heard from UMNO, which still claims the
allegiance of the majority of Malays. The leaders have
doubtless deemed it inexpedient to initiate any new policy
whilst negotiations between government and Malay
representatives are in progress. There is evidence, however,
that the lack of news of a definite progress and the
opportunity this gives to more extreme elements to gain a
hearing is already giving rise to serious misgivings... The
extremist elements most feared by UMNO are of course
represented in the Malay Nationalist Party. Efforts to enhance
136Por a fuller account of the negotiations, see Stockwetl, British Policy and Malay Politics,
89-94.
137P1J No.3 and No.4 (1946).
138Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics, 97.
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its prestige and extend its influence continue unabated by the
party amid some success.139
Despite indications that UMNO had no pressing agenda beyond the
dismantling of the Malayan Union, it was forced by the challenge of MNP
efforts to continue to gather the public and make political representations
before ft. Thus UMNO replaced mass demonstrations with the political
events discussed above—flag-raisings, speeches by Onn, and appearances by
the rulers which reinforced the solidarity of the Malay ruling class on the
stage of mass politics. for the next two years, UMNO-MNP rivalry was
played out through public meetings as well as in press debates. The waxing
and waning of the parties’ relative strengths was watched carefully by the
colonial power and judged by attendance figures and the “draw” of
different speakers. In October 1946, for example, it was noted that the MNP
anniversary celebration in Kuala Lumpur drew 500 participants, while that
in Singapore had only 200, and the meeting in Kedah “flopped” with only
15 in attendance.140 The following month, MN1’ mass meetings ranged in
size from 50 (in Pahang) to 1000 (in Penang and Taiping).141 Speeches at
MNP raffles during this time called for the federation then being
negotiated to include Singapore and to be centrally governed through
democratically elected councils. It was, even to government observers, a
message with “a certain realism and definite appeal to emergent Malay
nationalism.”142 As time when on, the MNP’s moderate tone toward the
Malay rulers, adopted for the sake of the united front against the Union,
was dropped and anti-ruler rhetoric increased. Anti-imperialist and pro
l39 203/6436.
1’PIJ No. 13 (1946).
141Plj No. 14 (1946).
1WO 206/6435.
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independence themes predominated, as speakers pointed toe example of
Indonesia and the universal principles embodied in the Atlantic
Charter.143
Competition between the two parties intensified in early 1947, when
the MNP had the published federation proposals to criticize. The
federation was condemned by their speakers on two different grounds. On
the one hand, it was portrayed as being no different from the prewar
constitutional arrangement, specifically in its privileging of ruling class,
state-based politics. On the other hand, “Malaya for the Malays,” a slogan
familiar from the anti-Union demonstrations, was now used against a
federation which included citizenship rights for the alien races,144
UMNO’s defense of the federation, as articulated by Onn, was that it
provided for each state to have its own constitution, chief minister, and
state secretary, as only Johor had had before the war.145 It was difficult
enough for Onn to sell this Anglo-Malay agreement to the UMNO general
assembly, where some delegates wanted to resume confrontation with the
British.146 It was an even harder sell on the tour circuit, for the federation
agreement had no nationalist appeal. It essentially offered well-qualified
Malays (i.e., the English-educated elite) more positions in government
administration; it said nothing to about self-government or independence.
To compensate for this shortcoming, UMNO speakers called attention to
other things: the specter of Chinese control which the federation
agreement was said to have averted; the need for greater educational
143S PIJ No. 6(1946) through No.4 (1947).
4PlJ No.3 and No.4(1947).
45PIJ No. 14 (1947).
146Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics, 100.
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opportunities which would prepare Malays for self-government; the
restoration of the Sultans to their rights courtesy of UMNO; and the need
to avoid violence in pursuit of independence.147
The MNP had the more compelling political rhetoric—
nationalism—but UMNO had been able to harness the rulers to a vision of
Malay security and gradual advance which appealed to those who did not
feel compelled to pursue independence with Indonesia or in alliance with
left-wing Chinese. Neither party was able, as a consequence, to gain a clear
advantage in membership or support. Throughout 1947, in fact, there was
considerable evidence of great volatility in interest in the two parties, as
reflected in widely shifting attendance at political meetings and intense
competition for followers. In one instance, during Ishak Haji
Mohammad’s tour of the northern states, he and a companion were
assaulted, while the local UMNO affiliate held an anti-MNP
demonstration of 2000 people.148
If the opposing parties had reached something of a draw in their
pursuit of followers using speeches, meetings, and rallies, UMNO was less
able to compete with another kind of political gathering. This was
revolutionary militarism as exemplified by armed and uniformed drilling.
During the prewar period, a Malay military tradition had not been re
articulated within colonial structures of authority as the monarchy had
been. The British had suppressed Malay military prowess in response to
aristocratic rebeffions against their authority which continued sporadically
into the 1890s. In the first decades of the twentieth century, other factors
147P1J No.3 and No.8(1947).
14PIJ No.3 (1947).
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made Malay military skills irrelevant to colonial rule: the localization of
each ruler’s influence to his own state and British-imposed pacification of
ruling class relations and relations with Thailand.149 further, British
Malaya fell within the larger plural society of the British empire, in which
Sikhs were designated as the military caste. The first Resident of Perak, for
example, had called for a force of sepoys to back up his own S;kh guards
shortly before his assassination by Malay chiefs in 1874.150 Later that state
had a ceremonial troop of Indian cavalry, the “1st Perak Sikhs,” ho
accbmpanied Sultan Idris when he traveled in his carriage.151 The
unfederated state of Johor did have a Malay force, under European officers,
which grew to a strength of 576 in 1915, but its function was mainly
ceremonial.152 Eventually Malays would be heavily employed in police
work; however, no links were forged, conscious or otherwise, to an earlier
martial tradition. According to Gullick, “in the early years of colonial rule
the police force was an alien institution, whose Malay personnel were
recruited from outside the State, often from Melaka.”153 This was no doubt
because, as noted by Wilkinson about Perak in the 1870s, “a corporal and
his police in a Malay village were so many rivals to the local headman,”154
The active military forces of twentieth-century British Malaya were
the Malay States Guides (1896-1919), a non-Malay body meant to quell
149Anderson refers to this “pacification” of external relations from, the perspective of the
Thai military from the mId-nineteenth century. “Studies of the Thai State: The State of
Thai Studies,” in The Study of Thailand, ed Eliezer B Ayal (Athens, Ohio Ohio
University Center for International Studies, 1978), 202-3.
150R.J. Wilkinson, A History of the Peninsular Malays (Singapore: Kelly and Walsh, 1923),
136.
151J M Guflick, Rulers and Residents Influence and Power in the Malay States 1870-1920
tSlngapore: Oxford University Press, 1992), 235.
52jbjd., 129, n. 105.
1531bid., 258, n. 34.
154WflkInn, Peninsular Malays, 129.
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disturbances such as arose in Kelantan in 1915,155 and a battalion of the
Burma Rifles, on loan from India. By the 1930s, Malay military prowess,
which had so impressed (and harassed) Europeans into the nineteenth
century, seemed completely lost. This, fact was a continuing point of
dissatisfaction for the ruling class, which grew tired of being considered
effete. In response to twenty years of Malay urging, the 1st Experimental
Company, Malay Regiment, consisting of twenty-five men, was established
in 1933.’ It was experimental in that it had to prove to naysayers that the
“individualistic Malay” could submit willingly to military discipline and
become an efficient soldier. This it had proved by 1935, when it became a
permanent force. Yet despite popularity (judging from the number of
applicants), loyalty (many of the recruits came from “leading Malay
families”),’57 and unquestioned success in achieving high military
standard.S, the Malay Regiment did not entirely succeed in recreating a
Malay martial tradition within the context of colonial rule. There was, to
be sure, a Malay component to the culture of the Regiment—dress
uniforms in the “national costume” and compulsory Friday mosque
attendance—but the substance of military training was entirely British. All
commands were delivered in English, due to “the inherent difficulty of
translating British military terms and phrases,” and “the squad was trained
and brought up on the lines of a British infantry unit down to the
traditional Army way of instruction—much profanity on the parade
ground and no ill-feeling afterwards.”158
155GulHck, RUlers and Residents, 130, n. 115.
156 Dol Ramh, History of the Malay Regrment 1933-1942 (Singapore n p, 1963), 6-19,
for the background to the establishment of the Malay Regiment
1571b1d., 2122.
1Jb1d., 27,30, 39.
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But the Regiment’s greatest limitations were in function and Size,
Although it received superlative praise from British military and civilian
observers throughout the 1930s, that praise was always for its ceremonial
functions—good drill, smartness of attire, performance on parade.159
Neither was the Regiment large enough to make a difference in the
defense of the country. Despite urging by the Malay press and numerous
applications from all over the peninsula, the Regiment had only reached
the size of one battalion by 1941 and was in the midst of expansion when
the Japanese invasion began. A postwar assessment commended the
“young and untried soldiers” for their efforts in the 1941-42 campaign,16°
but clearly the Malay Regiment, like the other Asian-manned regular and
volunteer forces, was underestimated and/or distrusted by the colonial
government until the situation had become hopeless.161 The Ma1ay
Regiment ended up helping British forces to withdraw, and for this several
Malay officers were executed by the Japanese.162
The failure by the British to take full advantage of Malay willingness
to fight for Sultan and empire thus left militarism available for
revolutionary symbolism, as was developed by the Japanese during the
1591b1d., 28, 33.
Major-General A.E. Percival’s foreword to The Malay Regiment (Kuala Lumpur: n.p.,
1947).
161 Virginia Thompson, Post-Mortem on Mataya (New York: Macmillan, 1943), 250-54. See
also James Ongkill, Nation-Building in Malaysia 1946-1974 (Singapore Oxford University
Press, 1985), 23-24, on British failure to mobilize Malay forces during the Japanese invasion.
162p.angj, Malay Regiment, 103-5; The Malay Regiment, 45. After the war, the Regiment’s
problems continued. There was an abortive attempt, in connection with the Malayan Union,
to open the ranks to non-Malays In late 1946, Majtrs complained that the Malay Regiment
didn’t have enough Malay officers (29 November 1946). As late as 1950, the Regiment was
still recruiting from Britain in sufficient numbers to prompt the publication of pamphlets for
the “newcomer to the Regiment [to] obtain.., an elementary knowledge of... the History,
Customs, Beliefs, Superstition and Religion of the Malay” Major N Stamforth, comp, The
Malay Regiment. Papers on Malay Subjects. (n.p., 1950).
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occupation and continued by radical nationalists afterward. During the
occupation, the large-scale mobilization of young Malay men created “a
new elite, a military elite, exposed to intense training and exhortation to
patriotic sacrifice.”163 The Heiho, a mostly Malay auxiliary force, and the
Giyu Gun, a Malay regular army under the command of KMM leader
Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob, were used frequently against the communist
guerrillas. RecruIts received military training in the use of anti-aircraft
guns and artillery. Both organizations were very popular among less well-
educated Malays; in its first five months, the Giyu Gun recruited 2000 men.
Malays lives were touched by other quasi.military organizations as well.
The “semi-military”164 Malay Police Officer’s Training School in Singapore
had, by early 1944, graduated over 1800 students and in late 1944 a women’s
auxiliary to the Heiho was established. Beyond the fact that thousands of
Malays were influenced directly by military institutions was the general
militarization of society, as reflected especially in the ubiquity of uniforms:
Everywhere could be seen uniforms, military caps and badges
of all shapes, colours, sizes and designs Government
servants, Kaisha clerks, Kumiai employees, factory or foundry
hands, Police trainees, trade-school students, Normal school
students, Youth Training Corps, and even departmental
coolies and lorry-drivers sported their distinctive caps and
badges.’65
Physical drill and the singing of patriotic and martial songs were also
common in these civilian and educational settings.’66
Militarism and its attendant attitudes of physical fitness, sacrifice,
and commitment to the motherland appealed to emergent nationalism,
163Ths discussion is based on Cheah, Red Star, 33-36.
164Chrn, Malaya Upside Down, 142
165P.KI., 143.
1661b1d., 136-37.
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and It is thus not surprising that it was the nationalist groups, not UMNO,
which replicated the spirit and organization which had been learned under
the Japanese.167 API fAngkatan Pemuda Insaf, Generation of Aware Youth;
apt means fire) was founded in February 1946 to take part in the MNP’s
celebration of six months of Indonesian independence. In the recalled
conversation of Boestamam fits leader) and Perak MNP leader Abdul
Rahman Rahim, we see the new organization, like an emergent butterfly,
shedding its Japanese cocoon:
“How can we get the young people together? And if we can
get them together, where’s the time for us to train them to
drill properly?”
“if that’s the situation it’s difficult for sure, but we can look for
youths who are already good at drilling. Those with skills of
this sort are not so scarce because they were trained during the
Japanese time.”
“But they were trained Japanese fashion, We don’t want to
use Japanese when we give orders during the parade.”
“The training’s the same, whether in Japanese or any other
language. The present Indonesian Independence Army, aren’t
most of them youths who had Japanese training? How come
they’re given orders in Indonesian?”
“Because Indonesians have translated the language of
command from Japanese into Indonesian. It only remains to
match them up. And that’s easy.”
“And we can do that, for sure. What’s more, commands in
Indonesian are widely known here. Why can’t we just use
those orders?”166
was true in the other ethnic communities as well. The San Mm Chu Yl Youth Corps
was a Kuomintang affiliate whose members in Penang and Singapore were organized in
regiments. Ex-Indian National Army cadres on the estates formed militia concerned with
social and religious reform. T.N. Harper, “The Politics of Disease and Disorder in Post-War
Malaya,” lournat of Southeast Asian Studies 21,1 (1990): 104, 108.
68Boestamam, Carving the Path, 35.
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API recruitment literature made clear that patriotism demanded
change: “API is open to courageous and confident young men desirous of
reforms and ready to make sacrifices in order to achieve those reforms.”169
Its rhetoric was openly hostile to both the ruling class and the British.
Ustaz Yunos, API’s secretary, condemned the Sultans and the Kathis (state
Islamic officials) for being “paid creatures of the British Government,” and
other API members were heard saying Apuskan Perentah Inggeris (abolish
English rule).’7° Its aims were: “(1) to unite all awakened youths under one
organization; (2) to strengthen the fighting front for the nation and the
motherland; (3) to give training in politics—both physical and spiritual—
to its youths in order that they may be able to lead whenever required; (4)
to rebuild Malaya in accordance with genuine democratic principles and
people’s sovereignty; (5) to obtain the right of representation in the
Government of Malaya.”17’ These aims, according to API, would be
pursued by force, if necessary; API’s “battle cry” was Merdeka dengan Darah
(Freedom through Blood) and its emblem was a black clenched fist on a red
background.’72
Within two months of its founding, API’s influence was spreading
quickly, and by the end of 1946, the colonial government attributed to it
over 2500 members, its strongest states being Perak, Melaka, and Pahang.
Boestamam c ai ed 10,000 members in March 1947. That figure was
probably high, but the government did admit that both• the MNP and API
169Pelita Malaya, 30 April 46 (BMA PR 3/6/Pt. IV); see also meeting announcement in
$emboyan Baharu, 8 May 1946.
70P1J No.3 and No.4(1947).
171Testament Potitik Api—Merdeka Dengan Darak, cited in Firdaus, Radical Malay
Pohttcs, 99
172Boestamam, Carving the Path, 45.
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were successfully infiltrating the police and Malay Regiment, and that API
gained 900 new members in May 1947 alone.173 In February there had been
well-attended parades in several cities to mark API’s one-year anniversary,
and British handling of the parade in Kuala Kangsar highlights what was
to the colonial regime the most unsettling aspect of API’s political
practice—uniformed drilling. from their first meeting in February 1946,
the youth group had worn rudimentary uniforms, a white shirt and
ftoüsers and a red and thite armband with the name API written on it.174
Thereafter they always appeared in uniform, for example, at MN? mass
meetings or when conducting military training in public.175 For the Kuala
Kangsar meeting, leaders put out the call for all API r embers in Perak to
flood “the feudal town” (seat of the sultanate) in uniform. The British,
fearing an outright ban on the event would simply be ignored, instead
threatened all owners of commercial buses and trucks with loss of license if
they provided transport to anyone in uniform on the day in question.
According to Boestamam, the obstacle was circumvented quite easily—API
members traveled the day before or marched in from nearby towns.176
It was in response to API’s popularity that UMNO-affiiated youth
movements were established. These did not reflect the conservative
politicians’ original attitude toward youth. At the Malay Congress and at
many anti-Union demonstrations, young children held signs imploring
parents to save their future.177 The message seemed to be that adults were
173?Jj No. 16(1946); No.3 and No.8 (1947).
174Boestamam, Caruing the Path, 36-37.
175P1J No. 13 and No. 15 (1946).
176floestamam, Cait’ing the Path, 93-94.
1According to Warta Negara, schoolchildren at an Alor Star demonstration held banners
reading, “Oh, fathers and mothers, preserve our rights until we grow up” (BMA PR 3/6/Pt.
II).
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responsible for shaping the future, and the only way youth should
manifest itself was as a helpless child. UMNO had to counter API’s
mobilization of youth, however, and it did so by emulation. The British
government noted with approval that UMNO had increased its efforts ‘by
adopting methods hitherto used by the opposition, i.e., the use of religious
institutions, religious anniversaries, flag flying, appeal to youth and the
wearing of uniforms,” but also observed that the opposition had stepped
up its own activities, resulting in little change in the proportional strength
of MNP and UMNO.178 At this point, when API was seen marching with
parang (the knives responsible for many Chinese deaths in 1945) and had
just embarked on a new round of propaganda, the colonial government
went on the offensive. In March 1947, Boestamam was arrested on sedition
charges in connectiOn with his Testament Politik API, and uniforms,
drilling, and the uncontrolled collection of money were banned. for a
short time, API drilling and recruiting slowed down, as Dr. Burhanuddin,
the less militant president of the MNP, advised API members to obey the
laws and avoid wearing uniforms, carrying weapons, and using the word
darak (blood). By April, however, soon after Boestamam’s conviction, API
training and recruiting had resumed, and new branches were opened in
Singapore and Trengganu.179
The government, in the meantime, was turning a blind eye to the
uniforms worn by UMNO-affiliated youth movements. (A typical uniform
closely resembled those worn by API—white shirts and trousers, black caps,
and UMNO badges.) In Perils, just after the banning, a youth group greeted
178PU, No.3 (1947).
179PU, No.3 thmugh No.6(1947).
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the ruler in uniform, drawing no comment from the intelligence officer
who recorded the event. A few months later, Hussein Onn told his group
in Johor to wear white trousers and shirts and black caps, saying that the
government would not regard this as a uniform In actual fact, the
government did not bother to enforce the ban on uniforms. Instead, with
the reintroduction of societies registration, API itself was banned, on July
17, 1947, the first postwar organization to be suppressed in this manner.
The API ban, the societies ordinance, and the sedition enactment were all
protested by a coalition of leftwing groups, and the increasingly repressive
atmosphere was challenged in progressive journals like Kenchana 181 A
month after the banning, the government estimated that API membership
was down to an enthusiastic core of three to four thousand, but that large
numbers of ex-i embers were interested in continuing the movement.182
Meanwhile, Hussein Onn resigned from his government job to
devote himself full-time to the Pemuda Pergerakan Malayu Semenanjung
(and later the amalgamated UIvINO Youth). He devised a military salute, a
prescribed greeting—Assalam Ataikum Hidup Melayu-Wa Ataikum
Satam Hidup Metayu—and a dress uniform consisting of formal Malay
ceremonial dress and the UMNO badge.’83 This appropriation of the
trappings of militaristic nationalism did not flourish, however, until the
rivalry of “the real thing” was quite stamped out.1M The declaration of
180P1J, No.4, No. 9(1947).
181p;j, No. 14 (1947); “Dimana Letaknya Democracy ‘Kedaulatan Rakyat,” Kenchana,
August1947.
182p, No. 13 and No, 14 (1947).
183P1J, No. 10(1947).
l84g Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics, 126-28, for Hussein’s difficulties in
the early years.
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Emergency in June 1948 finally accomplished that, and only then did
UMNO Youth grow in influence and membership.
This chapter has examined the ways in which UMIJO attempted to
maintain Its popularity after achieving ascendancy within the ruling class.
In an atmosphere of political nationalism, the rearticulation of tradition
alone could not secure aristocratic hegemony in Malay society. The linking
of nationalism with mass politics which began during the Japanese period
demanded innovation on the part of conservatives that was supplied
largely by the political acuity of Onn bin Jaafar and the selective
appropriation of nationalist political practice. Onn’s genius was to update a
classic figure—the Malay hero—for modern political practice and even
impress his enemies. UMNO more slowly learned the importance of
symbols and uniforms to represent the nation visually and conceptually to
its followers, but having adopted these practices, successfully attached their
meaning not only to the nation, but also to the party. Finally, in shaping
the emerging political arena to fit its agenda, UMNO benefited, probably
unknowingly, from an inherent bias toward traditionalism in the way
Malays produced and consumed newspaper editorials, the daily currency of
political nationalism. It was this variety of strategies, all occurring within
the context of increasing support from the cplonial government, that left
UMNO poised for triumph on the eve of Emergency. In the epilogue, I will
show kow, once UMNO had developed these nationalist credentials, it
engaged in a final round of traditionalism to secure its position as the only
legitimate voice of the Malays.
Chapter 7
EPILOGUE
“Hidup Mehzyu’ is a national slogan not political.”
Depoliticizing Nationalism
Despite its growing mastery over the new forms of political practice—
propaganda, popular leadership, symbolism, public gathering—UMNO
was unable to gain decisive victory over the nationalists in the political
arena. This was because political nationalism made certain demands that
UMNO was unable to appropriate, namely the restructuring of traditional
society along egalitarian lines and independence from British colonialism.
The first demand was implicit in the practice of politics in a democratic era,
the second an inevitability since the Japanese shattered the colonial world.
The Malay aristocrats who led the campaign against the Malayan Union by
uniting their state organizations into a national body learned the forms of
mass politics and the language of nationalism, but their interests still lay in
a traditionalist formulation of Malay culture and, for the time being, in the
protection of the colonial state. Salvation would come in disarming the
political practice of nationalism: dampening political debate and updating
1Letter from Hussein Onn, head of UMNO’s youth affiliate, to the Secretary General of
UMNO, distinguishing UMNO activism from revolutionary politics. Hidup Melayu (long
live the Malaya) was UMNO’s official slogan, adopted during the anff-Malayan Union
campaign. UMNOSG 126/1947.
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traditional ideas of loyalty, treason, and sovereignty. The result was a
dominant narrative of struggle which cast UMNO as hero and Malayan
Union as villain, a narrative which marginalized from mainstream Malay
nationalism progressive demands for social change and independence.
Early in the postwar period, during the universal celebration of the
Malays’ politicization, newspapers called for all Malays to voice their
political views and applauded the widening debate. Seruan Rakyat, at the
tune still favoring the MNP, expressed support for the re-establishment of
the conservative Malay Associations, saying the more voices the better.2 A
month later1 after it had broken with the MNP over its stance on the
Malayan Union, the paper still çditorialized in favor of a multiplicity of
political views
In a self-governing country, there are bound to be several
parties because the people are free to think for themselves. In
view of the coming changes, Malaya is going through the
same stage. The mushroom growth of unions and parties
should not cause concern, because they all aim at the
betterment of the people and the country3
Majtis as well called for debate as a political tool, issuing in January 1946 an
early call for a conference of organizations at which the problems of the
Malays and proposals for their future could be “freely discussed.”4 In
August of that year, Majtis proposed a new magazine to be called
“U.M.N.O.,” which would feature essays on politics written by the public.5
A final example is provided by Kenchana, in which pictures and text
2$mrnn Rakyat, November 3, 1945.
3Seruan Rakyat, 14 December 1945.
4Majlis, 5 Januacy 1946.
5Majlis, 6 August 1946.
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featured congresses of both conservative and progressive parties, a
celebration of politics regardless of views6
At the same time, however, another idea was growing which would
prove much stronger. This was the idea that unity was necessary for Malay
pohtcal progress While couched in modern political terminology, the
idea had historical resonance. It invoked a glorious past when the Malay
world was unified under the leadership of Melaka. The suggestion that the
unity of the Malays even at that time was deficient made contemporary
calls all the more urgent:
if the Malays had been united before the Portuguese came,
Melaka would not have come under Portuguese rule for Java
would certainly hive come to her assistance against the
outsiders. if united, the sale of Singapore and Pinang and the
treaties inviting British advice would never have happened.7
In the more recent past, it was argued, lack of unity was responsible for the
Malays falling behind, a variation on the pervasive critique of Malay
backwardness.8
The political benefits of this line of reasoning are fairly obvious—a
party successfully claiming to unify the Malays could gain enormous
advantage. But the unity argument was not used exclusively along
conservative-progressive battlelines. Early in the anti-Union campaign,
before political postures had hardened, all Malay newspapers called for
unity behind Dato Onn’s party, citing the need to coordinate the many
organizations’ activities, to assert the Malays as equals with the other
nations of the world, and to present a united front against the Malayan
6yrn,Jza,ja, No. 2/3, February 1948.
7Majlis, 7 March 1946.
8MajIfs, 18 February 1946.
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Union.9 Soon, however, the conservative papers Majtis and Warta Negara
began to emphasize the dangers of disunity in order to isolate the MNP’s
ambivalent stance on Union. Majtis especially engaged in a debate with the
papers of the MNP, accusing that party of undermining the unity of the
Malays by opposing UMNO.10 According to Yunus Hamidi, editor of
Majtis:
It’s good to have all kinds of Malay organizations, from labor
to independence movements, even to communist
movements, as long as they can all unite on the problems of
the nation.11
Before the MM’ withdrew from UMNO, its official organ, Petita
Malaya, countered that it was the conservative editorialists themselves
who were causing disunity and that there were only minor differences
between UMNO’s and the MNP’s position.12 They also tried to popularize
alternate visions of unity, such as the unity of labor or the unity of all races
against colonialism.13 But Majtis overwhelmed these efforts with a
constant barrage of editorials identifying UMNO with Malay unity and
victory over the Malayan Union. By newspapers and through Onn’s
speeches, flag-raisings, and use of the rulers, UMNO was presented as the
most viable, if not the only, national body of the Malays.14 This ideological
formulation was fairly believable in the first half of 1946, when UMNO’s
prestige was at its highest. Once mass mobilization had ended, however,
9Utusan Metayu, 26 November 1945; Suara Rakyat, January 16, 1946; Warta Negara,
January 28, 1946 (DMA PR 3/7/Vol. 1).
10MajIis, 8 March 1946 and 14 May 1946.
Quoted In Seruan Rakyat, 18 December 1945
12Petita Malaya, 14 May 1946
13peJj Malaya, 20 and 27 May 1946 (DMA PR 3/6/Pt. IV).
141n this period, UMNO’s main membership strength was in the states of Johor and Perak
Both UMNO and the MNP claimed about 100,000 members, in neither case were all the
membership fees paid up.
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unity became more elusive and was increasingly achieved by stifling
debate Within UMNO, the executive began to vet suggested topics of
discussion before general assemblies met In January 1947, an UMNO
leader commented about the upcoming general assembly vote on the draft
federation proposals:
H this is done without any debate, well and good. If at all there
is going to be any debate it should be in dose session for we
would not like our ill-wishers to know that there is even the
hint of division or disunity among ourselves UMNO
members.16
Prescriptions for unity were now used to silence opposition both within
and outside of UIvINO, and political debate, once celebrated as a sign of the
Malays’ vitality and progress, was now condemned as dangerously
divisive.
Disavowing political activity or identity became a signal to the
colonial power that a publication or organization was non-threatening. In
June 1946, the president of the Kesatuan Melayu, Alor Gajah, Melaka,
sought permission to publish Pemuda, a new magazine for youth with the
aim of defending society, the fatherland, and religion through social, not
political, activity. In contrast to the immediate postwar attitude celebrating
the birth of political activism, increasingly only nationalist publications
l55 item no.20 in UMNO SC 45/46, which is a list of proposals made by member
organizations from JuLy to September 1946. Beside each proposal is a notation in English,
such as “Debate,” “Unnecessary to debate,” and “This should be In the form of a question
There will be no debate on this.”
16Letter from Mohamed All Rouse, UMNO SG 1/47, cited in Aj, Stockwell, British Poticy
and Miday Politics During the Malnyan Union Experiment, 1945-46 (Kuala Lumpur:
Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Monograph No 8, 1979), 100 A Samad
Ahmad recalls this as a critical time Because enemies were attacking through newspapers
and growing in popularity, he says, a large part of the January 1947 meeting was held in
secret. $ejambak Kenangan: Sebuah Autobiographi (Kuala Lumpur: Pewan Bahasa dan
Pustab, 1981), 24044.
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professed to be political. Conservative papers applying for permission to
publish either claimed outright to be non-political or simply included a list
of proposed topics—”True story. Education and Religion. Advice on
economy and business. Good and sound thinking advice. General
News”—from which politics was pointedly absent.17 It was in this spirit of
disavowing politics that Hussein Onn protested a government order
banning political youth organizations from the schools, an order which
greatly harmed the already struggling UMNO youth groups. Correctly
assuming that the ban’s true target was “a certain Pemuda organisation
which has revolutionary and militant objects” (API), Hussein outlined
why the UMNO-affiiated groups should be allowed to operate:
These organizations, though political in the general sense,
have definite stated objects of their own. They indulge more,
if not exclusively, in sports, physical culture, music and
dramatic; social and cultural activities; education; thrift;
voluntary work of various kind, all of which bring benefits
not only to the community and Race but to the members as
well. They are not and have never been revolutionary or
militant and have not done anything which is detrimental to
the peace, security and welfare of the country.
Further in this vein, Hussein protested the education department’s
objection to Malay teachers teaching schoolchildren to say Hidup Melayu
(long live the Malays). According to Hussein, UMNO’s slogan was “a
national slogan not political.”18
Dampening political debate in favor of unity and cultural activities
had the effect of elevating “Malayness” to a supraepolitical position. Put
another way: nation trumped politics. Nativistic and seemingly non
17MU 621/46 Vol. II.
18Husseln Onn to Secretary General, UMNO, July 25, 1947. UMNO SG 126/47. (English
original.)
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ideological, any activity which was “political in the general sense,” but
which was strictly about culture or improvement of the race, was
compared favorably to a contentious politics which drew on “foreign”
ideologies like democracy or communism. The uncritical emphasis on
Malayness also allowed aristocrats to introduce into modern politics ideas
and practices they presented as intrinsically Malay, but which critics then
and now call “feudal”—namely, updated conceptions of deference, loyalty,
and treason which were used to further the creation of a nationalist
mainstream identical with UMNO policy.’9 In short, conservative
politicians sought to redefine postwar Malay politics along traditionalistic
lines, prompting this critique from Semboyan Baharu:
The masses have waited and waited for the arrival of the
zaman gemilang [brilliant era, often used in relation to
fifteenth century Melaka] in the Malay states, but the brilliant
era for which the sultans and Dato Onn’s Congress strive only
aims to return Malaya to a pemerintahan cara feudalism
[feudalistic government] fin which the people must pay
19These practices have persisted Into the post-independence era and have prompted a
number of sociological studies by academic critics of UMNO. See S. Husin All, “Patterns of
Rural Leadership in Malaya,” JMBRAS 41, 1 (1968); Syed Hussein Alatas, “feudalism in
Malaysian Society: A Study of Historical Continuity,” in Modernization and Social
Change: Studies in Modernization, Religion, Social Change and Development in South-East
Asia (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972); A. Kahar Bador, “Social Rank, Status-Honour
and Social Class Consciousness Amongst the Malays,” in Modernization in South-East Asia,
ed. Hans-Dieter Evers (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973); Chandra Muzaffar,
Profector? An Analysis of the Concept and Practice of Loyalty in Leader-ted Relationships
within Malay Society (Penang: Aliran, 1979), 63, where he writes that the Malayan Union
period saw “the emergence of new notions of unquestioning loyalty”; and Shaharuddin
Maanaf, Malay Ideas on Development (Singapore, Kuata Lumpur: Times Books
International, 1988). Shaharuddin skips over Onn’s UMNO and its formative influences on
Malay politics, attributing what he calls aristocratic or traditionalistic nationalism to
Tunku Abdul Rahman (see especially pp. 116-20). Although Onn did come into conflict with
the rulers in a way that the Tunku (from the royal house of Kedah) avoided, the present
work demonstrates that ruling class solidarity defined UMNO from the start, When Onn
was accused of disloyalty in his final confrontation with the rulers, it was not an anomalous
moment. His own weapon was merely being turned against him.
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homage and say dautat tuanku syah atam [hail, my lord, king
on earthfl.2°
Commoner members of UMNO, like the Malay schoolteachers and
well-off peasants who constituted the local membership, had difficulty
unlearning the habit of deference to aristocratic political leaders. One brave
soul wrote to UMNO protesting aristocratic privilege and control in the
Persatuan Melayu Perak, questioning the seemingly sudden nationalism of
the ruling classes, and demanding that the Malay College Kuala Kangsar be
opened to commoners—”ff it’s not opened in this manner, then just
change the name to Aristocric [sic] Malay College.” Even such a crusader
within UMNO opened his handwritten letter with Than (sir), which was
then crossed out and replaced with the more egalitarian Saudara
(brother).2’ Others within the conservative political movement made no
such effort. The Majlis correspondent in Ipoh, asking the Secretary General
of UMNO (Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang) to pass along news of the
organization for publication, took a tone strikingly at odds with the
egalitarian expectations politics had engendered. He used the formal
expressions with which commoners traditionally addressed nobility,
referring to himself throughout his letter as hamba dato (your slave).22 It
was probably not, difficult to graft deference to traditional authority onto
the new political culture; the prohibition on political activity had been
lifted such a short time. When asked for their views on the federation
20Semboyan Baharu, 8 May 1946.
21Md. Yusuf bin Ayub to Secretary General, UMNO, October 15, 1946. UMNO SC 12/46. The
letter was In Malay with the exception of several English references to the aristocracy and
democracy Otherwise he referred to the ruling class as bangsawan (aristocracy) and raja
raja dan dato-dato (rajas and datos). An unsigned minute in the file registered this reaction:
“There Is a lot of truth In what he says but the way he says It Is magnthcently rude”
Abdul Rahman Alyobi to Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang, July 16, 1946 UMNO SC 12/46
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agreement, some Malays “preferred not to make any comment, as they
thought it was a matter for the UMNO to comment.”23 Onn encouraged
such reliance, warning that politics could be interesting, but dangerous,
and that a slight mistake could have grave consequences.24
To further the impression of Malay unity and to encourage
obedience to its leadership, UMNO began to solicit expressions of loyalty
from organizations throughout the country, echoing the colonial practice
of the loyal toast and telegram. Declarations like this one from the writers
at Warta Negara were published in friendly newspapers:
Resolution—That a meeting of the Warta Negara writers,
which took place on August 31, 1946 in Pulau Pinang, came to
the unanimous decision to support the policy of the United
Malays National Organization and to pledge loyalty Iberikrar
taat stiuJ to its leader, the honorable Dato Cnn, to be confident
in his leadership, and to be prepared to cooperate with the
United Malays National Organization.25
Those who opposed UMNO policy were attacked by Onn and Majtis for
being disloyal, and even their membership in the community was
questioned. We have seen the epithet traitor used against the rulers for
signing the MacMichael treaties; it would also be used against those who
supported the Malayan Union and those who later opposed the Anglo-
Malay accommodation resulting in the Federation of Malaya. Cnn told a
meeting of the Malay Congress in May 1946 to stand firm and united
against the Malayan Union. As for those who disagreed: “Unfortunately,
there are people here who look like Malays, but in their hearts they are not
23News clipping contained in UMNO SG 125/47.
24pj No. 14 (1947).
25lbrahlm Mahmood, editor, Warta Negara, to Dato Pangtima Bukit Gantang, Secretary
Genera!, UMNO, September 5, 1946. UMNO SC 72/46.
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Malays.”26 In a speech in Melaka that same month, he further defined
opponents right out of the community, saying that there were no traitors
among the 25 million Malays27 This method of enforcing ideological
conformity was picked up with alacrity by pro-UMNO newspapers, which
called for ostracizing and disowning those not in agreement with UMNO.
On many occasions Malays were warned not to participate in the Malayan
Union in any way or they would “not be acknowledged as Malay.”28 Thus,
loyalty to UMNO became conflated with loyalty to the nation. In rituals
across the peninsula, UMNO youth raised the national-turned-party flag
and swore allegiance to Islam, the Sultan, and UMNO.29 This formulation
subsumed the nation, not even mentioned, to a triumvirate over which
UMNO claimed control. In Onn’s words, “UMNO itulah Melayu—Melayu
itulah UMNO.” (UMNO is the Malays—the Malays are UMNOJ3°
In 1947, as the federation proposals began to draw criticism from the
MNP and the other ethnic communities, UMNO’s opponents were
branded tools of the foreigners or, worse, accused of working for the
foreigners’ benefit to the detriment of the Malays,31 Onn told an audience
in early 1947 that the MNP belonged to a prewar association (referring to
the KMM) which had sold the Malays to the Japanese and that the party
26?elita Malaya, 14 May 1946.
27Warta Negara, 6 May 1946 fBMA PR 3/6/Pt. IV).
28Sea examples In Maflis, 2 Apr11, 22 April, 1 June, and 7 August 1946.
29P1J No. 15(1947).
30A Samad Abmad, Sejambak Kenangan, 247
311n January, the following Malay groups rejected the proposals as being agamst the
Atlantic Charter, democracy, and the interests of the Malay masses Lembaga Persatuan
Melayu Johor, Joint Association of Malay National Welfare Associations, MNP, API,
General Labour Union (Malay Section), Electric Workers Union, Drivers Union of Kots
Bharu. Straits Times, 29 January 1947. In Majtis, this rhetoric began a year earlier: “there
are certain elements among us who are hying to undermine unity in the interest of other
communities.” 8 March 1946.
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therefore could not be trusted. He also claimed that the MN? could not
represent the Malays because it was dependent on the other ethnic
communities.32 This was a reference to the All-Malaya Council of Joint
Action and its Malay associate, PUERA (Pusat Tenaga Rakyat).33 These
two coalitions worked uneasily together to oppose first the exclusion of all
but UMNO and the rulers from the negotiating table, and second the
federation agreements. Because the federation itself offered little positive
to nationalist aspirations, editorialists for UMNO were forced to rely on
negative commentary about the federation’s opponents. Developing a
political equation in which Malay interests would always, and by
definition, be in opposition to those of the other communities, they found
the MN? guilty by association. Malays were told that the MIJP opposed
negotiations between UMNO, the rulers, and the British and that this
dubious stance was shared by the other ethnic groups. They were warned
against propaganda urging them to back the MN?, and were told in the
same editorial that some Malays had been influenced by propaganda of the
foreigners.34 It was often stressed by conservative editorials and speeches
that attacks on UMNO made the Malays weak, disunified, and easier for
foreigners to take advantage of.35
But the federation agreement, which granted limited citizenship
rights to domiciled Chinese and Indians and said nothing about elections
32piJ No. 1 and No.5 (1947). Earlier, the MNP condemned the “whispering campaign”
against it “to the effect that it is not an independent political organisation” and pointed out
that It, unlike UMNO, had “never stooped to curry favor with imperialism.” Democrat, 7
July 1946.
33UMN0 leaders denounced the AMCJA as a “fake” at a meeting attended by 7000 in Johor.
Straits Times, 6 February 1947.
34Maflis, 6 and 12 December 1946.
35Majtis, 18 December 1946.
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or a timetable for independence, was similar enough to the Malayan
Union to be very vulnerable. The MNP had only to cry Merdekal
(freedom) to highlight UMNO’s greatest weakness and to increase its own
support.36 The contradiction inherent in a nationalist movement which
did not seek independence threatened to expose the true relationship
between the British and UMNO, which, according the MNP, “has merely
been dissatisfied with the British rulers for withdrawing from the Malay
upper classes the privileges which they had enjoyed prior to the war.”37
MNP rhetoric and progressive journals hammered away at this point,
saying that the demand for independence was what distinguished the
“left” from UMN0138 and that UMNO “still dling[s] to the belief that
British ‘protection’ is good for the Malay people”:
I would like my fellow-countrymen to appreciate this lesson
to the full—the lesson that imperialism is anything but
benevolent; that to expect sincere protection from the
imperialists—whether Dutch, French, British or American—
is equivalent to hoping for mercy from a cobra poised to
strike, and that British imperialism, in particular, is going all
out to safeguard its interests and possessions in this part of the
world at all costs.39
UMNO leaders had also to keep their own membership’s aspirations
closely in check. It was not unheard of for letters to UMNO from the public
to close with Hidup Melayu-Merdeka, combining UMNO’s own “long live
the Malays” with the MNP’s more militant slogan, or for an UMNO youth
36lnterview with A. Samad Ismail.
37Democrat, 7 July 1946.
38Kenchana, No. 3, March 1947 (article entitled “Melayu Berjuang” tMalays struggle]).
Other articles with the same theme included “Kemerdekaan Tidak Diterima tetapi
Dituntut” (Independence Is not received, but demanded), No.4, April 1947, and “Terus
Beajuang Untok Kemerdekaan” (Struggle on for Independence), No.5, May 1947.
39Ahmad Boestamam, quoted In Democrat, 7 July 1946.
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group to be seen giving the Merdeka salute.40 For this reason, UMNO
speakers responded to calls for independence with particular venom,
waging what Boestamam called a war of words (perang mutut).41
Onn’s most prominent argument against immediate
independence42 was that the Malays were not ready to compete against the
Chinese—politically or economically—without British protection. Here
the articulate, well-educated aristocrat mocked his fellow Malays:
Membuat sebatang jarum pun tak tahu, hendak merdeka pula
konon.
[Can’t even produce a single needle, they say they want
independence.]43
He also argued, somewhat ingenuously, that there were no Malays fit to be
ministers, representatives, or ambassadors.44 And more and more often,
Onn evoked the specter of Chinese political control, reminding his
audience of the ethnic violence of 1945 and arguing that if the British left,
the Malays would all be “trapped by communism.”45
But the most important way in which political conservatism
deflected calls for independence was to counter contemporary anti-
colonialism with the older idea of sovereignty. The colonial protectorate,
40UM.NO SG 10/46; PIJ No. 9 (1947). To give the Merdeka salute one raised the left fist
while shouting Merdeka. PIJ No. 10(1947).
4lMijid Boestamam, Datuk Onn Yang Saya Kenat (Kuala Lumpur: Adabi, 1979), 24-25.
421t should be noted that Onn set up something of a strawman. The MNP demanded
immediate steps toward independence, including unification of the states, civil liberties,
the promotion of democracy, and so forth. See Pirdaus Haji Abdullah, Radical Malay
Politics: its Origins and Early Development (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1985),
79, for the MNP’s eight-point manifesto. Even API, while expanding the political discourse
to include militant nationalism, never physically attacked a European or a colonial
institution.
43Boestamam, Datuk Onn, 24.
MAccount of the January 1947 UMNO general assembly In CO 537/2145. A slightly different
account is given in A. Abdul Samad, Sejambak Kenangan, 240-44.
45A. Abdul Samad, Sejambak Kenangan, 232-33; PU No. 22 (1947).
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by retaining the nominal sovereignty of the Malay rulers, had left the
Malay conception of sovereignty intact. We have seen how the articulation
of that idea in colonial society located Malay sovereignty with the greater
power of the British empire. The Malayan Union crisis challenged both
British and Malay conceptions of sovereignty—the rulers would lose their
Western-defined legal jurisdiction in the Malay states as well as their role
as guarantor of the Malay nature of those states. We have also seen how
conservative anti-Malayan Union rhetoric focused on the terms of the
original treaties between the British and the rulers, emphasizing the
sovereignty of the Malay states and highlighting the arrogance and
presumption the British showed in their postwar plans for Malaya. In
countering anti-Federation sentiment, UMNO continued to insist upon
the sovereignty of the Malay states and their rulers. This strategy gave
voice to the feeling of most rural Malays that they lived in a Malay State.
To the Malays, rulers were not symbols of sovereignty, as the British had
thought, but the meaning of sovereignty. Once restored, they guaranteed
that the Malay states were again sovereign Most important to UMNO
contest with the MNP, the notion of sovereignty within colonial rule
thwarted a dear understanding of British imperialism by perpetuating the
fiction of a protectorate.
The colonial sovereignty myth was articulated in language which
was used to confuse calls for independence. Consider the words of Dato
Onn’s secretary and biographer on the effects of the Malayan Union:
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The Malay States, known as free and sovereign tmerdeka dan
berdautatI territories under British protection, had become
colonies...
and the use of “independent” in this editorial:
The Malay peninsula is not “British,” There is no doubt
whatsoever that the toriginall treaties between each Malay
State and Great Britain were treaties between two
independent states (negeri yang merdaheka] and conducted
according to international law. The Colonial Office has no
right to make a “plan” for the Malay peninsula.47
Defeat of the Malayan Union—and restoration of sovereignty—thus made
further demands for independence at once unnecessary and awkward.
Unnecessary, because if the Malay states were sovereign, in both the
Western and Malay sense, all that was needed was to gain control of the
administration of the country, to achieve self-government (berkerajaan
sendiri). Calls for independence were awkward because they pointed to the
need for socio-political change—the nation which would achieve
independence would be different from the states which were already
sovereign.
Instead of independence, the traditional elite needed time to
consolidate its position in the late colonial state so that, eventually, it could
simpiy replace the British at the helm. The idea of gradually attaining self-
government was one that Onn spoke of often.48 It was a safe topic that
returned political discourse to the familiar terrain of Malay backwardness
and the need for more education and administrative positions—the
themes of good government the aristocracy had made its own. The idea
46Anwar Abdullah, Data Onn: Riwayat Hidup (Petaling Jaya: Pustaka Nusantara, 1971),
139.
47$eruan Rakyat, 31 January 1945.
PlJ No.3(1947).
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that the Malay states were sovereign again, thanks to UMNO, also helped
Onn to construct a narrative of nationalist struggle—and victory—torn
displace the MNP’s call to struggle for independence. In his mass meetings
around the country, where he often appeared with a ruler and raised the
UMNO flag, Onn began to tell a story. He described the birth of UMNO, the
boycott of the Malayan Union, how Malays all over the country wore
mourning for the loss of their birthright. He then told of the visit of
Gammans and Rees-Williams, the size of Malay demonstrations, and the
resulting capitulation by the British. He emphasized UMNO’s role in the
negotiations and how UMNO was responsible for restoring the rulers to
their rights.49
This narrative presented aristocrats as nationalists. It positioned
UMNO as the hero who protected the Malay bangsa against British
treachery and Chinese domination. It ignored the Malay nationalists who
provided the political language and practices that enabled UMNO to
achieve its ends. Neither did it acknowledge that the British granted
concessions to UMNO largely out of fear of fueling that nationalist
movement. And it featured the anti-Malayan Union campaign as the
center of the anti-colonial struggle—a struggle and victory which left
national independence more than a decade away. By positing the struggle
as over and the battle as won, it assured the Malays that they could
unproblematically assume nationhood. The “natural” ascension of Malays
to nationhood reinforced the “natural” ascendancy of certain Malaya
within the nation. finally, centering this narrative of Malay nationalism
49P1j No.8 and No.15(1947).
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on the Malayan Union struggle defeated enemies within the Malay
community who questioned UMNO’s position in the federation.
This narrative succeeded in winning a dominant place in Malay
popular and scholarly historiography. Despite the many thousands who
supported the MNIP and other independence-oriented political groups in
the late 1940s, and despite a robust print culture which vigorously criticized
the slide back into “feudalism,” the victory of the aristocrats’ narrative has
most commonly been attributed to the conservatism of the Malay public.
But on the contrary, the Malay political public that debuted in 1945 was
much less inherently conservative than is usually assumed, Indeed, one of
the first things it was asked to do was to threaten to disown the rulers, a
feat it performed convincingly. Malay public opinion was, in fact,
constructed, shaped, and fought over using political tools learned first by
nationalists during the Japanese occupation.
The aristocrats, more precisely Onn bin Jaafar, succeeded by doing
three things. The first was to adjust quickly to the changing times, to be
right behind the nationalists in learning mass politics, and to appropriate
from them the practice of political nationalism. In this way the aristocrats
constructed a nationalist facade for what was, in Cnn’s time, a reactionary
project. Their second success was in reinventing Malay traditions—as they
knew them from the colonial period—for the era of mass politics. The
rehabilitation of the rulers revived aristocratic legitimacy and the
manipulation of ideas like loyalty and treason countered egalitarian
impulses inherent to political democracy. Finally, even at the height of the
anti-Union campaign, the Malay ruling class cultivated British complicity.
Colonial intelligence knew as early as february 1946 that Onn was firmly
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against independence for the peninsula.50 Through social meetings (like
tea parties and dinners) during the period of political opposition, Anglo-
Malay relationships were repaired so that once negotiations began, the
relationship between aristocrats and colonial officials was quite
operational, if occasionally prickly. The British government backed UMNO
from mid-1946 and first used its revived legislative apparatus for
repression against enemies of that conservative party. It was not merely
this last element, however, but the combination of all three which
guaranteed that a conservative political agenda would dominate the Malay
political mainstream throughout the late colonial period and into
independence. This was Onn’s legacy to Malays—the ideological hegemony
of the United Malays National Organization.
Traditionalism, Nationalism, and the State in Late and Post-Colonial
Malaya
Despite British Malaya’s growing uniformity of laws and procedures,
outside observers before the war had been struck by how little land and
how few people were divided into so many administrative structures.51
Centralization of the state, such as occurred in Thailand in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was resisted by the indirectly-
ruled Malay monarchies and aristocracies in the 1920s and 1930s in the
name of local identity and with the backing of “pro-Malay” traditionalists
in the British administration. The same fight was repeated, for the same
50W0 203/5660.
51Roughly fifty thousand square miles Inhabited by Just over five million people were
governed by ten administrations within the FMS and UMS alone See Virginia Thompson,
Post-Mortem on Malaya (New York: Macmillan, 1943), 1.
314
interests, over the Malayan Union, which would additionally have
deposed traditional authority. After successfully restoring its position
through mass mobilization, however, the aristocracy, as much as the
radical nationalists, realized that the mini-states of the peninsula would
not be compatible with a strong Malay position in the future. Unwilling to
take an anti-colonial position, UMNO therefore compromised by accepting
the Federation of Malaya, which preserved the state-based power of the
party’s leadership, while granting citizenship to a portion of the immigrant
communities. In preserving aristocratic privilege in this way, UMNO
committed itself to a future nation which conformed to the prewar
colonial state.
UMNO’s loyalty to the colonial state, which would become a
container for different nationalisms, precluded a strictly Malay nation-
state, It had, therefore, to reject all other visions of the nation, some of
which were the product of nationalist efforts to unseat traditional
authority. The MNP actually proposed two alternatives. In the first, the
idea of Melayu Raya (Greater Malaya), nationalists looked for a future
nation-state to erase the colonial past. Union with Indonesia would restore
the precolonial Malay world as well as establish Malay demographic
dominance over the immigrant Chinese.52 After the colonial restoration
in Malaya and the separate fate of Indonesia was clear, the MNP was part of
the AMCJA-PUThRA coalition which produced the People’s
Constitutional Proposals for Malaya. In what was essentially an attempt to
create a nation to fit the existing state, these proposals included a blueprint
52S Rustam Sani, “Melayu Raya as a Malay ‘Nation of Intent,” in The Nascent
Malaysian Society: Developments, Trends and Problems, ed. H.M. Dahian (Kuala Lumpur:
Jabatan Antropologi dan Sociologi, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1976).
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for a new conception of bangsa Metayu, enshrinlng the hegemony of Malay
language and culture, while respecting religious differences.
Both MNP visions of a nation-state proved vulnerable to UMNO’s
“foreigner-baiting.” They were, of course, attacked by UMNO because they
would have dislodged the Malay elite from its privileged position. But
their defeat also highlighted the victory of a traditionalistic Malay polity,
the territorially based and politically distinct Malay states that had emerged
under colonial rule. The consequences of this victory can be seen in
UMNO’s stance toward three groups on the cultural and geographical
margins of the emerging nation: Eurasians, orang ash (aborigines), and the
Malays of southern Thailand. The leftwing API had signaled its
willingness to accept Eurasians, the descendants of Dutch and Portuguese
colonists, as Malay. But UMNO clung to a more rigid conception. When
the Eurasian Associations applied to the Malay rulers to become non-
Muslim subjects, UMNO rejected the application, thus confirming the
narrow (i.e. Malay only) utility the reinvented rulers would have for the
Malaysian future.53 On the other hand, UMNO was eager to incorporate
the orang ash into the Malay fold, an effort it pursued through education
in combination with Islamization.54 In this UMNO can be seen to have
inherited the colonial state’s posture toward the orang ash, who were
viewed by both as uncivilized and in need of protection. finally, the
Malays of southern Thailand generated a flurry of publicity in the
immediate postwar period. They had long been under the control of the
Thais, whose centralizing and Thai-icizing activities were becoming more
UMNO GA 28/47; PIJ No.20 and 21 (1947).
UMNO SC 74/46. Onn favored appointing a Malay officer to be responsible for the
welfare of the orang ash. PIJ No. 3(1947).
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and more burdensome. Despite the appeal in restoring the “original”
boundaries of the Malay world and an abundance of sympathy within
UMNO for the plight of these Malays, the party leadership kept the issue
firmly off the agenda.55 In these three cases, as well as in the larger
challenge of alternative visions of a Malay nation-state, UMNO faithfully
conformed to the ethnic, cultural, and geographical map of British Malaya.
UMNO had to appeal to popular nationalism as its main source of
political legitimacy after World War II, but its adherence to the forms and
priorities of the colonial state would produce an uncomfortable distance
(rather than congruence) between nation and state. UMNO’s nationalism
was reactive, the appropriation of a timely discourse in an effort to
preserve ruling class hegemony. It may most accurately be termed “official
nationalism,” following Anderson’s description: “an anticipatory strategy
adopted by dominant groups who are threatened with marginalization or
exclusion from an emerging nationally-imagined community.”56 In its use
of traditional elements of Malay culture, UMNO’s was much like the
official nationalism of Thai elites who utilized monarchy and religion to
consolidate their position in society. Official nationalism in Malaya
succeeded not because of its own strength or an ability to mobilize popular
forces, which it sent home after the Malayan Union demonstrations. (In
fact, most aristocrats “went home” themselves, to jobs in the state
administrations.) The colonial state’s continuous narrowing of the range of
acceptable political activity, combined with UMNO’s appropriation and
55BMA ADM 9/16; Majtis, 7, 12, and 25 Februaiy 1946; ?IJ Supplement to No. 16—Political
Developments in Siam and their Probable Effect on Malaya (1947).
56nJict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationatism, rev. ed. (London and New York: Verso, 1991), 101.
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depoliffdzation of those nationalist symbols and actIyjties, left little choice
but official nationalism by mid-1946.
In 1957, UMNO attained independence within an Alliance with the
“mainstream” parties of other ethnic groups But did UMNO embrace, let
alone achieve, the goals of popular Malay nationalism? Judging by three
Important criteria, it clearly did not. First, the primacy of Malay language
and culture was central to the emergent nationalism of the prewar period.
After independence, the Malay language was added to English for (some)
official purposes, but did not supplant it. This policy protected the
monopoly of the English-educated and maintained the foreignness of the
state to those literate only in Malay. A second central demand was for
improvement in Malay economic stattis. However, UMNO’s dass alliance
with the Malayan Chinese Association protected existing Chinese
economic activities. At the same time, continuing British ownership of
important sectors of the economy was preferred to increased Chinese
dominance. As a result, economic nationalism against foreign ownership
of the economy was moderate in comparison with other Southeast Asian
states.57
Finally, mobilization against the Malayan Union had revealed deep
Malay discomfort with the construction of a nation which ignored their
special connection with Tanab Melayu. The Malayan Union had denied
that contiguity of people and territory. If anyone who called the peninsula
“home” could be called a Malayan, there would be no exclusivity, resulting
in an unacceptably porous nation. The Malayan Union, in other words,
57Frank Golay, “Malaya,” in Underdeoelopment and Economic Nationalism in Southeast
Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969).
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had put naturalization before definition. In opposing these blows to an
emerging nationality, Malay opposition to the Union rejected the Union’s
characterization of the territory: Malaya (as in Federation of Malaya for
Persekutuan Tanah Metayu) was an acceptable translation of Melayu, but
the hated Malayan (Who are these so-called Malayans? asked Tunku
Abdul Rahman) was not. It also insisted that Tanah Metayu belonged to
the Malays, who alone should be entitled to the modern rights of national
citizenship. Although that Union was defeated under UMNO’s leadership,
the victory was pyrrhic. Within five years, over half of Malaya’s Chinese
and Indian residents were granted citizenship. UMNO’s anti-Malayan
Union campaign was successful for the bureaucratic elite, who would
enjoy a privileged position within a multi-ethnic federation. But it was
unsuccessful for the kind of nationalism it purported to represent—Malaya
for the Malays.
As the ruling party, UMNO made few alterations to the inherited
state, so the essential relationship of Malay nationalism to that state
stagnated as well and continued to be articulated in terms of special
privilege and protection. Aristocratic hijacking of the nationalist
movement had prevented the logical next step in the development of
popular Malay nationalism: a restructuring of society in which all citizens
had equal access to the benefits of nationhood. The continued hegemony of
the traditional leadership perpetuated the following types of ideas: that few
Malays were qualified for leadership positions; that Malays were in danger
of being overrun by foreigners in their own land, like the “Red Indians” of
America; and that what Malays continued to need, above all, was
protection. The popular Malay nationalism which survived independence
319
was a colonial form, encouraged to look to archaisms like the rulers for
validation and satisfaction.
UMNO would remain unresponsive to the nationalism of the mass
of Malays until captured by a new generation in the 1970s. Its relationship
with the rulers also continued to reflect the transformation wrought by
Dato Onn at the Station Hotel in 1946. Because the aristocracy had used the
legitimizing power of the rulers to deflect radical criticism against itself, it
was unable to move as decisively against royal power as it may have
wished. And because the status and power of the rulers were the very
things at stake in the Malayan Union crisis, the rulers remained center
stage during negotiations to determine the Malayan Union’s successor
state. The rulers came out of the crisis with veto power over constitutional
change and the green light to further elaborate their traditional positions.
After Onn, neither power was seriously challenged until Mahathir bin
Mohamad became Prime Minister. The first non-aristocratic leader of
UMNO and the country, Mahathir has moved away from traditionalism as
a mechanism of power, even as his modernization of Malay life remained
in constant dialogue with it and even though he retained inherited
features of it, such as autocratic control over the party. In 1983 and again in
1992-93, Mahathir moved to cut back the rulers’ political powers and legal
privileges. During both confrontations, Mahathir appealed to the popular
nationalism Cnn had repressed in 1946. Temporarily lifting the legal ban
on criticizing the rulers, Mahathir allowed Malaysian newspapers to
unleash a barrage of outraged commentary on the personal and financial
corruption of Malay royalty. Mahathir also showed how well he
understood the dynamic of the 1946 aristocrat-ruler conflict. During the
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constitutional crisis of 1983, he staged a mass rally at Batu Pahat, Johor, the
site of the second Congress meeting at which UMNO was founded,
reminding citizens and rulers alike of the inversion of ruler and rakyat
which began the modern political era.
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GLOSSARY
batai ceremonial hail
bangsa race or nation
darah blood
derhaka treason, disloyalty
hikayat court-generated narrative
is tuna ruler’s residence
jawi modified Arabic script for Malay
kampung village
kebangsaan national
kerah corvée
kerajaan traditional Malay polity, lit, condition of having a ruler
ketua kampung village head
kris dagger
kuasa authority given to someone by the ruler
Metayu jati true Malay
merdeka free, independent
muafakat consultation, consensus
m u kim sub-district
negeri state
parang knife
penghulu subdistrict chief
rakyat common people, subject class
rakyat jetata common people, the masses
rumi romanized Malay
Tanak Metayu the Malay states, lit. Malay land
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